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forms. To help better understand the nature of the post-communist transformation in 
Russia, I address the questions of organizational adaptation and change in business 
practices resulting from the changing role of the state in the economy and society, 
focusing specifically on the problem of contract enforcement among small firms. The 
main source of data was the empirical research that I conducted in St.Petersburg, Russia, 
where I interviewed owners and/or managers of forty-five firms in 2001 and 2002. 
When firms perceive state institutions as unable to guarantee the enforcement of 
contracts and property rights, they rely on alternative (non-state) ways of enforcing their 
agreements. My research shows that these strategies can be either based on a given firm’s 
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state enforcement strategies are rooted in preexisting institutions and cultural practices, 
and develop in response to specific kinds of state failure to provide contract enforcement.  
My research findings demonstrate a proliferation of non-state strategies of 
contract enforcement and dispute resolution, as well as the significance that state contract 
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1INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most profound changes to occur in Europe or Asia in the past century was 
the fall of communism and the subsequent transition to capitalism of the former Soviet 
countries.  Transformation of this magnitude raises a host of compelling questions for the 
social sciences, most especially about the character of capitalistic organization and 
development.  
To understand the Russian way of transformation, I address the questions of 
organizational adaptation and change in business practices resulting from the changing 
role of the state in the economy and society. I focus on the web of small individual 
enterprises, and in particular on relationships between Russian small firms and their 
trading partners, and the Russian state, because these micro-level relationships formed in 
everyday transactions constitute the essence of nascent market relations, and thus shape 
the future of Russian capitalism.  
The question of the role of the state institutions and, in particular, state contract 
enforcement institutions, in the processes of post-communist transformation drives this 
study. In developed western countries a legal system and public authority guarantee 
protection of property rights and contracts, and are largely taken for granted. In the 
planned socialist economy, however, the problem of enforcement of contracts and 
protection of property rights did not exist at all: all the property of firms was state-owned, 
the contracts were assigned by command-administrative means, and dispute resolution 
was governed by the needs of the Plan. In the beginning of the 1990s, as the Russian 
government launched free market reforms, it relinquished a significant portion of its 
2control over economy by allowing private ownership of firms. However, the state 
enforcement institutions in post-perestroika Russia are not as reliable and trusted as in 
developed market economies; we can observe much uncertainty and variation with 
regards to state provision of basic protections (Frye 2000, 2001; Greif and Kandel 1995). 
As a result, during the past decade private firms have been attempting to conduct 
capitalist exchange in an environment where it is not clear whether their contracts will be 
fulfilled by partners and protected by the state.  
Faced with this challenge, Russian firms have little choice but to develop new, non-
state strategies to enforce their business agreements as well as safeguard their private 
property. These strategies – their origins, operation and impact on the newly emerging 
market economy in Russia - are the focus of this dissertation. In particular, I am 
addressing the following four questions:  
1. Non-state forms of contract enforcement exist in all economies, but their 
reasons and significance vary. What factors caused small private firms in Russia 
to realize the need to develop non-state ways of enforcing their business 
agreements, and to stay away from the ones suggested by the state? 
2. What particular institutional forms do these non-state contract enforcement 
strategies take, and where do these forms come from?  
3. To what degree do the answers to the questions 1 and 2 shed light on the effects 
that non-state contract enforcement strategies have on inter-firm relationships, 
state/firm relationships, and the development of market institutions? 
4. What determines the choices of individual firms with regard to strategic 
solutions of their enforcement problems?  
3I propose that enforcement is more than just a part of transaction costs, but in fact it 
can, and does, (re)define the structure of relationships between state and business, and 
between firms, influencing the form of capitalist relationships existing in a society. 
Building upon the propositions of new institutionalists and economic sociologists, I put 
forward the following arguments: 
A. With the introduction of free market reforms in 1991 and 1992 in Russia, 
which included among other things the beginning of a far reaching rapid privatization 
process, legislating for the rights of individuals on private property, and allowing 
individuals to establish small private firms, state control over the economy began to 
crumble. This process, combined with the underdeveloped and inadequate legal 
infrastructure and poorly written laws resulted in the inability of the state to provide 
consistent, reliable and impartial law enforcement. On the other hand, the crisis of 
legitimacy of the Russian state among the general population exacerbated the 
problem by further alienating private entrepreneurs from state institutions. 
Contentious relations between private entrepreneurs and the state are deeply 
entrenched in the Soviet legacy of prosecuting private entrepreneurship, reinforced by 
the current climate of rampant corruption and lack of accountability among officials 
of various state regulatory agencies, and result in an enormous gap between the world 
of small businesses and the state. As a result, entrepreneurs perceive state 
enforcement as both unreliable and untrustworthy, and develop their own means of 
enforcing their business agreements. 
B. Particular institutional forms of non-state enforcement strategies are 
determined by such factors as preexisting value orientations, norms, practices, 
4attitudes and perceptions, and develop in response to the specific kinds of state failure 
to provide contract enforcement.  
Including state courts, I differentiate between two types of contract enforcement 
strategies that firms can use: those that are internal to a firm and based on its own 
resources, and those that are external to it and come from various agencies that offer 
enforcement services for sale. Strategies internal to firms include: 
• Information and closed exchange networks;  
• Threat of violence by criminals;  
• Arbitration by mutually agreed upon powerful individuals;  
• Threat of punitive actions by state officials;  
• Financial tools (prepayment, ‘hostages’).  
External strategies include:  
• Professional associations;  
• Private protection firms;  
• Private arbitration courts;  
• State arbitrazh courts.  
C. Non-state contract enforcement strategies have a dual effect on the 
business environment: on the one hand, they facilitate transactions by giving them 
additional security; on the other hand, they constitute barriers to entry; they 
contaminate the business environment with illegal practices; and increase general 
unpredictability. 
D. On the level of individual firms, I propose to consider five factors that 
may help explain why firms prefer certain contract enforcement strategies over 
5others. These are certain attributes of firms that describe firms’ need for contract 
enforcement strategies, and firms’ resources to pursue their enforcement needs. Three 
out of five explanatory factors offered are reflective of firms’ internal resources 
(connections to criminals, connections to old Soviet networks, and the time of 
founding), one is an indicator of a firm’s needs in enforcement (area of business) and 
one is an indicator of both (size of firms). Firms’ need for contract enforcement 
determines whether or not a firm would develop a specific strategy or strategies for 
dealing with contractual problems, while the available resources largely shape the 
response the firm chooses. 
Graphically, the argument looks like this: 
 
Political and 
economic reform 
Enforcement ability of the 
state is compromised; crisis 
of legitimacy of the state  
Reliance on various non-state 
enforcement strategies creates 
unstable and unpredictable business 
environment and affects relationships 
among firms but at the same time 
facilitate transactions. 
Non-State Enforcement Strategies
Two types: external to firms (based on an outside agency), 
or internal to firms (based on their own resources). 
Negative relations between state 
and entrepreneurs have harmful 
effect on overall law compliance 
and reform support. 
Different form of 
capitalism: it has its logic 
but it deviates from the 
capitalism we know 
Historical  and 
cultural 
legacies  
Present 
institutional 
factors 
6The main source of data for the dissertation was the empirical research that I 
conducted in St.Petersburg, Russia. I interviewed owners and/or managers of 45 firms 
(63 qualitative interviews: 18 open-ended and 45 semi-structured interviews), over the 
period of six months in 2001 and 2002. I then used qualitative methods of analysis to 
provide a “thick” description of studied cases, and quantitative methods of analysis to 
look across cases for broader patterns which could have wider relevance.  
Small firms1 were chosen as subjects of the study for a number of reasons. First of 
all, for small firms forming a monopoly is a much less likely answer to state enforcement 
deficiencies than for large enterprises, and they typically lack resources necessary to keep 
legal advisor on staff, like large enterprises frequently do. Second, small businesses 
comprise a growing share of the Russian economy, and thus are important to study. 
Finally, most small firms are started from scratch and in comparison with old Soviet 
enterprises they carry little, if any, Soviet legacy of organizational routines, norms and 
ties, and are more open to innovation and change. As Peter Murrell pointed out,   
… it is the experience of capitalist societies that large organizations are 
often quite unresponsive to new circumstances. As Arrow (1974, pp.56-9) 
emphasizes, new organizations are often essential for change, because 
established ones are likely to have an irreversible commitment to existing 
arrangements. In capitalist societies, in new industries and in existing 
industries where the technology is new, new firms are of enormous 
importance for these very reasons (Mansfield et al. 1977:16 and R.Nelson 
1981:1051-2). (Murrell 1992) 
 
The central concept of my research is contract enforcement that is understood as the 
process of constraining the transacting parties to ensure fulfillment of contracts and 
 
1 Elsewhere I define study subjects as both small and medium-sized firms. Here, I talk about both of them 
as “small firms” because their needs and capacities are much more similar than those of large, typically 
post-Soviet enterprises. 
7business agreements. Throughout the dissertation, the term contract is used in relation to 
a written document that records an agreement between two or more parties regarding 
terms of a transaction. Verbal contracts are referred to as business agreements. Although 
verbal contracts are not accepted in the Russian court of law, both terms are used in the 
dissertation, because formal written contracts frequently describe only part of the deal, 
and the rest is agreed upon verbally. While enforcing such contracts, parties typically 
look for the enforcement of the deal in its entirety, including its unrecorded part. As 
chapter 3 will show, the usage of the term “contract” in itself in Russia is far from 
straightforward, and many different types of agreements are described as “contracts” by 
economic actors. Thus, the usage of this term is consistent with how it is used in Russia, 
rather than in western economic literature. 
By state enforcement institutions I mean state courts, including their enforcement 
branch, and police forces that are supposed to prosecute unlawful behavior on the part of 
various economic actors. By non-state strategies of contract enforcement I understand 
various ways and means outside of the state legal system that entrepreneurs resort to in 
order to achieve a goal of enforcing business agreements with their partners. Actors 
deliberately develop their enforcement strategies given their predispositions and 
preferences, their needs and available resources, and their understandings of the actions 
of other actors, both inside and outside of the business community.  
Finally, I frequently use the term institution, and since it is understood differently by 
representatives of different schools of thought in sociology and economics, I feel that it 
needs clarification upfront. Throughout the dissertation, institution means a set of 
normative and cognitive rules regulating a particular aspect of social life as recognized 
8and culturally accepted modes of thought and action that are routinely reproduced 
through habitual activities of members of a society. Formal institutions are such rules that 
are upheld by the force of law paired with some monitoring and enforcing organization. 
Informal institutions are such rules that are supported by commonly held beliefs and 
practices only. Institutionalization is a process of acquiring this rule-like status. 
 
Much of the present work consists of a “thick description” of enforcement strategies 
on the basis of information obtained from field research and secondary data analysis. 
Such description is inevitably necessary when our knowledge of the processes on the 
ground is as limited as that of contemporary Russia. Analytical claims about various 
relationships on the ground are not organized by chapters, but instead are made in stages 
across the dissertation. For example, the question of relations between the state and 
contract enforcement is raised in chapters 1, 3 and 6, while chapters 4 and 5 provide 
necessary information for the understanding of these relations.  
The dissertation is organized in the following way. Chapter 1 discusses three 
theoretical paradigms that equip me with conceptual tools to address the puzzle of 
contract enforcement, and presents the state of the debate on transition processes in post-
Soviet countries with regard to the role of state in these processes. Chapter 2 first outlines 
the general methodology used in the study and data collection method, and gives the 
description of the study subjects. It then discusses the virtues of, and problems with the 
data, the demographic characteristics of respondents, and five explanatory factors that 
were selected prior to the main stage of data collection as having the potential to impact 
the choice of strategies of contract enforcement used by a firm. Chapter 3 examines the 
9types of problems with contracts experienced by the participants of my study, discusses 
historical and institutional roots of the perceived incapacity of state institutions to 
guarantee contract enforcement, and finally outlines various strategic responses 
developed by small firms. It addresses the first research question of the dissertation by 
examining what factors caused small private Russian firms to realize the need for non-
state contract enforcement. Chapters 4 and 5 present an analytical description of contract 
enforcement strategies developed by small Russian firms in the 1990s, on the basis of the 
field research data, and attempt to answer the second, the third and the forth research 
questions. In these chapters, I look closely at how each contract enforcement strategy 
operates on the ground, what its institutional and historical roots are, and assess the role 
of the explanatory factors in the choice of contract enforcement strategies by individual 
firms. Finally, chapter 6 describes the relations between the state and entrepreneurs as a 
context in which contract enforcement strategies get formed and employed, thus bringing 
the discussion back to the first research question. 
10
Chapter 1: THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
Introduction: the problem of post-Soviet transition 
 
In addressing the puzzle of contract enforcement under the conditions of failing state 
institutions I use the insights of a few theoretical paradigms. First, in the introduction I 
outline the present state of the debate on transition processes in post-Soviet countries 
with regard to the role of state in these processes. Then, in the subsequent three parts of 
the chapter I discuss three theoretical paradigms that provide me with the conceptual 
toolkits to examine different sides of the problem of contract enforcement in 
contemporary Russia. Specifically, the new institutionalism literature (NIE and 
Transaction costs institutionalism in sociology) helps me identify contract enforcement as 
a crucial component of the institutional structure of a society, pivotal for capitalistic 
exchange. Then, conceptual tools and insights of network analysis of economic sociology 
are used to explain how non-state strategies of contract enforcement operate. Finally, 
neo-institutionalism in organizational analysis is used to understand the cultural and 
historical roots of non-state strategies of contract enforcement. 
 
One can identify three dominant approaches to post-communist transformations in 
Eastern Europe and FSU in the academic literature of the past decade with regard to the 
role of the state institutions. At first after the collapse of communism neo-liberalism 
prevailed, especially among the economists. Various arguments were put forward in 
11
support of rapid restructuring and the withdrawal of the state from the economy, giving 
way to the powerful forces of the market to naturally develop capitalistic relations. The 
neoliberal approach tended to disregard the unique institutional makeup of each country 
in transition, and apply similar SAP-looking generic policies that were only half-
heartedly implemented by governments under the threat of withdrawal of financial 
support, in a form of high-interest loans, for new democratic regimes (Wedel 1998, 
Murrell 1996, Murrell and Yijiang 1993, Gustafson 1999, Stiglitz 2000). One of the 
major shortcomings of the neoliberal approach was that it took the state for granted, 
which is dangerous because it assumes that “states in all times and places have had a 
similar potential or ability to achieve their leaders’ intentions; the varying roles states 
have played in different societies may be lost” (Migdal 1988, 17). 
Early in the 1990s, after the first alarming evidence of the failure of the neoliberal 
strategy nearly everywhere in the region (particularly so in Russia), a strong political 
backlash against neoliberal governments and a swing of popular support toward neo-
communists, some scholars proposed to reconsider the role of the state in the 
restructuring process (Amsden et al. 1994; Kochanowicz 1994; Burawoy 1996, 2001a). 
They claimed that the market cannot be both the means and the ends, and that after all it 
is the task of the state to establish the new capitalistic organization of the economy. The 
main downside of this approach was the confusion that appeals to a ‘strong state’ seemed 
to provoke. While most neostatists depicted the strong state as resembling modern 
capitalist democracies of the West2, their claims were often perceived as either 
 
2 “Historically, the ‘West’ (Western Europe, North America, Australia, and New Zealand) developed a 
unique pattern of a strong state – one that does not consist of a strong executive and a weak society, but of a 
high legitimacy and functional cooperation between the state and civil society. Informal habits and customs 
12
advocating the state’s unnecessary overextension and interventionism, or as wishful 
thinking, since it is just as difficult to transform weak states into strong ones as to 
organize market exchange where there are no markets (Stark and Bruszt 1998).  
Throughout this work, I refer to the strong state in Weberian sense, in a definition of 
J.Migdal: “it is an organization, composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by 
the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and 
implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making 
for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its 
way” (Migdal 1988, 19). 
As an alternative to both lines of argument came Stark and Bruszt’s (1998) claim 
that we don’t have to choose between market and hierarchy, and should better instead 
resort to networks among firms – powerful and pervasive remnants from the Soviet era – 
as a solution to the shortage of state capacity. This argument is based on Evans’s concept 
of embedded autonomy. Evans (1992, 1995) on the basis of studying East Asian 
countries built a claim that a Weberian-type state bureaucracy, through embeddedness in 
private capital, can get accurate and timely information about necessary state actions to 
facilitate economic development. While application of this model to Eastern European 
countries raised a certain amount of criticism (Burawoy 2001b), it is clearly inapplicable 
to Russia, because of her state’s lack of two pivotal characteristics that a state should 
possess according to Evans – autonomy and capacity. Having a patrimonial state with a 
historically weak legal tradition, Russia displays neither a strong formal institutional 
 
and historical traditions are as important for the functioning of this social order as legal arrangements.” 
(Kochanowicz 1994, 201). 
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structure, nor a significant civil society capable of keeping state corruption in check. In 
the 1990s, economic policies have been heavily influenced by a few oligarchs who 
created alliances with political elites (Klebnikov 2000, McFaul 1997). The Russian state 
can be viewed as a predatory rather than a developmental one in Evans’s definition, 
rendering Stark and Bruszt’s argument powerless to explain the Russian case. 
Recent works in sociological literature on the processes of change in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union are focused on the diversity of socio-economic institutions, 
and the recognition of the various forms and faces that contemporary capitalism may take 
(Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley 1998; Stark and Bruszt 1998). Authors analyze how the 
divergent paths of post-communist transitions shaped by institutional legacies of the 
Soviet era lead to distinctively different capitalisms, thus asserting the existence of 
multiple capitalisms coming from different origins. 
The comparative capitalisms perspective undoubtedly opens new horizons to 
studying post-communist transformations. However while providing valuable insights 
about elites in post-communist Eastern Europe, few of the current works study transition 
processes on the level of individual firms. Those authors who do so tend to concentrate 
on the most influential actors (Stark 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Guseva and Rona-Tas 
2001), and rarely notice the less powerful majority whose choices are also important 
(Hass 1999; Burawoy and Verdery 1999).  
In the present work, I focus my attention on the “little people” in the transformation 
process, whose strategic choices get largely shaped by their interaction with, and 
perception of the state and its agents, and who are intimately involved in the development 
of the new institutions of market capitalism. Many of the arguments that I make in 
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subsequent chapters, as well as the information provided by the interviewees, support the 
claims made by scholars from the neostatist camp in the middle of the 1990s, as a critique 
of the neoliberal approach. Finally, my argument that failure of the state institutions to 
provide consistently reliable contract enforcement impacts the form that Russian 
capitalism takes is certainly consistent with the propositions of authors of the 
comparative capitalisms perspective. 
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Setting up the Puzzle: NIE and Transaction Costs Analysis 
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Rational choice institutionalism in sociology 
view individuals as purposeful actors, whose attempts to maximize returns on their 
exchanges are shaped by various transaction costs and the bargaining power of actors, 
and whose rationality is bound by the environment, circumstance and available 
information (Levi 1991, Williamson and Winter 1991). Institutions are defined here as 
formal rules and informal constraints that govern human behavior (North 1990). Rational 
choice institutionalists analyze choices made by individuals under the conditions of 
scarcity, interdependence, and as a response to a preexisting system of incentives.  Hard-
core rational choice institutionalists view actions as both rational and strategic, and as 
being constrained by conditions of incomplete and costly information.  
Scholars of NIE and rational choice institutionalism are particularly preoccupied 
with the problem of reduction of transaction costs. Institutions structure social 
interactions, and transaction costs are the costs of these interactions. Transaction costs are 
defined as costs of information, decision-making and enforcement (Coase 1988, 
Williamson 1985). In the real world to make exchange possible economic actors have to 
purchase information about products and business partners, spend time and money on 
decision-making, and provide enforcement for the transaction. Attempts by economic 
actors to decrease transaction costs in the world of imperfect markets and incomplete 
information bring about institutional change (North 1990). 
New institutional theories postulate that economic growth depends upon the 
existence of a favorable institutional environment (North and Thomas 1973, North 1990).  
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The constraints imposed by the institutional framework define the opportunity set and 
therefore the kinds of organizations existing in this institutional framework and 
determines the direction of organizational development: “Institutions, together with the 
standard constraints of economic theory, determine the opportunities in a society. 
Organizations are created to take advantage of those opportunities, and, as the 
organizations evolve, they alter the institutions” (North 1990, 7).  
This framework of analysis is very helpful for the discussion of an environment in 
which economic activity occurs, in particular, one characterized by the presence of 
institutions of authority and enforcement, drawing attention to the role of the state. 
According to North (1990), over the course of human history economic exchange 
evolved from personalized exchange (small-scale production and local trade, present 
even in stateless societies) to impersonal exchange (the parties are constrained by kinship 
ties, bonding, exchanging hostages, or merchant codes of conduct) to impersonal 
exchange with third-party enforcement, where the state generally takes on the function of 
enforcement as an impartial third party that can act as a coercive force able to monitor 
property rights and effectively enforce contracts. Together with formal institutions, like 
legislation, and informal constraints, like culture-specific normative patterns, state 
enforcement comprises the institutional matrix of any society which defines how 
economic organizations operate, and their performance.  
While transaction cost institutionalists draw attention to the importance of 
enforcement for economic exchange, they do not generally analyze it as a variable. The 
analysis of the role of enforcement in capitalist economies remains largely on a 
theoretical level which shows how much the enforcement system is taken for granted in 
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developed market economies. Even those scholars who point out the variability of state 
enforcement fail to discuss the implications of its failure. 
 
New institutional theories and troubles which former socialist countries experienced 
in their transition to capitalism encouraged many scholars, especially economists and 
lawyers, to turn their attention to the problem of contract enforcement in nascent market 
economies. In the end of 1990s a number of works have been published which addressed 
the problem of contract enforcement faced by enterprises in transitional economies. Some 
of these works draw attention to non-state mechanisms of enforcement developed by 
enterprises to supplement or substitute state enforcement. I roughly divide the work on 
enforcement in Russia into two camps: theoretically grounded works that use mostly 
secondary data, and empirically rooted studies. The two works analyzed below present 
rich description and analyses of mechanisms of contract enforcement used by Russian 
enterprises, and advance our understanding of how economic exchange works in Russia 
after the beginning of free market reforms in 1991.  
The paper by Greif and Kandel (1995) on enforcement problem in Russia in the 
beginning of the 1990s undoubtedly belongs to the category of ‘theorists’.  The authors 
describe the institutional setting for economic exchange left over from the collapse of the 
Soviet system and demonstrate its inadequacy to handle contractual relationships. They 
argue that the issues of contract enforcement are inherently linked to the question of 
property rights in both legislation and the public consciousness, and that the process of 
change from socialist to capitalist realities is slow. The decline in political and economic 
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power of the state increased uncertainty and further undermined the security of property 
rights.  
Greif and Kandel describe non-state enforcement mechanisms developed by medium 
to large enterprises in the beginning of 1990s, as the first aftermath of the withdrawal of 
the state from the economy. They found three main groups of mechanisms: self-enforcing 
contracts (large industrial enterprises which remained monopolies in their respective 
industries - a position of exclusivity guarantees enforcement; smaller enterprises use 
reputation as a means of enforcement); binding arbitration (introduction of commercial 
courts for resolving disputes); and private enforcement by force (for a fee, the Mafia 
provides physical force to ensure enforcement and protection against extortion by other 
criminals). Self-enforcement works by linking current and future economic transactions, 
binding arbitration is indirectly supported by the legal system, and private enforcement 
by force is based on the coercive power of parties other than the state. 
While this account presents historical background of the enforcement problems 
which large and medium enterprises in Russia experienced in the beginning of 1990s, its 
lack of empirical evidence does not allow authors to deepen their description of the 
informal enforcement strategies practiced by enterprises at that time. It also fails to 
identify important consequences of non-state enforcement for economic development. 
Another criticism which can be made is that this analysis does not address specific 
problems of contract enforcement faced by small businesses. Authors do point out, 
however, that it is small businesses that drive the changes that take place in the Russian 
economy, and that it is important to study how they ensure contract enforcement.  
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Interesting, although incomplete, Greif and Kandel’s work constitutes a valuable 
introduction to the analysis of the contract enforcement problem in Russia. 
 
An example of the opposite – empirically grounded – approach is a work by 
Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (2000), who make the first attempt to evaluate the 
relative importance of various non-state mechanisms of enforcement in Russia, on the 
basis of survey data collected in 1997 from 328 industrial enterprises. Reflecting on the 
“significance of relational contracting, self-enforcement mechanisms, social networks, 
and legal institutions”, the authors’ main conclusion is that much like their Western 
counterparts, Russian managers tend to use combinations of different strategies to enforce 
contracts. Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman develop a classification of seven mechanisms 
used by Russian enterprises to enforce contracts, ranging from the most personal and 
informal, to litigation in state courts. They also identify complementarities between 
transactional strategies, showing how the usage of different strategies correlates.  
This work is significant not simply because it unveils the mysteries surrounding 
business relationships in Russia (which many westerners assume to be incompatibly 
different from those in western countries), but also because it makes an important 
conclusion about the active presence of state institutions in economic relations.  
However, the work also has some limitations, which are better understood if we look 
at qualitative follow-up research done by one of the authors, Kathryn Hendley (2001). 
She conducted a case study of six Russian industrial enterprises attempting to understand 
the logic of their behavior when dealing with non-payments. Her general conclusions 
support those of the survey, but she makes it clear that while the behavior of Russian and 
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western managers may seem similar in certain respects (like their common unwillingness 
to take disputes to court), it in fact has different reasons. She identifies that law and 
lawyers play a different role in Russian business and that competition in the Russian 
environment of uncertainty often leads to inefficient decisions. In her words, concerns of 
US managers are  
qualitatively different from those facing virtually any Russian manufacturer. 
Russian mangers do not have the luxury of worrying about profitability; they 
are obsessed by mere survival. Thus, all of the case study enterprises are 
preoccupied by short-run bottom-line concerns, irrespective of the level of 
competition. While the contours of the behavior might seem similar, when we 
look below surface, the explanations are radically different. In the Russian 
context, the driving force is desperation. As desperation increases, enterprises 
are less likely to push through to litigation, and more likely to settle for 
whatever they can get. (Hendley 2001, 21)  
 
Just like Greif and Kandel, Hendley, Murrell and Ryterman limit their analysis to 
large, ex-Soviet enterprises. Small firms which entered the market during the past 
decade, remain outside their survey. 
The following table summarizes the typologies of alternative mechanisms of 
enforcement given in above-describe works: 
 
Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (2000) 
 
Greif & Kandel (1995) 
1. relational contracting (trust, informal contacts) 
 
2. self-enforcement (financial tools: prepayment, 
barter, “hostages”) 
1. self-enforcement (linking current and future 
economic transactions: large enterprises use their 
sectoral position, small use reputation) 
 3. third-party enforcement (networks as a third 
party, reputation) 
4. private enforcement (private courts, security 
firms, mafia) 
2. binding arbitration (private enforcement, but 
relies on state enforcement institutions) 
5. state administration (old connections, associate 
with previous state ownership) 
6. shadow of the law (threat of state enforcement) 
7. litigation (state enforcement) 
 
3. private enforcement by force (Mafia, private 
security firms) 
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 Critique:
1. This analysis does not discuss origins of these 
enforcement mechanisms, or the consequences of 
their usage. 
2. It does not ‘dig below the surface’: how each 
strategy translates into actual contract enforcement. 
3. It does not include small firms into the analysis; 
does not recognize that small firms may have a 
different enforcement experience because they lack 
the social and financial capital which large and old 
enterprises enjoy.   
 Critique:
The categories described in the analysis are too 
general and uneven. For example, self-
enforcement includes a great variety of 
mechanisms of enforcement, while binding 
arbitration is very narrow and rarely used (survey 
of Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman, 2000, does not 
find many examples of its use). Deep historical 
analysis does not seem to compensate for the lack 
of empirical evidence. 
Regardless of their limitations, these works provide extremely valuable information 
for understanding how Russian enterprises conduct economic exchange, and set the 
ground for future research.  
 
Not only economists have studied the problem of contract enforcement in Russia. 
Political scientist Timothy Frye and his co-author E. Zhuravskaya (2000) address the 
problem of racketeering that Russian small shop keepers face daily. On the basis of a 
survey of small shops in Russia they make a claim that it is an unreasonably high level of 
governmental regulation that pushes businesses into the unofficial economy, making it 
impossible for them to refer to state institutions for enforcement services. This study is 
important because in their view, proliferation of informal relations in the Russian 
economy does not result from the inefficiencies of state law enforcement institutions, but 
appears to be a by-product of the government’s regulatory activity. 
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1.2. Understanding Non-State Enforcement: Network Analysis of 
Economic Sociology  
 
Both theoretical and empirical works of transaction cost institutionalists draw 
attention to the importance of contract enforcement for economic exchange.  However, 
even though NIE helps us to acknowledge the variability of contract enforcement as a 
problem to study thus providing the point of departure for this project, it neither gives us 
an adequate toolkit to understand how non-state contract enforcement strategies operate, 
nor helps us decipher their origins and impact on the business environment in Russia3.
The scholarship that forms perhaps the core of economic sociology suggests a 
different outlook on economic action in general, and the problems of contractual relations 
in particular. Differently from the instrumental-reductionist vision of NIE, it offers a 
framework of analysis that emphasizes relationships rather than individuals, and multiple 
sources of action rather than pure self-interest (Granovetter 2001, 1994, 1985; Smelser 
and Swedberg 1994; Fligstein 1996a). The social embeddedness approach of economic 
sociology puts forward key insights into the role of social relations and networks in 
economic exchange, postulating that social relations and networks provide the structure 
in which economic transactions exist. Differently from NIE and transaction costs types of 
analysis, the embeddedness approach focuses on long-term cooperative ties between 
exchange partners as opposed to opportunism-based arm-length relations. In particular, 
Uzzi (1997) offers an important specification of the embeddedness approach, focusing on 
 
3 By ‘business environment’ I understand the equivalent to what N.Fligstein (1996a) calls governance 
structures, conceptions of control and rules of exchange. 
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structural embeddedness as opposed to cognitive, political or cultural types of 
embeddedness4. Structural embeddedness is defined as the influence that the quality and 
network architecture of exchange relationships have over economic activity.  
The emphasis on the structure of social relations, rather then on formal institutional 
arrangements, seems to be particularly appropriate for the analysis of transitional 
economies where we see the failure of many formal institutions and the pervasive 
presence of informal arrangements. Scholars who study transformation processes stress 
that the existing patterns of inter-organizational networks in former Soviet economies not 
only make exchange possible but structure the pattern of subsequent exchange in 
powerful ways (Stark 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Tatur 2000; Rona-Tas 1998).  
This theoretical framework proves extremely useful for the analysis of the Russian 
case. On one hand, networks reflect continuity in institutional formation during transition. 
In his study of the role of networks in the Soviet Union and in post-Soviet Russia, 
Yevgeny Kuznetsov (1997) argues that both pervasive hierarchy failure (in the Soviet 
Union in the 1970s and 1980s) and market failure (post-socialist Russia) resulted in the 
formation of personal networks which constitute ‘intangible capital’, such as personal 
trust, reputation, and information that is tacit and difficult to transfer. Kuznetsov argues 
that while in stable environments, formal and informal institutions coexist peacefully, and 
often support and reinforce each other, in Russia a firm’s capital is embedded in personal 
networks. As a consequence of the shock of market reforms of 1991-92, new networks 
got carved from the old ones, realigning personal trust and reputation from previous 
periods.  
 
4 Distinction between these four types of embeddedness was offered by Zukin and DiMaggio (1990).  
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The particular blend of formal and informal institutions depends on the 
government’s legal framework. If this framework provides low transaction 
costs for doing business, informal networks will have an incentive to 
register as legal entities and become subject to government supervision and 
regulation. … If transaction costs are high, informal economic activity that 
takes place outside the government taxation and regulation systems will 
flourish. In this case, networks will perform functions the government is 
unable to perform. (Kuznetsov 1998, 160)  
 
Enterprise learning includes the processes of acquiring competencies and accumulating 
social capital, as well as forming the social networks that will enable firms to put both 
capital and competencies to productive use. During the post-socialist transformation, the 
interaction among these various facets of enterprise learning has created an unusually rich 
and diverse set of transformation options. 
Applied to the study of contract enforcement in post-Soviet Russia, the 
network/embeddedness approach is suitable on two levels. First of all, the concept of 
structural embeddedness helps us understand the relationships that are formed among 
firms in the milieu of unreliable and weak formal institutions, and how these relationships 
structure one particular aspect of exchange: contract enforcement. Second, entrepreneurs’ 
participation in networks outside of the business community may be recognized as a 
factor that can determine their enforcement choices, in particular, ties that link 
entrepreneurs to criminals on one hand, and to state officials in certain state 
organizations, on the other. Such ties give entrepreneurs enforcement options that can be 
valuable at times. 
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1.3. Digging for the Roots: Neo-Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis 
 
For the analysis of the origins of non-state enforcement strategies I invoke a 
particular branch of neo-institutionalism in organizational analysis that comprises an 
eclectic variety of works that emphasize the impact of culture on the economic 
institutions and relations (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; DiMaggio 1994; March and Olsen 
1989; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Fligstein 1996a, Dobbin 1994, Douglas 1986). This 
framework of analysis concentrates on the configuration of meanings, values and cultural 
definitions and treats institutions as not simply rules, procedures and norms, but as 
symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that define actors’ preferences 
and their range of culturally acceptable choices. Preexisting models, scripts and traditions 
define the rules of appropriateness and shape preferences which lead to certain actions, 
and not others. According to this account, the “logic of instrumentality” is embedded in 
the “logic of appropriateness”, because the former is culturally determined (March and 
Olsen 1989). Thus even instrumental rationality is seen here as guided by culture-specific 
orientations. 
In contrast to the rational-actor model of firms postulated by NIE scholars and 
rational choicers in sociology, this perspective sees organizations as “sites of situated 
social action” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991) that embody institutional logics that are 
“more than beliefs and normative pressures however: They find social and material 
expression in concrete practices and taken-for-granted organizational arrangements that 
both prompt and constrain economic actors at multiple levels, from individual actors to 
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the state as actor, and help to determine which social roles and strategies are conceivable, 
efficacious, and legitimate in a given setting” (Biggart and Guillén 1999, 725). The 
distinction between normative patterns and “institutional logics” (also called cognitive 
scripts and schemas, moral templates and models by other scholars) is fundamental since 
normative patterns presume the availability of a socially given choice when the actor can 
conceivably choose a deviant path away from a socially accepted norm. Institutional 
logics on the other hand do not presume such a choice; they comprise an overarching 
view of all available choices within a given culture. Institutional logics are much more 
resilient to changing circumstances than normative patterns. 
This conceptual framework is uniquely suitable for the analysis of various aspects of 
economic and social life in countries that undergo post-Soviet transition. It draws 
attention to collective understandings of social order and rationality that are culture-
specific and deeply embedded in any society. These collective understandings can 
account for the variations in the results of standard packages of free-market reforms that 
were implemented across the former Socialist block at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, 
it is not the logic of the exogenous economic laws that guided reformation processes in 
each of the former Soviet countries, but the historically developed patterns of social 
organization (Dobbin 1994; Biggart and Guillén 1999). 
For the purposes of analysis of the origins of non-state contract enforcement 
strategies devised by Russian entrepreneurs a conceptual framework developed by Ann 
Swidler (1986) is especially interesting. In her work, the culture is seen not as the 
meaningful end to which the action is directed, but instead as a supplier of a repertoire of 
habits, skills, styles and other cultural components from which “strategies of action” are 
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constructed. Strategies of action are “persistent ways of ordering action through time” 
(Swidler 1986, 273) that are not equivalent to a plan to attain a certain goal. Instead, they 
are understood as a general way to organize action: 
People do not build lines of action from scratch, choosing actions one at a 
time as efficient means to given ends. Instead, they construct chains of action 
beginning with at least some pre-fabricated links. Culture influences action 
through the shape and organization of those links, not by determining the 
ends to which they are put. (Swidler 1986, 277) 
 
Swidler pays particular attention to periods of social transformation (“unsettled 
lives”), when new strategies of action may get developed. During such periods, culture 
provides actors with a set of styles and skills that they can choose from in attempts to 
establish new dominant models of authority and cooperation, and ultimately form new 
strategies of action. The choice will be determined by concrete structural constrains and 
historical circumstances within which competing strategies struggle for domination. 
 
The theoretical perspective offered by cultural institutionalists helps me identify 
culture-specific roots of non-state strategies of contract enforcement that were shaped in 
the past decade but in fact can be traced back much further into the past, to Soviet and 
pre-Soviet era “institutional logics” and “strategies of action”, and explain their durability 
as well as change (Campbell 1996; Ledeneva 1998; Nelson, Tilly and Walker 1998). 
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Chapter 2:  
RESEARCH PROCEDURES AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
This chapter has a number of tasks to fulfill. First, it outlines the general 
methodology that guided this research. It then presents research procedures that were 
used to collect data, and discusses the quality of the data. Then a separate section 
discusses subjects of the study – population of small and medium-sized firms in 
St.Petersburg, Russia. The next section is devoted to the data description, including 
general description of the surveyed firms, and socio-demographic characteristics of 
respondents. The overview of the five explanatory variables concludes this chapter. 
 
2.1. General methodology 
 
To test the hypotheses I develop detailed case studies of a range of small and 
medium sized firms through field research5, following the procedures of multiple case 
study research by Ch. Ragin (1994, 2000). I selected a multiple case study technique 
because I consider this approach to be the most adequate given how little we know about 
the processes of business exchange in nascent capitalist economies. Multiple case-based 
research helps avoid “homogenizing assumptions” (Ragin 2000, 5) that are inevitable in 
more formalized quantitative methodology without sacrificing the possibility for 
 
5 The field research was made possible by the generous support of the National Science Foundation 
(Dissertation Improvement Grant #0221100, July 2002); Cosmos Club Foundation Award (January 2002); 
Milton Dean Havron Social Sciences Award (October 2001); and a research grant from the Sociology 
Department, University of Maryland (May 2001). 
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documenting generalities. One can commence the investigation with little information 
about the nature of relationships on the ground and guided by theory, and through careful 
comparison of characteristics of a number of cases, arrive at a comprehensive picture.  
It is common among social scientists to focus either on complexity of studied social 
phenomena through ethnographic, historical and macrolevel research, or on generalities – 
patterns that hold across many cases (Ragin 2000, 21). These two approaches are 
traditionally viewed as a variable-oriented versus case-oriented strategy, and their origins 
traced to the founding fathers of sociology – Durkheim and Weber (Ragin and Zaret 
1983). A typical case study concentrates on the details of a small number of cases that are 
studied in-depth; cross-case analysis allows only for very limited generalizations that 
may not have wider relevance. Quantitative techniques are typically applied to large 
numbers of cases that are not studied in depth but instead a researcher focuses on a 
variation of specific factors to arrive at some broad patterns of causality.  
The multiple case study technique developed by Ragin (1987, 2000) attempts to 
bridge the gap that exists between these two traditions. It suggests the in-depth study of 
relatively large sets of cases, thus preserving the focus on complexity of case-oriented 
research strategies and simultaneously attempting the possibility of some generalizations 
typical for variable-oriented strategies. Attention to the details of cases are supposed to 
help avoid homogenizing assumptions, while coding techniques make some degree of 
formalized quantitative analysis possible. In essence, the comparative case-based 
methodology formalizes and deepens the diversity-oriented techniques that are common 
in qualitative inquiries and applies them to relatively large datasets.  
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In my research I compiled a data set of forty-five cases, and apply some of the 
techniques of multiple case studies offered by Ragin. I use his idea of partial set 
membership: instead of having a case fully ‘in’ or fully ‘out’ of the dataset on some 
attribute, a case can be assigned a partial membership, depending on the degree of its 
participation. This feature helps me better capture the complexity of the real world 
because it helps avoid the homogenizing bipolarity of an exclusive ‘yes’ or ‘no’, instead 
inviting a range of in-between possibilities into the analysis. I apply this technique to the 
analysis of the frequencies of use of contract enforcement strategies by the studied firms. 
It allows me to follow the trends in strategies’ use, to distinguish between strategies that 
used to be popular in the past, those that are currently in common use and those that are 
gaining popularity among entrepreneurs, and also to estimate the intensity of their use.  
For the purposes of presentation, I organize the analysis not around the cases – 
individual firms, but around the variables – contract enforcement strategies. Analytic 
description of each strategy in chapters 4 and 5 includes not only the discussion of its 
patterns of use by the studied firms, but also the examination of its origins and the 
implications for inter-firm and state/firm relationships. 
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2.2. Research procedures and data 
2.2.1. Research site, sampling, sample bias 
The field research took place in St.Petersburg, Russia. St.Petersburg is located in the 
north-west of Russia, on the banks of the river Neva and the shore of the Finnish Gulf, 
and close to the borders with Finland to the north and Estonia to the west. The city 
excluding suburbs has a population of approximately 4.62 million people, out of which 
nearly 2.7 million are considered to be of working age (16 to 55 for women, and 16 to 60 
for men). In reality these figures are probably significantly larger due to a great influx of 
refugees and people from the provinces looking for jobs in recent years, which authorities 
have little, if any, way to account for.  
St.Petersburg was chosen as the site for the research for two reasons: (1) this is the 
second largest city in Russia and has sufficient organizational diversity and complexity of 
economic life, and (2) because it is my native city, where I myself worked between 1990 
and 1995, and have access to networks of organizations which may be closed to 
outsiders.  
A snowball technique of sampling was used in data collection, and was chosen 
because differently from random sampling it ensures trust, which is a fundamental 
prerequisite for researching sensitive issues like double bookkeeping or the bribing of 
state officials. Snowball sampling is a special non-probability method that relies on 
referrals from initial subjects to generate additional subjects. While this technique can 
dramatically lower search costs, it comes at the expense of potentially introducing bias 
because the technique itself reduces the likelihood that the sample will represent a good 
32
cross section from the population. Awareness of the possibility of this bias is the first step 
towards overcoming it. 
A clear selection bias might have been present in the data collection toward more 
educated as well as toward younger people. My own background undoubtedly played an 
important role in starting the ‘snowball’ rolling. The selection bias may have limited the 
validity of my data, although the bias has hopefully been reduced by the relatively large 
number of cases. 
What may present an even more important concern is that snowball samples are 
usually biased towards the inclusion of individuals with inter-relationships, and therefore 
over-emphasize the cohesiveness of social networks missing those who are isolated from 
such networks (Atkinson and Flint 2001). This potential difficulty is even more 
dangerous than selection bias because of the importance of networks among firms as 
stated in my hypotheses. The low number of maximum referral links6 (detailed 
description is in the next section) is intended to reduce this bias. 
Clearly, no generalized conclusions about the whole population of small firms in 
St.Petersburg can be made solely on the basis of the information obtained from this 
sample. Snowball sampling contradicts many of the assumptions fundamental to the 
conventional representative sampling, and the degree to which this sample deviates from 
the population remains unknown. However, for the exploratory purposes of the research, 
and in the combination with the secondary data this technique appears to be adequate. 
 
6 “Referral link” denotes the degree of separation of the researcher from the interviewee. One referral link 
means that the researcher knows the interviewee personally; two referral links mean that the interviewee 
was recommended by a personal acquaintance of the researcher, and so forth. 
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2.2.2. Data collection and data management  
The first set of data I collected in St.Petersburg, Russia, in the summer of 2001. I 
conducted interviews with owners and/or mangers of eighteen7 small private firms (seven 
of them engaged in trade, five offered services, and six were involved in product design 
and manufacturing). An open-ended questionnaire was used; interviews were tape-
recorded, and transcribed verbatim. Field notes were also taken at the time of interviews. 
Interviews lasted from forty-five minutes to four hours, and took place in informal 
environment, either in the respondent’s home, or in a quiet public place, like a café or 
restaurant. Snowball sampling was used to generate additional subjects. In the first wave 
of data collection six interviewees were personal acquaintances of mine, nine were 
recommended by them, and the remaining three had three referral links. 
The information obtained during the first wave of data collection allowed the 
elaboration of the research hypotheses, further specification of explanatory factors, and 
the development of a more formalized questionnaire (see Appendix 1) for the second 
stage of data collection. This stage took place in St.Petersburg during the summer of 
2002, when representatives of forty-one business firms were interviewed. The sample 
selection included thirteen8 firms that were interviewed during the first phase of research 
in the summer of 2001. A second interview with them appeared to be necessary since the 
format of interview and questionnaire used were different. Four firms from the first stage 
 
7 One of the cases from the first stage of field research was later dropped from the analysis because it 
presented a deviation: the firm was bankrupt.  
8 Besides one case that was dropped (see footnote above), four other firms were not interviewed during the 
second stage of the field research. Owners of two of those firms (#44 and #45) were unavailable for a 
second interview, claiming a hectic summer schedule. Since the information they provided in the first stage 
of the research was very valuable, they were not omitted from further analysis. Respondents from two other 
firms (#29 and #32) changed jobs in the meantime and were included in the second stage as new cases (the 
general description of all studied firms is given later in this chapter). 
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of data collection that could not be interviewed for the second round were nonetheless 
also included the in the final data set, thus bringing the total to forty-five firms. 
The questionnaire was changed from an open-ended format in the first stage of data 
collection to a multiple-choice format in the second stage to facilitate subsequent analysis 
of the data. To gather as much information as possible from the respondents I was asking 
them questions from the questionnaire, and while tape-recording their full answers, coded 
their answers in the multiple choice questionnaire booklets. I encouraged respondents to 
give comments and examples from their personal experience, emphasizing the 
importance of their first-hand knowledge. The final result of interviews was therefore 
two-fold: a completed questionnaire on one hand that allowed later quantitative analysis, 
and tape-recorded comments and examples on the other hand. The latter part of 
interviews was to be treated as qualitative data, analyzed separately, and was meant to 
enhance research findings by giving them richness and detail. 
Interviews for the second stage of data collection lasted from forty-five minutes to 
two and a half hours, averaging one hour, and took place mostly in an informal 
environment: in a respondent’s office (twelve interviews), his or her home (twenty-four 
interviews), or in a public place of their choice (nine interviews). Snowball sampling was 
used to generate additional subjects. In this stage of data collection out of forty-five 
interviewees twelve were my personal acquaintances or friends, and the remaining thirty-
three were recommended by them or by other acquaintances of mine: twenty-eight cases 
had two referral links, and five had three referral links9.
9 It is likely that the number of referral links in the snowball sample is associated with a within-sample bias.  
In the following chapters I will be quoting participants of my study, and it certainly appears that 
interviewees with just one referral link get quoted more frequently. Out of a total of 94 direct quotations 
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The table below summarizes the differences between the first and the second stages 
of data collection and analysis: 
 First (pilot) stage 
(completed in summer 2001) 
Second  stage  
(completed in summer 2002) 
General methodology Multiple case study Multiple case study 
Method of data 
collection 
Qualitative interview, tape-recorded Semi-structured interview with tape-
recorded comments and examples 
Technique of 
sampling 
Snowball sampling Snowball sampling 
Subjects of field 
research 
Owners/managers of small private 
Russian firms 
Owners/managers of small and medium 
sized private Russian firms 
Number of subjects 18 small firms 45 firms in total, including 13 repeat, 28 
new firms and 4 firms from the first stage 
without new interviews 
Research site St.Petersburg, Russia St.Petersburg, Russia 
Data analysis Qualitative analysis of interviews Cross-case analysis of contract 
enforcement strategies used by studied 
firms, with relation to the explanatory 
factors  
Final outcome  Specification of explanatory factors, 
further elaboration of hypotheses and 
creation of structured questionnaire 
for the second stage 
PhD dissertation in Sociology 
All data obtained from interviews and participant observation are preserved for the 
entire duration of the project and after10, and are available for re-examination. During the 
data collection all respondents were assured of complete confidentiality and anonymity of 
the process, and were asked to sign an Informed Consent Form. Questionnaires and 
 
and references to interviews 34 belong to interviewees with just one referral link (average 2.83 quotations 
per firm with one referral link), 49 quotations are from respondents with two referral links (average 1.75 
quotations per firm), and 11 quotations are from respondents with three referral links (average 2.2 
quotations per firm). Thus there appears to be no strong relationship between the number of referral links 
and the average number of quotations per a firm, both firms with one referral link and with three referral 
links get quoted more than those with two referral links. The average number of quotations per firm across 
whole sample was 2.47. All but 7 interviewees got quoted; maximum number of quotations per firm is 8, a 
median is 2 quotations per firm. 
10 With the exception of the interview tapes that were destroyed after transcription, as indicated in the 
approved application to the University of Maryland Institutional Review Board with regard to treatment of 
human subjects. 
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consent forms have been approved by the University of Maryland Institutional Review 
Board11 with respect to their treatment of human subjects prior to the field research 
stages.  
 
2.2.3. The data: problems and virtues 
Virtually all interview-based data present certain problems. First, it cannot be 
ensured that the respondents always tell the truth, either for the innocuous reason of 
forgetfulness, or to intentionally distort reality. It is in human nature to try to project a 
positive image to one’s interlocutor, thus respondents are typically quite likely to ignore 
or omit those past experiences that make them appear in a less than flattering light.  
In the context of this research it is possible that the participants overemphasized the 
contractual disputes which for them had positive outcomes, and neglected to mention, or 
were reluctant to elaborate on, the disputes with negative outcomes, or those that 
involved illegal means of redress. This potential bias is particularly significant in this 
research because of the sensitivity of the issues in question, like hiring criminals to exert 
physical violence, or bribing a tax inspector to pressure another firm. Many entrepreneurs 
might have been reluctant to admit such doings. Hence it is possible that the scale of 
occurrences of such overtly illegal activities may in fact be larger than it appears from my 
data. 
 
11 IRB approval of the questionnaire and research procedures for the first stage of data collection: 
University of Maryland Institutional Review Board, IRB HSR Identification Number – 01 sociology006, 
April 18, 2001. IRB approval of the questionnaire and research procedures for the second stage of data 
collection: University of Maryland IRB HSR Identification Number – 02 socy010, April 5, 2002.  
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On the other hand, entrepreneurs might have been embarrassed to admit their lack of 
certain knowledge that could be instrumental in shaping their contract enforcement 
attitudes. For example, some respondents might have been reluctant to reveal their lack of 
knowledge regarding litigation in state courts that is in fact responsible for their failure to 
use this potentially valuable enforcement tool, and instead exaggerate their distrust of the 
state in general. It is both common and popular in Russia to blame the state for all 
problems, and for many entrepreneurs it could have seemed like an attractive avenue to 
take in a conversation about their business practices.  
Second, interviews are hardly a precise instrument in measuring an objective reality. 
Few entrepreneurs are capable of, or even willing to try, to recall exactly how many 
contract violations they have experienced, or how much money they have lost as a result 
of these disputes. Instead, what they reveal are their perceptions of their business reality: 
how serious they feel the contract enforcement problem is for their business, how reliable 
they perceive their enforcement strategies are, or how strongly they feel about the state. 
While understanding of this difference between the objective and the perceived realities 
is important to keep in mind, it should neither discourage analysis, nor put off the reader. 
As it will be argued in subsequent chapters, perceptions are as important, and sometimes 
can be even more important, than the objective reality because the former have the power 
to influence and shape the latter. Small Russian entrepreneurs are not simply passive 
bystanders of the business environment that is bestowed on them; they actively form this 
very environment through business transactions they engage in every day, and the way 
they perceive this environment influences their choices.  
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Finally, entrepreneurs are reluctant to talk about money. While they might be willing 
to share anecdotes and little stories from their experience, when the questions concern 
actual amounts of turnover concealed from tax authorities, or amounts paid to criminals, 
or size of bribes to state officials, their enthusiasm suddenly wanes and brows get raised 
in suspicion as to why such information is requested. While I managed to obtain rough 
estimates of those figures that appeared to me to be of particular value for understanding 
the scale of the discussed issues, it should not surprise the reader that more detailed 
information is not provided, and that the accuracy of the given numbers is not always 
asserted. Secondary data was used for comparison when possible to give more credibility 
to those figures that were provided. 
Methodological triangulation – developing cases in-depth and in breadth – was used 
to minimize the effect of all potential sources of problems with the data, with regard to 
both sampling and data collection method problems. Embeddedness of the research into 
the data and richness of the data allows avoiding mistakes that can be found in results of 
surveys, and are seen as more appropriate for the exploratory goals of the research. 
Breadth of the data, achieved through a substantial number of cases, allows me to move 
beyond a “thick” description of a handful of cases, and attempt to look across cases for 
broader patterns which can have wider relevance. Researchers of the processes of 
transformation in former Soviet block typically use either qualitative (Hendley 2001; 
Hass 1998) or quantitative-oriented strategy (Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman 2001; Frye 
2001). My research is an attempt to bridge the two types of inquiry, and address the 
problem of contract enforcement on the level of many firms studied in a “thick” fashion. 
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Thus even when firms are looked at in aggregate in certain parts of analysis to point out 
some general patterns, a rich, detailed qualitative description typically accompanies it.  
The reason why the qualitative side of the data is emphasized in the analysis is so we 
can understand the logic that actors use to make decisions about their economic actions, 
the reasoning behind their choices, the way they perceive their business environment and 
other actors. The answers to these kinds of questions are pivotal for understanding the 
context in which contract enforcement in Russia occurs. Thus, given the kind of data I 
collected, the way the sample is compiled, and the character of the research questions, the 
only kind of quantitative analysis I have confidence in is non-parametric12 correlations 
between causal factors and the reliance on a specific contract enforcement strategy on the 
level of an individual firm to help me to identify what kinds of firms use particular 
strategies. Other types of quantitative analysis, like regression models, do not seem 
suitable for the kind of data and exploratory goals of the study.  
 
12 The term “non-parametric” refers to non-normal distribution; typically a non-parametric type of analysis 
is used with distributions that are suspected to be not normal, often produced by small, non-probability 
samples. 
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2.3. Study subjects: Population of small and medium-sized firms 
in St.Petersburg  
 
The notion of small businesses was formally introduced in Russia at the end of the 
1980s, in the midst of Gorbachev’s perestroika. It started with the Law on Individual 
Labor Activity (1986), the Law on State Enterprises (1987), and the Law on Cooperatives 
(1988). A few other important laws regarding private property rights were introduced in 
1989 and 1990. Finally, in 1990 the Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity 
allowed individuals start their own small private business.  
The official definition of small businesses has changed a few times over the course 
of the 1990s. Originally, by the law of 18th of July 1991, a firm was considered “small” 
for the purposes of tax collection if the number of employees did not exceed an officially 
established limit of 200 people (200 in heavy industry and construction, 100 in R&D, 50 
in other areas of production, 15 in trade and services). On the 19th of June, 1995, a law 
was passed that currently regulates all activity of the small business sector in the territory 
of the Russian Federation. According to this law, the number of the employees in a small 
firm should not exceed 100 people in industrial production, transport and construction, 60 
people in R&D and agriculture, 50 people in wholesale trade, 30 people in retail trade 
and consumer services, and 50 people in all other activities. The government’s share in a 
firm’s equity should not exceed twenty-five percent (National Research Institution 2003). 
A medium-sized business is defined as employing up to 250 people. 
There are three ways in which small businesses were created in Russia during the 
transitional 1990s: 
41
1. through the privatization of state-owned companies or their sub-units; 
2. as spin-offs of the existing (often state-owned) large enterprises, tailored for the 
needs of the mother-company;  
3. through establishing new businesses from scratch.  
The last category – newly established firms – constitutes the majority of existing 
small businesses, and they are at the center of my interest. Each method of organization 
gave small businesses different access to resources and power, and different internal 
dynamics. Privatized firms and spin-offs inherited the old Soviet ways of doing business, 
while start-ups often lacked access to existing trade networks and had to build new ones 
from scratch, unless they had management with strong connections to pre-existing Soviet 
exchange networks. Stiff competition for financial and human resources accelerated the 
“natural selection” process as markets have developed. 
Almost 900,000 small companies were established in Russia by 1995; this number 
has diminished slightly in subsequent years. In 1999, there were 890,000 small 
companies (32% of all enterprises) registered in Russia, 90% of them privately owned. 
According to the most recent statistics (Resursnyi Tsentr 2003), by the end of 2002 
there were 882 thousand small business firms registered in Russia, and 2,137 thousand 
medium-sized enterprises. Including farmers (264 thousand) and the self-employed 
(4,717 thousand), the number of all businesses that employed up to 250 people increases 
to eight million, which 93.4% of the total of 8,562 thousand of firms working in Russia in 
2002 (figure 2.3.1). The overall share of small and medium-sized firms in the Russian 
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economy is 39%, and they employ 45.1% (29,547.2 thousand) of the working population 
of Russia13.
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Figure 2.3.1. Types of businesses in Russia, by share of all enterprises, and by share of all 
the employed in 2002, in %. (Resursnyi Tsentr 2003) 
 
In 2002, the Russian state received 7,278.5 billion rubles in taxes from small and 
medium-sized businesses, 39.3% of all its revenue (of this 20.8% came from small 
businesses and the rest from medium-sized businesses). The share of small businesses 
alone in the economy is quite significant: in 2001 they covered 51% of all wholesale 
trade, 26% of retail trade, 28% of subcontracting jobs and 4% of all industrial production. 
Their share of the Russian economy grew dramatically in the past three years: in 2000 
small businesses made up only 6% of GDP, in 2002 they made up 11% of GDP, and in 
2003 they made up 21% of GDP. In 2003 alone, small businesses created 260 thousand 
new jobs across Russia (National Institute 2003).   
 
13 In the US, small and medium-sized business is defined as employing up to 500 people. Calculated 
according to this standard, the share of economy for this category in Russian is 57%, and they employ 58% 
of the working population (Resursnyi Tsentr 2003, 5). 
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Small businesses emerged mainly in the sectors of economy which were most 
neglected in the Soviet past, such as trade in consumer goods, public catering (cafés, 
restaurants) and services. About half of all small businesses were engaged in trade and 
intermediary commercial services; by the end of the 1990s, they occupied half of the 
market in these sectors.  
At this moment, St.Petersburg is a city with the second highest percentage of small 
firms in the territory of the Russian Federation, after Moscow. In 2002, there were 
131,447 small firms14 registered (Komitet 2004b): 36.8 small firms per 1,000 of working 
age population, three times the average for Russia. Small and medium-sized firms 
comprise 67.2% of all enterprises in St.Petersburg; they employ 40.5% of all residents of 
St.Petersburg of working age; and they produce 50.6% of the total economic output for 
St. Petersburg (Resursnyi Tsentr 2003). 
Officials in St.Petersburg tend to combine needs and problems of small and medium-
sized private firms in their speeches, but provision of any kind of information and support 
is given only for small business that qualify according to the number of their personnel. 
Such support, especially in a form of tax-breaks and low-interest loans, is often 
responsible for the nominal breaking of firms into a number of small ones that in fact 
function as one medium-sized firm, with a single administration and budget. In my 
research such cases were described according to their operational status, rather than 
paperwork that they submit to tax authorities.  
 
14 Experts’ opinions vary on the issue of how many small firms really operate in St.Petersburg. The most 
common estimates are that in reality there are at least a third small firms fewer than the official statistics 
suggest (Komitet 2004a). 
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2.4. Data description  
2.4.1. General description of the studied firms 
The table 2.4.1 presents a summary of a few main characteristics of the forty-five 
privately owned small and medium-sized business firms and their representatives whom I 
interviewed during the summers of 2001 and 2002. The table contains information about 
the firms’ main activity, the year in which they were founded, the number of personnel, 
position of respondents that they occupied in those firms at the time of interviews, and in 
the last column the month and year when the interview was conducted.  
 
Table 2.4.1. General description of the studied firms. 
 
# FIRM’S ACTIVITY 
FOUND-
ED IN 
# OF 
STAFF
POSITION OF A 
RESPONDENT 
DATE OF 
INTERVIEW
1 manufacturing of tents 1992 105 co-owner, executive manager June 2002 
2 construction 1993 35 co-owner, executive manager June 2002 
3 media retailer  1991 3 owner, executive manager July 2002 
4 advertising  1996 13 executive manager July 2002 
5 advertising  1995 12 manager 
June 2001; 
July 2002 
6 publishing 1999 6 owner, executive manager July 2002 
7 business consulting 1992 200 manager July 2002 
8 art gallery 1992 2 co-owner, executive manager July 2002 
9
geophysics equipment 
development 1997 8 engineer-constructor 
June 2001; 
July 2002  
10 computer wholesale 1991 200 head of finance department July 2002 
11 packaged bread snacks production 1998 20 co-owner, executive manager July 2002 
12 construction  1997 35 co-owner July 2002 
13 beer, soft drinks wholesale 1996 35 executive manager July 2002 
14 restaurant 1987 12 co-owner, executive manager July 2002 
15 mobile phone retail 2000 7 co-owner, executive manager July 2002 
16 
design and manufacturing of 
furniture 1994 28 co-owner, executive manager 
 
July 2002 
17 oil refinery parts manufacturer 1992 19 co-owner, executive manager July 2002 
18 labels, packaging manufacturing 1996 40 accountant August 2001; 
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July 2002 
19 chemicals wholesale 1991 120 manager 
August 2001; 
July 2002 
20 engineering 1992 8 co-owner, executive manager 
August 2001; 
July 2002 
21 import and wholesale of lime 1995 2 executive manager 
August 2001; 
July 2002 
22 medicinal cosmetics wholesale 1997 10 owner, executive manager July 2002 
23 sales of consumer electronics 1995 54 executive manager 
June 2001; 
July 2002 
24 
manufacturing of advertising 
banners 1992 40 co-owner, executive manager 
July 2002 
25 fur and leather clothing retail 1998 19 executive manager 
August 2001; 
July 2002 
26 publishing 1999 2 co-owner, executive manager August 2002 
27 manufacturing of beer packaging 1998 110 manager 
July 2001; 
August 2002 
28 lease of offices 1997 7 accountant August 2002 
29 musical instruments wholesale 1999 2 owner, executive manager August 2001 
30 sales of musical instruments  1992 30 manager August 2002 
31 advertising 1995 2 co-owner, executive manager 
June 2001; 
August 2002 
32 
manufacturing of advertising 
banners 1998 200 accountant 
 
June 2001 
33 consumer electronics retail 1994 150 accountant August 2002 
34 telecommunications 1993 100 co-owner, executive manager August 2002 
35 ship electronics repair service 1987 20 co-owner, executive manager August 2002 
36 
business consulting, market 
research 1991 25 co-owner, executive manager 
August 2002 
37 construction parts manufacturing 1995 4 executive manager August 2002 
38 consulting, market research 1995 15 co-owner, executive manager August 2002 
39 sales of construction goods 1996 10 owner, executive manager 
August 2001; 
August 2002 
40 convenience store and cafeteria  1995 14 owner, executive manager August 2002 
41 sales of video/audio equipment 1993 100 financial director August 2002 
42 
radiology equipment design, 
manufacturing 1989 150 co-owner, engineer 
August 2001; 
August 2002 
43 real estate agency 1999 180 owner, executive manager 
August 2001; 
August 2002 
44 café 2000 6 co-owner, executive manager August 2001 
45 hiking equipment retail/wholesale 1992 20 co-owner, executive manager August 2001  
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2.4.2. Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents 
Position
Firms in the sample were selected by means of snowball sampling, where some 
respondents were my personal acquaintances, and others were referred to me by them or 
other personal acquaintances of mine. Although the goal was to interview firms’ primary 
decision-makers, in a few cases it was not possible and instead less significant decision-
makers were interviewed. Figure 2.4.1 shows the distribution of the respondents’ position 
in their firms: 
manager, 13.3
owner and 
executive 
manger, 15.6
co-owner and 
executive 
manager, 42.2
executive 
manager, 15.6
accountant, 8.9
other , 4.4
 
Figure 2.4.1. Position of respondents within firms (n=45), in %.  
 
Most respondents share ownership and active managerial participation in their firm’s 
activity: single owners who are also executive managers of their firms, and co-owners 
who are executive managers combined compose 57.8% of all respondents. Executive 
managers and managers without ownership in the firm compose a total of 28.9%. 
Accountants (8.9%) are a well-informed category of respondents but without much 
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decision-making capability. Finally, the category “other” includes one chief engineer-
constructor and one engineer who is also a share-holder. Out of all six categories three 
comprise primary decision-makers in the firm: single owners who are also executive 
managers, co-owners who are also executive managers, and executive managers without 
ownership, combined constituting 73.4% of all respondents. The other 26.6% of 
respondents participate in local decision-making and/or have an exclusive access to 
information regarding firm’s finances and activity, but do not have final authority over 
the firm’s major strategic decisions.  
 
Gender
The majority of respondents (73%) were men15; business ownership and 
management in Russia still remains predominantly a male affair. Most women in the 
sample occupy less significant positions, like accountant or manager. In fact, all 
accountants among respondents were women, accounting being traditionally a woman’s 
job in Russia (figure 2.4.2). Overall, the more significant the position of a respondent in a 
firm, the more likely it is to be occupied by a male16.
15 Consistent with official statistics: according to the administration of St.Petersburg, in 1999 “over 70%” 
of owners of small firms were men (Resursnyi Tsentr 2000).  
16 Correlation between a respondent’s position in a firm (ranked from 1 to 6 in order of decreasing 
significance, where 1 = “single owner who is also an executive manager” and 6 = “other”) and sex of a 
respondent (1 = male and 2 = female) has a coefficient = .380 (Kendall’s tau_b, significant at the .01 level, 
1-tailed), and .421 (Spearman’s rho, significant at the .01 level, 1-tailed). It shows that the more significant 
the position of a respondent in a firm, the more likely it is to be occupied by a male, within given sample. 
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Figure 2.4.2. Respondents' position in a firm by gender (n=45), in %. 
 
Age
Respondents’ ages varied from 26 to 65 years, with the mean age of 39.2 (fig. 2.4.3). 
Most respondents were in their 30s, and older respondents tend to have more significant 
positions in firms than younger ones (fig.2.4.4). 
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Figure 2.4.3. Distribution of respondents by age groups (n=45), in %. 
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Figure 2.4.4. Age groups by position of respondents (n=45), in %. 
 
Education
Finally, almost all respondents had a college degree or college degree with advanced 
degree17 (figure 2.4.5).  
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Figure 2.4.5. Comparison of education of all respondents, owners only, and official 
statistics for 1999 (n=45), in %. 
 
17 Consistent with official statistics: according to the administration of St.Petersburg, in 1999 71% of all 
owners of small firms had a college degree, and 10% had an additional advanced degree (Resursnyi Tsentr 
2000). 
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Lack of education did not seem to prevent respondents from achieving a significant 
position in firms: out of those who did not have college degree only one person was 
employed as a manager, all the rest were either owners with managerial participation, or 
executive managers.  
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2.5. Explanatory factors  
2.5.1. Overview of the explanatory factors  
Three explanatory factors were selected on the basis of secondary evidence prior to 
the first stage of data collection as having a significant impact on strategies of contract 
enforcement used by a firm: the sector of economy (three sectors are considered: 
“service”, “trade”, “product design and manufacturing”), time of founding (three periods 
are specified: 1991-1994, 1995- August 1998, and August 1998-2001), and previous 
experience of management in the Soviet era.  
Two more explanatory factors were added after the first wave data was analyzed: the 
size of a firm (small or medium sized), and criminal involvement. Size was added as a 
factor because in the first set of interviews many informants indicated that the size of 
their firms determined the contract enforcement strategy they used. Regarding criminal 
involvement, three out of eighteen studied firms in the first set of interviews indicated 
that they had some kind of criminal involvement, either on the level of investment, or on 
the level of personal connections, and the pattern of their contract enforcement strategies 
was remarkably different from firms that did not have any criminal involvement. 
Therefore, I included involvement of criminal capital as a fifth explanatory factor.  
All five explanatory factors can be seen as manifestations of one of two things that 
seem to have the greatest effect on the contract enforcement choices that a firm’s 
management makes. The first and perhaps the most essential cause is the firm’s need,
persistent contract enforcement problems that require some kind of solution or solutions. 
The need in contract enforcement solutions is most strongly determined by the business 
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area in which a firm operates. For example, some firms in service – like a café or a 
restaurant – many not have experienced any contractual violations because of the way 
their business operates: they would typically take food and beverages as a commodity 
credit, sell for cash to their customers, and then repay the debt to their suppliers. On the 
other hand, firms in such areas as wholesale trade, realty or certain kinds of 
manufacturing can suffer substantial and persistent losses due to contractual violations, 
and they may feel pressured to develop some kind of response to contract violations.  
The other feature that may shape the enforcement response of a firm (once contract 
violations are determined to be a threat to a firm’s well-being) is a firm’s available 
resources, both financial and social. The social capital of a firm’s key figures – like a 
firm’s owner or an executive manager – dictates the set of available choices among the 
firm-based contract enforcement strategies. For example, without access to bribable state 
officials the “Threat of punitive action by state officials” strategy obviously cannot be 
used. Likewise, the larger the information network is, the more successful it becomes for 
its members. Availability of financial resources, on the other hand, determines both a 
firm’s capability to pay for those services that can only be accessed through personal 
connections, and its ability to resort to extra-firm contract enforcement strategies, like 
becoming a member of a professional association or initiating a litigation process against 
a contract violator.  
Out of five offered explanatory factors, three are intended to help find out how 
different types of available resources play out in picking various contract enforcement 
strategies. Soviet experience of a firm’s upper management is hypothesized to provide a 
firm with connections to state officials that can potentially be used for enforcement 
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services. Criminal involvement can give a firm an access to the underworld and the 
possibility of using the “Threat of violence by criminals” strategy. The year in which a 
firm was established can be particularly relevant for two contract enforcement strategies: 
“Information and closed exchange networks”, because they grow and acquire influence 
with the time in business; and the “Private protection firms” strategy, because protection 
firms were very widespread and connected to small business particularly in the first half 
of the 1990s.  
The size of a firm can determine both the need for contract enforcement (larger firms 
may suffer bigger losses), and resources (they would have larger financial resources to 
invest into solving of enforcement problem, and may have wider social connections due 
to larger upper management personnel).  
 
The explanatory factors were made measurable in the following way: 
1. Sector of the economy. Question 1.1 of the Questionnaire18 asked: “What is the 
main business activity of a firm?” Three sectors are specified: “service”, “trade”, or 
“manufacturing” when the description of the main activity of the firm was recorded. 
2. Time of founding. Question 1.2 asked: “When was the firm founded?” Three 
periods are specified: 1991-1994; 1995-1998; 1998-2001 and the actual date was 
recorded. 
3. Previous experience of management in the Soviet era. Question 1.3 asked “Was 
the firm previously a part of a state enterprise?” (yes/no aswer), and question 1.10 asked: 
 
18 See Appendix 1. 
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“Have you ever held a managerial position in a Soviet enterprise?” Number of years is 
specified if the answer is “yes”. 
4. Size of a firm. Question 1.4 asked: “What is the number of full time personnel 
employed by your firm?” A firm is classified as small or medium depending on the 
number of employees and the sector when the actual number of employees is recorded19.
5. Criminal involvement. Questions 9.1.1 and 9.1.2 asked: “To the best of your 
knowledge, has there been any connection between the owner(s) of the firm and criminal 
business (please remember that the interview is anonymous and will be analyzed only in 
aggregate with dozens of other questionnaires): a) connections on the level of personal 
relations; b) connection on the level of capital investments in the firm”. Three possible 
answers are specified: “yes”, “no” and “don’t know”. 
 
2.5.2. Sector 
The first explanatory factor – sector of the economy – was selected as a most 
important factor for two reasons. First, identified sectors (product design and 
manufacturing, service and trade) differ remarkably in their entry requirements, and 
returns on the investments. Product design and manufacturing tends to be very labor 
intensive, requires quite a lot of time for any return on invested capital, and the profit 
margin tends to be quite small. Service tends to be less labor intensive, but requires more 
 
19 The dividing point between small and medium sized firms was chosen according to official guidelines for 
the definition of small firm: maximum of 100 employees in industrial production, transport and 
construction, 60 employees in R&D and agriculture, 50 employees in wholesale trade, 30 employees in 
retail trade and consumer services, and 50 employees in all other activities. Firms with more employees 
than that but fewer than 250 were considered as medium-sized. Firms larger than those having 250 
employees were not included in the sample. 
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starting capital; speed and rate of return on invested capital is on average higher than in 
product design and manufacturing. Finally, trade commonly offers the fastest and the 
highest rate of return on invested capital, and it requires the least labor and specialized 
knowledge.  
Consequently, the nature of transactions within each of three specified sector is very 
different, too. In the production sector (= product design and manufacturing) contracts are 
commonly concluded for extended time periods (normally a year) and imply a number of 
transactions to occur within this time period; service contracts typically are concluded for 
each particular transaction (excluding food service providers); and in trade the two 
patterns are mixed: usually trade firms make time period contracts with suppliers, and 
transaction contracts with clients. These differences affect types of contract enforcement 
problems experienced by firms in each sector. 
Another important reason why sector of economy is an important explanatory factor 
is the legacy left over from the Soviet era. Under the Soviet regime, the biggest share of 
the economy was production, while both service and trade were rather underdeveloped. 
Thus, newly organized private firms that engaged in production may have enjoyed certain 
advantages in comparison with firms in both trade and service because the former were 
more likely to have access to old exchange chains, were more familiar with the business 
routine (ie, know-how to do things), and might have experienced fewer obstacles from 
the state bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, the only two firms out of forty-five that were 
created on the basis of a state-owned firm (firm #20 through the privatization of a state-
owned sub-unit, and firm #27 as a spin-off of the existing [former] state-owned large 
enterprise) are both engaged in production.   
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Despite snowball sampling, data distribution along the first explanatory factor is 
rather consistent with the official statistics20. Out of forty-five surveyed firms, thirteen 
firms (28.9%) are involved in production; fifteen firms (33.3%) offer services, and 
seventeen firms (37.8%) are engaged in trade. Figures 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 show the sector 
distribution of the surveyed firms, and number of firms in each sector by the date of their 
founding, taken cumulatively: 
28.9
33.3
37.8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
production service trade
sectors of the economy
pe
rc
en
to
fs
ud
ied
fir
m
s
Figure 2.5.1. Sector distribution of the studied firms (n=45), in %.  
 
20 According to the official statistics, approximately half of all small firms in St.Petersburg in the end of 
1990s were engaged in trade and public catering, 30% were engaged in different types of services, and 20% 
in production (Podderzhka 2001). Since ‘public catering’ can be classified as service, the number for 
service can be brought a little up from 30%, and for trade a little down from 50%.   
57
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
prior
to
1990
1990-
1991
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Years of founding of the studied firms
Nu
mb
er
of
fir
ms
production
service
trade
 
Figure 2.5.2. Cumulative growth of the studied firms (n=45). 
 
These figures show that trade is the most wide-spread type of activity among small firms, 
followed by service. This is consistent with the notion that small firms were organized 
mainly in the sectors of economy which were least developed in the Soviet economy. 
 
2.5.3. Size 
During the first stage of data collection in the summer of 2001 many respondents 
from small firms indicated that size of their firm (and consequently, the size of their 
assets) heavily influenced the choice of the contract enforcement strategy that they used. 
First and foremost, small firms would rarely consider using the state judicial system 
because of their limited financial resources. For the same reason they seldom can buy 
unofficial protection from state officials. Second, because the average number of 
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transactions is relatively small, smaller firms less often become victims of fraud schemes 
and marauding criminals when compared with larger firms.  
Sociologists have long recognized size of organizations (number of personnel) as one 
of the most important variables in studying organizational behavior. Size is considered a 
central property of a firm because of its influence on level of managerial control and 
formalization, inter-organizational communication, structural differentiation. Size 
directly affects organizational resources, the mobility of employees (Kalleberg and 
Mastekaasa 1998), and ability of organizations to survive and to adapt to changes in the 
environment (Aldrich 1979; Haveman 1993). The size of the firm is directly linked to the 
amount of resources available for solving any problems that should arise, including 
contract violation. 
To be able to assess the influence of these differences on the contract enforcement 
strategies used by firms, size of a firm was introduced as a separate explanatory factor in 
the second wave of the data collection in summer 2002. The dividing point between small 
and medium sized firms was chosen according to official guidelines for the definition of 
small firm: 100 employees in industrial production, transport and construction, 60 
employees in R&D and agriculture, 50 employees in wholesale trade, 30 employees in 
retail trade and consumer services, and 50 employees in all other activities. Firms with 
more employees than that were considered as medium-sized. Firms larger than those 
having 250 employees were not included in the sample. Firms were identified as “small” 
or “medium-sized” according to their factual operational status, rather than paperwork 
that they submit to tax authorities.  
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It is reasonable to suggest that having larger available resources to put in resolving 
contract enforcement problem, medium-sized firms will be more likely to make use of the 
court system, and to use such expensive contract enforcement strategies as Private 
protection firms and Threat of punitive action by state officials. 
A majority of the studied firms (thirty-three firms, constituting 73.3% of total) are 
small firms; the remaining twelve firms (26.7%) are medium-sized firms with a number 
of employees up to 200. Figure 2.5.3 below demonstrates the distribution of firms in a 
sample by size, with the breakdown by different sectors: 
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Figure 2.5.3. Distribution of studied firms by size (n=45), in %. 
 
2.5.4. Time of founding 
The third explanatory factor is the time of founding. This factor assesses the impact 
of change in the general economic and political environment over the 1990s that might 
have affected the choice of contract enforcement strategies used by firms. I differentiate 
three distinctive periods in Russian economic development. The first period is 
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characterized by implementation of large-scale reforms intended to transform the 
economy from the socialist mode of organization to the capitalist one. It started in the end 
of the 1980s, when the first laws permitting private property and free economic exchange 
were passed, and continued throughout the major reformation process until 1994. The 
second period lasted from 1995 to the crisis of August 1998 and is characterized by 
rapidly deteriorating economic and political conditions and further criminalization of the 
economy. The third period started after the crisis and continues to the present, and is 
characterized by a general stabilization of the economic and political environment. Each 
period presented business firms with unique challenges that they had to respond to by 
developing resources necessary to use particular strategies available at that time, in order 
to survive. I suggest that the founding time may thus influence the contract enforcement 
orientation that firms adhere to. Firms that were unable to adapt to the challenges of each 
particular period were less likely to survive. For example, enforcement by private 
protection agencies was very widespread in the first half of the 1990s, and those firms 
that did not connect to one, or at least learn how to deal with them, quickly found 
themselves disadvantaged. 
Twenty-one firm out of forty-five surveyed firms (46.7%) were organized during the 
first period, between 1990 and 1994 (in fact three of them were organized even earlier, 
when Gorbachev’s reforms allowed non-state enterprises to come into existence, and had 
to re-register to change their status to fully private firms when the appropriate law was 
passed). Fourteen firms (31.1%) were organized in the second period, between 1995 and 
1997, and ten firms (22.2%) were organized in the third period, between 1998 and 2001. 
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Below is the chart of the distribution of the forty-five surveyed firms by periods of their 
founding and sector of the economy in which they are involved: 
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Figure 2.5.4. Studied firms by three periods (n=45), in %. 
First period
The first law regarding small firms was passed in the fall of 1990, specifying that 
individuals can organize into small for-profit firms. A precursor of this law was a decree 
issued by Gorbachev’s administration in 1988 that allowed groups of individuals to create 
so-called “cooperatives”, which were a somewhat intermediary entity between a socialist 
enterprise and a capitalist private firm. Cooperatives could bring profit to their founders, 
but legally and structurally they still bore a lot of resemblance to their state-owned 
predecessors. Founders of the first cooperatives were glad to re-register their firms in 
1991 and become legal private owners of their firms. 
Meanwhile, the general economic and political environment was in turmoil. During 
the early 1990s revolutionary changes were happening in the former Soviet empire. To 
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start with, the empire ceased to exist, ironically right after the majority of the population 
voted in the referendum for the preservation of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party 
hardliners attempted to get their power back in August 1991, and failed. Finally, the first 
ever democratic presidential elections took place in Russia, and Yeltsin, committed to 
capitalist reform, came to power. The great experiment had begun.  
Russia has a bizarre history of grand experiments. In the beginning of the 18th 
century, Peter the Great attempted to ‘modernize’ a huge and backward Russia in just a 
decade, inevitably failing to achieve his dreams, although changing Russia forever. Two 
centuries later a couple of young ministers tried to do the same, with quite similar result: 
Stolypin’s agricultural reform and Witte’s economic reform were both curtailed before 
they could produce any positive outcome. Finally, the 1920s witnessed the impressive 
experiment by Lenin and his followers, who were committed to creating the first ever 
man-made progressive alternative to capitalistic order.  
It seems that no Russian ruler of significance and ambition can resist the temptation 
of astonishing the world with yet another undertaking of unheard-of scale. Yeltsin proved 
to be no exception. Having initiated shock therapy in 1991-1992, his government together 
with American advisors managed to effectively destroy the Soviet economy, and 
irreversibly change Russian society and the political landscape. Those who were in 
Russia in 1991-1994 remember the feeling of living in a giant casino: even if you win 
today, you may still lose everything tomorrow, and in the end of the day only those who 
made up the rules are the true winners.  
Structural adjustment reforms initiated by Yeltsin’s government in accordance with 
World Bank and IMF advice, brought about among other things redistribution of power 
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in Russian society. Having given up much of its ownership in the economy, the state had 
lost its most significant lever of control. The severe financial difficulties of the Russian 
state put state employees, including enforcement officers, in the lowest income group. 
Police officers and judges experienced long delays of payment of their tiny salaries. 
Consequently, many of them either quit their government jobs and went on providing the 
same services for cash in new private enterprises, or found ways to make their position 
within a state institutions more lucrative through rent-seeking behavior. At the same time, 
disintegration of police forces brought about an unprecedented increase in the rate of 
crime, both petty street crime, and large scale organized groups that engaged in all kinds 
of money extortion from new private businesses21.
For private businesses 1991 - 1994 were the years of hope and the years of loss. 
There was little continuity between laws that the government was issuing daily, and the 
reality of chaos and opportunism. Rapid changes in legal code and disintegration of state 
enforcement institutions caused normlessness in the business environment and emergence 
of many competing business practices. New-born business firms had to learn quickly how 
to respond to hyperinflation, bandits on the streets and in the offices, and new rules of the 
game every day. It is likely that small firms organized at that time would choose “close 
exchange networks”, “private protection firms” and “organized criminals for pay” as their 
dominant contract enforcement strategies.  
 
21 See, for example, Sergeyev (1998) and Volkov (2002). 
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Second period
Year 1995 marked the official ‘end of reforms’, but neither the political arena, nor 
the economic landscape became more stable. Contradictions between the new laws of the 
90s, and institutional legacies from the Soviet era became more pronounced than ever 
before. The state apparatus was in deepening crisis, its political authority was crumbling; 
hyperinflation and unemployment left the majority of the population impoverished and 
desperate; and the society was a no man’s land. Soon the government found itself on the 
brink of bankruptcy and began defaulting on its obligations to its own workforce. As the 
wage arrears to state employees kept growing, more and more of them used their 
positions for rent seeking, some out of desperation, some because legal system no longer 
posed a threat.  
Lack of cash in the economy forced businesses to shift to primitive forms of barter 
exchange. Numerous tovarnyie birzhi (commodities markets) were set up in urban centers 
to facilitate the exchange (Frye 2000). Proliferation of barter exchange further 
exacerbated the financial crisis of the state: it is very difficult to tax barter exchange, and 
tax inflow into the budget thinned to a critical minimum. 
The role of extortion forces that dominated the business landscape in 1991-1994 had 
changed, too. If in the beginning of the reforms extortion forces were more concerned 
with one-time profits, and often would ‘milk’ a private firm until its untimely death, now 
with increased certainty of irreversibility of free-market reforms there came an aspiration 
to participate in the business itself. Criminal fortunes accumulated in the first years of 
reform were looking to be invested. Consequently, many private firms that were 
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organized between 1995 and 1998 had significant criminal involvement on the level of 
ownership and capital.  
Thus, lack of cash in the Russian economy of 1995-1998 caused both predominance 
of barter exchange in economic transactions among firms, and a tremendously increased 
level of corruption among state employees. For small firms bribing of all sorts (“Threat 
of punitive action by state officials”) may have become the most dominant contract 
enforcement strategy during this period. The other new feature of the environment was 
that many former foes from the criminal world now presented themselves as business 
partners. 
 
Third period
The crisis of August 199822 had a devastating effect on small Russian business. With 
most commercial banks gone bankrupt, firms’ deposits were wiped out. One-third of 
small firms suspended their activity, or went bankrupt altogether (Bonnell 2001). At the 
same time, it must be noticed, the post-crisis turmoil opened opportunities for new firms 
to enter the market. In a way, the crisis turned out to be a positive event for small firms: 
the government stopped wasting resources trying to artificially maintain the ruble against 
devaluation, and the purchasing power of the ruble was brought to reality creating a 
healthier economic environment. The economy finally got the cash it needed, bringing 
about an end to the reign of barter exchange, and the country entered a period of relative 
 
22 The crisis had a number of causes, some of which were internal, and some were external. Most important 
internal causes were persistent budget deficits, low tax collection, corruption and poor management of 
exports of raw materials, government’s reliance on short-term domestic and foreign financing, and 
underdevelopment of fundamental financial institutions. External causes included raised premiums on 
foreign loans as a consequence of the Asian crisis of 1997, and lowering of world market oil prices by 30% 
from November 1997 to summer 1998. 
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stability23. While businesses that dealt with imports suffered most damage, domestic 
production received sudden and very much needed boost. The ruble kept falling, but 
gradually and predictably, giving firms time to adjust. New president Putin’s agenda 
included strengthening of state institutions and ending the crime wave, which he 
successfully started with paying off salary arrears and increasing wages to police officers, 
judges and other law enforcement officials. Both these trends had positive effect on 
private businesses.  
In general, the economic and political environment after August 1998 appears to be 
more favorable for small firms. I suggest that overall fewer firms that were organized 
after August 1998 had to resort to non-state contract enforcement strategies, and of the 
used strategies financial tools would be most commonly used. It is also likely that more 
firms refer to state enforcement institutions to solve their disputes now than in the 
preceding years. 
 
2.5.5. Soviet-era managerial experience  
The social embeddedness approach in economic sociology emphasizes the 
importance of inter-organizational networks for the definition of the patterns of exchange. 
The Soviet economy before the 1990s was permeated by strong networks running both 
vertically, from various ministries that dispatched ordered and distributed resources down 
to local factories and shops, and horizontally, connecting managers of Soviet enterprises 
 
23 Numerous factors played role: growing oil prices helped the budged; political stabilization with 
appointment of Putin as prime minister, and his consequent election to presidency; determination of the 
new government to improve tax collection and bring lawlessness in the economic relationships to an end. 
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that were linked by chains of commodity and service exchange. Important members of 
networks were representatives of governance structures. 
Being a member of, or having an access to a managerial/Party network was an 
important asset during Soviet era. It remained important in the 1990s, when many jobs 
changed titles but did not change people who occupied them. It is possible that former 
Soviet managers with substantial ties to people in a position of power use these ties to 
their advantage, including for creating leverage in disputes with their trade partners. Thus 
“Threat of punitive action by state officials” is the possible dominant strategy of contract 
enforcement among new firms’ owners/managers who had access to a managerial/Party 
network during Soviet era. 
Lower-ranking managerial experience on Soviet enterprises is also important to look 
at. People who learned how to manage divisions of an enterprise in the Soviet economy 
may have picked up strategies that they still could find applicable and useful in today’s 
economy. On the other hand, today’s application of the Soviet-type strategies may not 
always be consciously realized: some strategies can become generalized and start existing 
outside of the individual actors. When it happens, we can expect all actors to have access 
to such strategies and use them circumstantially. Examples of such old style Soviet 
practices would be both blat and bribing, translated into the “Threat of punitive action by 
state officials” contract enforcement strategy. 
Out of forty-five surveyed firms thirteen (28.9%) had a respondent who had had a 
Soviet-era managerial experience varying in length from three to thirty years (with mean 
of 9.7 years), and thirty-two (71.1%) did not have such experience. Figures 2.5.5 and 
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2.5.6 show distributions of the surveyed firms in relation to Soviet-era managerial 
experience, sector they are in and their founding period:  
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Figure 2.5.5. Soviet-era experience of the management and the sector of the economy the 
firm is in (n=45), in % 
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Figure 2.5.6. Soviet experience of the management by the founding period (n=45), in % 
 
Since most enterprises during Soviet period were engaged in production, it is quite 
natural that the majority of small private firms that have owners or mangers with the 
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Soviet management experience are engaged in production, too24. It is also logical that the 
number of newly organized firms with owners or managers with Soviet management 
experience would decline over the years, as they would age and retire25.
2.5.6. Criminal involvement 
Just like Soviet era managerial experience, criminal involvement in a firm constitutes 
an important resource that a firm can use to facilitate its contract disputes. Such criminal 
involvement can be acquired through the presence of criminal investment in the firm’s 
assets, by personal connections to the criminal world, or both. Such criminal involvement 
can enable a firm to respond to a contract violation in ways that favor force over other 
means of dispute resolution. Such ways mainly involve exerting pressure on the disputing 
party, making it to comply under the threat of physical violence, but can also include 
gathering of information about the other party. 
As it was described in Periodization section of this chapter, by the middle of 90s 
many criminals realized that real profits lie not in simple extortion and racketeering, but 
rather in ownership, and many of them began investing their capitals in legitimate 
businesses. Sometimes these would be businesses that they formerly ‘protected’, and 
sometimes the business would be started from scratch. Together with investments, 
 
24 Correlation between Soviet-era management experience and sector “production” has coefficient = .459, 
significant at the .01 level, 1-tailed (due to small sample size, non-parametric correlations were used: 
Kendall’s tau_b and Spearman’s rho). Correlation coefficient shows that firms engaged in production are 
significantly more likely to have management with Soviet-era experience than firms engaged in either trade 
or service, within given sample.  
25 Correlation between Soviet-era management experience and founding period is not statistically 
significant, in this sample. 
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criminals brought with them their ways of solving problems that for the most part 
involved threats of physical violence. 
Criminal involvement could also be found on the level of participation in criminal 
networks of the ownership or management of a firm. Such participation can have similar 
consequence as criminal investment insofar as it will provide a firm with comparable 
resources.  
It is possible that firms that possess such additional resource as access to criminal 
groups that can generate a credible threat of physical violence will choose to rely on this 
resource more frequently than firms without such resource, and thus will use “Threat of 
violence by criminals” strategy to help enforce their contracts.  
Out of forty-five participants in the study fourteen (31.1%) indicated some criminal 
involvement, either on the level of connections, or on the level of investment. Twenty-six 
firms (57.8%) indicated absence of such involvement, and five respondents (11.1%) 
answered that they did not know. Figures 2.5.7 and 2.5.8 below demonstrate the 
distribution of the studied firms in respect to the criminal involvement on the level of 
investment, connections to criminal networks, or both: 
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Figure 2.5.7. Criminal involvement of the management and the time of founding of a 
firm (n=40), in %. 
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Figure 2.5.8. Criminal involvement of management and the size of firms (n=40), in %. 
 
Figure 2.5.7 demonstrates that the proportion of the studied firms with criminal 
involvement of some kind has been steadily increasing over 1990s, which is consistent 
with assumptions made in the description of both Periodization and Criminal 
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Involvement factors26. Figure 2.5.8 shows that more medium-sized firms have some 
criminal involvement than small firms27, and it intuitively makes sense that firms with 
larger financial and enforcement resources would have more potential to grow to medium 
size than firms that don’t have such resources.   
 
26 Correlation between period of founding and criminal involvement on the level of connections has a 
coefficient = .307 (Kendall’s tau_b, significant at the .05 level, 1-tailed), and .324 (Spearman’s rho, 
significant at the .05 level, 1-tailed). This correlation coefficient shows that the more recently the firm was 
organized, the more likely it is to have criminal involvement on the level of connections, in this sample.  
27 Four (out of twelve) medium sized firms that were organized in the second and third periods all have 
criminal involvement, which is consistent hypotheses put forward in Periodization section of this chapter. 
Correlation between size of a firm and criminal involvement on the level of investment has a coefficient = 
.429, significant at the .01 level, 1-tailed (both Kendall’s tau_b and Spearman’s rho), showing that the 
larger the firm is, the more likely it is to have some criminal involvement on the level of investment, in this 
sample.  
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Chapter 3: WORKING AROUND THE STATE: 
CONTRACTS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT IN THE 
RUSSIAN CONTEX 
Introduction 
From the very first days of economic reforms initiated by Gorbachev in the end of 
the 1980s new privately owned firms faced a great deal of problems, including that of 
enforcing contracts (Frye 1997, 2000; Greif and Kandel 1995; Murrell 2001; Radaev 
2000; Volkov 2000). Many entrepreneurs suffered from dishonest scheming by various 
opportunists who seemed to dominate the marketplace, from unresolved disputes with 
their business partners due to poorly written contracts, lack of legal advice on confusing 
and ever changing laws, or even more frequently due to the failure to understand the 
basics of business exchange on the part of entrepreneurs themselves. Firms’ struggle to 
survive in the conditions of lawlessness, pervasive opportunism, and social and political 
upheaval shaped economic landscape for the decade of the 1990s.  
I will start this chapter by showing types of problems with contracts experienced by 
the participants of my study who describe how contracting among small firms works in 
contemporary Russia, and how it often fails. While in developed western countries 
impartial legal services are available for contract dispute resolution and redress, in Russia 
the state is perceived by entrepreneurs as unable to guarantee such services. In the second 
and third sections of this chapter I will discuss historical and institutional roots of this 
incapacity of state institutions, and will outline various strategic responses developed by 
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firms. Detailed analytic description of the contract enforcement strategies developed by 
firms will be a subject of the following two chapters.  
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3.1. Contracting among small firms 
 
Nearly all participants in my study – forty out of forty-five (89%) - said that they 
experienced some kinds of contract violation on a regular basis. Out of the remaining five 
one businessman (firm #40) handles his business (a roadside café) in “for cash only” 
manner, thus avoiding contracts altogether, and four participants explained their lack of 
problems with contracts by either having been in business for a short time (firms #15 and 
#26), operating exclusively with 100% prepayment as a safe-guard strategy (firm #8), or 
having dealings with only a small network of well-known suppliers (firm #14). Figure 3.1 
shows the distribution of the problems with contracts that the participants experienced 
while they have been working for the firm that they worked for at the time of interviews.  
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Figure 3.1. Problems with contracts experienced by respondents (n=45), in %. The total 
is over 100% since multiple choices were possible. 
 
Non-payment is clearly the gravest problem noted by Russian business owners and 
managers, while delayed payment is the most common. Breach of conditions of contracts 
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– like terms of delivery – is probably the least damaging to business owners, but 
annoying nonetheless. Let us see now how some participants from my study describe 
their experiences concerning problems with contracts. The executive manager from a 
firm engaged in manufacturing of small construction parts says that her firm has had all 
kinds of problems with contractual agreements since they started their business in 1995, 
despite all the precautions taken: 
We always sign all the contracts before the deal, but in reality these contracts 
do not mean a thing because we depend on our clients – construction stores – 
and they do with us whatever they want. There are plenty of dishonest people 
out there who only want to make a quick fortune. They open a store, take 
goods from the gullible like us, and disappear without paying anybody. It has 
become rarer now, but still happens. Prepayment is not customary in this area 
of business; all stores take goods for sale [to pay us back after the goods are 
sold]. Even if they don’t disappear altogether, they will always delay 
payment for as long as possible. There is a store that owes us money for more 
than a year already; I think that the owner is saving money for a new branch. 
It is much more profitable you understand than to take a loan in a bank. Well, 
maybe they will pay us eventually. We suffer quite big losses due to non-
payment and delayed payment. (Firm #37, Personal interview, August 2002) 
 
A participant on the receiving end of the complaint expressed in the above quotation 
– the owner of a chain of construction goods stores (firm #39) – does not deny that he 
always delays payments for as long as possible. He says that he sees no reason why not, 
since it is profitable for his firm and has no repercussions. Sometimes he receives a phone 
call from a supplier asking to speed up the payment, and in such cases he says he would 
pay sooner rather than later.  
An accountant from a firm that leases offices is the person who makes such calls, 
asking firms to fulfill their contractual obligations. She says that without such reminding 
delays are much longer: 
The average delay of payment is about a month. Delays depend a lot on our 
attitude. If we call and remind them to pay, then the delays are shorter, if not 
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– longer. 30% to 35% of all payments come with significant delay. There 
have been many instances of firms disappearing without paying altogether, 
and we usually do not do anything about it, because chances are we are never 
going to find them and get the money. (Firm #28, Personal interview, August 
2002) 
 
Most participants concur that the worst days regarding losses due to fraudulent 
bankruptcies are gone with the 1990s, and that now the market is becoming more 
civilized, especially concerning non-payment. Most problems happen now simply 
because people do not know how to conduct business properly, how to plan, and are 
generally sloppy. It is rare now that people actually mean to make money on breaching 
business agreements, participants say. “Intentional non-payment used to be a much 
bigger problem a few years ago”, says the manager from an advertising firm. “They even 
had words for that back in the 1990s: ‘grabber’ and ‘duper’, about someone who grabs, or 
dupes, and then disappears” (Firm #5, Personal interview, July 2002). A few participants 
associate the improvement with Putin’s coming to power, others say that people simply 
learned that cheating does not pay off in the long run, yet others maintain that honest 
people learned how to conduct business with the minimal risks, having developed 
effective mechanisms of contract enforcement. 
To understand what the problems described above mean we must look at the concept 
and institution of the contract in the Russian context a little closer. Under the Soviet 
regime all means of production formally belonged to the state, and contacting among 
enterprises was largely regulated by the appropriate ministries. The procedures of 
exchange and redress in case of failure were drastically different from those in capitalist 
economies. So those Russians who began to engage in private business in the beginning 
of 1990s had to figure out how to build up contractual relations with their business 
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partners from scratch. In the chaos of the changing political and economic landscape 
people learned to rely on their own experience, very often negative. I will discuss 
negative experiences of small business owners with state institutions in depth in chapter 
6, and focus here on the experiences and practices concerning use (or non-use, as it is 
often the case) of contracts. The co-owner and executive manager of a firm that 
manufactures and sells tents denies the usefulness of formal contracting in the Russian 
context altogether: 
What can I say about contracts… Anyone can breach them, break them, 
violate them. 
What are contracts for? In general, they are supposed to discuss real 
stipulations of the deal. But in our conditions contracts are made for 
accounting purposes exclusively. It is a formality that no one pays attention 
to, because anyone can breach them. Because in reality there is no system of 
accountability. There is no working judicial system that could guarantee 
redress, and mobsters also stopped doing it. So if someone owes you, no one 
can make them pay. 
I personally always try to carry out my contracts, not because I am afraid not 
to, but simply because I like it better this way, it gives me self respect, even if 
it would be more profitable for me to breach a contract. 
There are many firms with whom I work without contract altogether, we talk 
our deals over and work, no papers signed. What for? (Firm #1, Personal 
interview, June 2002) 
 
Indeed, most small businesses in St.Petersburg often work without signing 
contracts, or sign the contracts after the deal has already taken place. Almost a quarter of 
participants (23%) say that they routinely sign contracts after the deal, and another 21% 
say that it happens quite often. The quotation above explains well the reasoning: why 
bother if a contract is just a meaningless piece of paper? The executive manager of a firm 
that sells consumer electronics puts it plainly:  
The contract is a fiction. I can fix any problem, even if I know that I am 
wrong. I know all the gaps in law that allow me to avoid penalty payments. 
For example, I can close one firm and open another, and I don’t even have to 
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move my office. Any lawyer will be able to prove in a court of law that this 
new firm does not have anything to do with the old one. This is exactly what 
I did when I was sued because I sold faulty equipment. And there were no 
problems. 
And about contracts… It is the state that wants contracts [for tax purposes], 
not us. We usually sign them post-factum. (Firm #23, Personal interview, 
June 2001) 
 
This quotation provides an example of the general sentiment about the futility of 
contracts as binding documents, expressed in the previous quotation. Some degree of 
familiarity between parties is highly desirable, though, in order to allow such kind of 
arrangement. The participant quoted above says that the first few transactions with new 
wholesale buyers he conducts strictly within the boundaries of the law because “I know 
all suppliers on the local market, but buyers can be… for example, they can come from 
the tax police, in attempt to understand how you evade. So during the first few 
transactions I have to figure out if the buyer is the real thing or fake, and behave 
accordingly. If he is real, we drop the pretense and start working with him for real” (Firm 
#23, Personal interview, June 2001). 
Most participants agree that they sign contracts because they are legally required to 
do so in order to provide an account of transactions for taxation purposes. These contracts 
rarely reveal the full truth about a transaction. To avoid paying taxes, many firms distort 
actual volumes and prices of the purchased goods or services. Managers call this practice 
“double contracting”, meaning that there is one “official” contract with fictitious prices 
and/or volumes of supplied or purchased goods or services, and there is another 
document, kept for internal records, that reflects the real money and goods/services 
exchanged. The following quotation describes how an owner of a café handles supplies of 
alcoholic beverages: 
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Question: Do you indicate the volume of the supplied drinks in contracts, and 
how much you pay for it? 
Answer: No, we do not. Reality differs greatly from what we specify in a 
contract. For example, the difference between real delivery of alcoholic 
beverages (in boxes of bottles), and volumes specified in a contract is ten to 
one. It means that for each bottle that we indicate in a contract that we 
purchase and is delivered to us, ten bottles are delivered. 
Question: Is double contracting widespread in restaurant industry? 
Answer: Of course, very much so. This is the only way one can make any 
money at all. I would say that 95% of firms work like that. (Firm #44, 
Personal interview, August 2001) 
 
The system of double contracting is more widespread in some areas of business than 
others. Areas of business that require transfers of large sums of money, or that involve 
large, especially state-owned enterprises as transacting parties rarely use it. That would 
include mostly firms in production. For example, interviewees from firms #9, #17, #20, 
#34 and #42 (all in production) say that it is inconceivable for them to practice double 
contracting, for the two reasons cited above.  
On the other hand, some areas of business seem to be particularly conducive to 
double contracting. Most firms that practice double contracting are engaged in small 
scale services, like advertising or middle-man services, with lots of small transaction, and 
often with a stable network of partners. For example, the owner and executive manager of 
a firm that is engaged in realty explains that all of their contracts are double contracts, 
because both sides want it. If they put the real sums of money exchanged, he says, both 
sides will have undesirable consequences: one side (the realtor) will have to pay taxes on 
the commission made on the transaction, and the other side (the property buyer) will have 
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to explain to the tax authorities where such a large sum of money28 came from (because it 
is common to declare tiny salaries, to avoid wage taxes29). So when for example an 
apartment is being sold for $20,000, a realtor signs a contract with a buyer for a 
significantly lower price: between $2,000 and $5,000, with the realtor’s commission at 
around 300 rubles [Z$10].  Like this the buyer does not have to explain to the tax 
authorities where $20,000 came from if the buyer does not have the visible means, and 
the realtor doesn’t have to pay taxes on the full commission. The participant describes 
what double contracts look like in his firm: 
Question: What do you write in the second contract? 
Answer: The second one is the real one, with the real $20,000 and real 
commission money, and it looks simply like a receipt. A customer treasures 
this one because this is the only proof that he has that he gave us his money. 
But he would not be able to go to court with it, because it is unofficial. 
Question: So you give a customer a ‘receipt’ type of the second contract, and 
keep a copy for yourself? 
Answer: Yes. See, my TV set stands on a pile of boxes? [Interview takes place 
at his home.] These boxes are filled with these second contracts. 
Question: You are not afraid that tax police will pay you a visit at home? 
Answer: They don’t know where I live. (Firm #43, Personal interview, August 
2001) 
 
As it becomes apparent from the above quotation, for some firms the benefits of 
double contracting – tax concealment – outweigh the potential risks of not having a 
proper contract that can be used in a court of law. In the discussion of double contracting 
 
28 Since the consumer credit is non-existent in Russia, people buy everything, including apartments and 
houses, for cash. See Guseva and Rona-Tas (2001) on credit industry in Russia. 
29 It is very common in Russia to have salaries declared significantly lower that the reality. The main reason 
for this is a “social security tax” which is around 30% of the salary. The employers prefer to save this 
money by declaring small salaries to tax authorities, and paying the real salary to their employees in cash. 
63% of all respondents said that their firms hide from tax authorities between 75 and 97% of the real 
salaries. This practice results not only in major underpayment of taxes, but also leads to in a host of other 
problems. For example, financial penalties imposed by a court are skewed due to the underreporting of 
income, and are difficult to enforce. 
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during interviews I asked participants to estimate the percentage of the firm’s revenue 
that goes undeclared to tax authorities through double contracting or other means. Figure 
3.2 illustrates the responses that I received. They are unlikely to reflect exact figures of 
how much revenue is hidden, but they portray a general picture:  
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Figure 3.2. Firms’ revenue undeclared to tax authorities (n=45), in % from all studied 
firms. 
 
The mean of hidden revenues at 55.9% of the total revenues of firms in my study is 
somewhat consistent with the data from other sources. The Goskomstat estimates the 
overall figure to be between 50 and 70% (Vestnik 2003), and the National Institute of 
Systematic Research of Problems of Entrepreneurship conservatively estimates the total 
hidden revenues in the small business sector of the economy as 42% (Shestoperov 2003).  
Some participants of my study lament the preponderance of double contracting 
among small firms. The owner and executive manager of a small chain of construction 
goods stores says in the interview that he personally would rather work honestly and sign 
truthful contracts, but he can find few suppliers willing to do so. The St.Petersburg 
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economy has two types of payment, he explains, cash versus bank transfer, and by law a 
buyer for cash has to pay an additional 5% “in cash purchasing” tax30. Most of his 
suppliers offer him delivery for cash, without papers, thus saving him 5% of the “cash” 
tax. For him the problem with cash transaction is that they reduce his firm’s turnover 
through the bank. Since the amount of credit he can request from the bank depends on his 
turnover, he prefers paying through bank transfers, whenever possible. He explains:  
My bank sees that I have a decent turnover each month, and so they think that 
I am a reliable business owner. A majority of store owners that I know in my 
area of business buy everything for cash. I don’t know how they deal with tax 
authorities though, because in my cash registry it is recorded that my average 
daily income is $300, totaling about $10,000 a month. This money should go 
somewhere, right? If you have debit, you have to have credit, too. That’s why 
I would prefer to work honestly, in full accordance with law. But not all 
suppliers want that. One of my main suppliers insists on working only for 
cash, I suspect that he sells me goods (very cheaply, I must say) that are 
stolen from a factory. I think I even know from which. Another supplier is 
ready to give me a commodity credit with very good terms, only to maintain 
our ‘cash-only’ relations. But I am still planning to try to convince them to 
switch to legal way of doing business. (Firm #39, Personal interview, August 
2001) 
 
Many firms sign general contracts for a certain time period, customarily a year, and 
then skip the paperwork for each particular transaction. These general contracts reflect 
the fact of collaboration between two firms, but provide no specifics as to the terms of 
exchange. Many transactions between small firms are paid in cash. A manager of an 
advertising firm describes her work in the following way: 
Our work is almost always paid for in cash. And we do not declare it [for tax 
purposes]. Everything is done by informal receipts: such and such paid to 
such and such a certain amount of dollars31. It happens often with long-term 
 
30 This tax was introduced to give an incentive to firms to pay by bank transfers that are easier to monitor 
and tax. 
31 Just as most Russian citizens keep their savings at home in dollars (as well as euros, but dollars remain 
the most popular currency), most cash transactions in business are made in dollars. 
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partners that I say: ‘I am giving you $50, are you writing it down?’ He may 
answer: ‘No, you write it’. Then I will write it down, that I paid him $50. 
Later he can even call me and ask how much I paid to him because he would 
forget. Very often we record the exchange simply not to forget [because we 
trust each other]. (Firm #5, Personal interview, June 2001) 
 
Imagining millions of dollars changing hands like that in Russia, no records, no 
taxes, no traces, it is not modern capitalist exchange in a developed country that comes to 
mind, but rather some sort of village bazaar. Many features of business exchange in 
Russia are similar to those found in a typical bazaar economy described at length by 
anthropologists: scarcity and high value of information, stable ties between buyers and 
sellers, clientalization32 and intensive bargaining (Geertz 1978). Information about 
trustworthiness of economic actors and quality of goods becomes an expensive 
commodity that participants have to invest enormous resources into. “The search for 
information one lacks and the protection of information one has is the name of the game” 
(Geertz 1978, 227).  
To summarize, participants described the following practices regarding contractual 
relations with their business partners: 
a) contracts are signed after the fact of the deal (for tax purposes only);  
b) contracts contain false information (double contracting); 
c) contracts are not signed at all (cash transactions with no records);  
d) contracts are signed before the deal and contain truthful information. 
 
32 Clientalization is the tendency for repeat purchasers to establish continuing relationships with sellers, 
rather then searching through the market for a better bargain each time (Geertz 1978, 228).  
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The first two categories overlap, since contracts can both contain false information and be 
signed after the fact. The first three categories reflect the nature of transactions for most 
small firms in St.Petersburg.  
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3.2. Why is it a problem? 
Why has contracting among privately owned firms been so problematic in the newly 
capitalist Russia? There are reasons aplenty, of course, and here I suggest looking for an 
explanation in one of them: the changing role of the state in the economy. As proposed in 
the general theory in chapter one, in a capitalist economy the state serves the role of a 
third-party enforcer of lawful contractual relations. In this capacity, the state should 
demonstrate a credible commitment not simply to creating a legal framework adequate 
for the needs of development of private business, but also – more importantly – to 
unwaveringly enforcing such a legal framework by ensuring suitable punishment for 
violators. In the context of contract enforcement, economist Partha Dasgupta explains 
why such commitment on the part of the state is required: 
• In the absence of punishment for breaking contracts, there are no incentives to 
fulfill them. Threat of punishment must be credible: enforcement agency must be 
trustworthy. Trust is interconnected: not trusting the enforcement agency leads to not 
trusting the other contracting party. 
• Transacting parties’ trust in each other is not implicit; it is based on the 
calculation that given the other party’s disposition, abilities, available options and 
their consequences, the party will choose to fulfill his obligations (Dasgupta 1988, 
50-51; italics in the original). 
As it appears from the words of the participants of my study, so far, the Russian state is 
perceived as failing to create positive precedents for effective contract enforcement. The 
state institutions have not yet managed, or have not been willing, to create a credible 
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threat of punishment for contract violators, and instead antagonized entrepreneurs by the 
predatory behavior of its agents.  
In part, it is the historic legacy from Soviet times that can be blamed for ineffective 
contract enforcement on the part of the state. For seventy years there could be no disputes 
relating to contract enforcement, since there was only one lawful owner of the means of 
production: the state. All contractual issues among enterprises were resolved on the basis 
of the Plan, by or through the mediation of the officials from a corresponding ministry. 
But these practices became unfeasible with the beginning of the process of privatization 
and ownership diversification that were launched in the beginning of 1992, after the 
failed communist coup-d’état of August, 1991, and the de-facto collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The newly elected first president of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin publicly 
declared the commitment of his administration to market reforms in the economy and 
political liberalization and democratization. Privatization of a large share of state 
enterprises and price liberalization were important parts of a packet of economic reforms 
devised with the help of American advisors. But as the state continued withdrawing from 
the economy throughout the 1990s, its ability to exercise control over enterprises 
decreased accordingly.  
The “withering away” of the state (Burawoy and Krotov 1992) was initially viewed 
as a means to achieve liberalization of the market, and was perceived as a positive 
phenomenon by both Russian economic actors and Western aid agencies, until it became 
clear that the state was not able to provide the necessary conditions for fair capitalist 
exchange. The neo-liberal paradigm, introduced by Western-minded reformers to Russia 
in the beginning of the 1990s, particularly emphasizes the importance of free 
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development of market relationships without interference from the state, but it also stands 
on principles of the sanctity of property rights and contractual agreements, and presumes 
their enforcement (Blanchard, Froot, and Sachs 1994). Observers viewed the collapse of 
the Socialist state as a positive event for the development of a free market economy, but 
as the state’s share in the economy was shrinking, so was its ability to enforce the law by 
old socialist means. At the same time, the Russian state was undergoing deep structural 
changes that weakened it and diminished its authority in society; it became riven by 
corruption, fiscal crisis and inability to competently implement reforms it committed to.  
The legal reform designed to support private property and new relations among 
enterprises could not catch up with rapidly developing new market relationships. The 
state contract enforcement system in Soviet Russia was underdeveloped, rarely used and 
generally tailored for different needs than those of private enterprise. When free market 
reforms were initiated in Russia in 1991, and fully private enterprises appeared after an 
absence of almost 70 years, they found the state system of law enforcement in disarray, 
corrupt and ill-equipped to deal with new kinds of claims and disputes (Solomon and 
Foglesong 2000; Waller 1997; Levin and Satarov 2000).  The state courts system 
available to enterprises (the state arbitration tribunals - ‘gosarbitrazh’) was changed in 
1991 into arbitrazh, a system of commercial courts for use by state enterprises and 
private firms.  
The problems with the arbitrazh system were many. Judges found it difficult to keep 
up with laws and procedural rules that changed daily. Numbers of courthouses and judges 
left after the collapse of the Soviet regime were insufficient to satisfy the needs of the 
rapidly growing private sector. But worst of all was the problem of implementation of the 
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courts’ decisions. The old mechanisms that worked to assure implementation of court 
decisions were no longer possible. The power of the Soviet state was based on its 
ownership of the means of production and on its expansionist bureaucracy that 
monopolized the allocation of resources (Verdery 1991, 1996), and now with ownership 
diversification it crumbled completely. Under communism, state arbitration bodies used 
to deal mainly with cases of assigning blame for failure to achieve the Plan. Compliance 
with court decisions at that time was nearly universal. Enterprises were allowed to have 
only one bank account at a state-owned bank, so it was easy for the court officials to 
monitor the transfer of penalty funds in accordance with court decisions. Any dissent 
could be kept in check through a corresponding ministry. It also did not make much sense 
for Soviet managers to avoid paying penalties since ultimately it was not their own 
property at stake. Thus no special court enforcement services were needed for disputes 
among state-owned enterprises. 
From 1991 the situation changed radically. Now the burden of ensuring 
implementation of court decisions fell on judicial enforcers (sudebnyie ispolniteli) who 
were mainly middle-aged women with poor pay and low status, and who in the Soviet 
period were engaged in the implementation of civil court decisions, like alimony 
payments. They could easily be bribed or intimidated by those not willing to comply with 
arbitrazh decisions. In 1997 a new system of so-called bailiff-enforcers was introduced in 
an attempt to improve the rate of implementation of arbitrazh decisions. Bailiffs formed a 
vertical hierarchy independent of courts and subordinated to a Chief Bailiff in Moscow. 
Most of the old judicial enforcers retained their jobs and continued working as bailiff-
enforcers. A shortage of federal funding has not allowed the new system of bailiffs to 
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develop according to design, despite the importance that the government officials attach 
to the problem of implementation (Solomon and Foglesong 2000). 
It has been estimated that during the 1990s fewer than 40% of all decisions handed 
down by arbitrazh courts in disputes among private firms were implemented (Solomon 
and Foglesong 2000). Although the situation seems to be improving in recent years 
(Hendley 2004), the level of implementation of court ruling still remains low. There are a 
number of reasons for why it is the case: the ability of entrepreneurs to hide their assets 
and the predominance of cash transactions are probably the most significant. Another 
problem is a reportedly high level of corruption among judges and judicial enforcers that 
is compounded by low salaries and a lack of oversight. Levin and Satarov (2000) also 
note how a ‘habitual bias’ by law enforcement bodies and their representatives to protect 
state interests vis-à-vis everyone else contributes to spread of corruption: “Protection of 
the legal rights and interests of citizens, including private owners, has not become the 
main perceived task of law enforcement bodies. Not having found formal legal 
protection, entrepreneurs are obliged to seek special arrangements by buying unlawful 
services from state officials” (Levin and Satarov 2000, 120). 
One of the major goals of Yeltsin’s economic reforms of 1991-1992 was to liberate 
economic relationships from the interfering power of the state. The law was now 
supposed to fulfill regulatory functions that were once performed by state officials. In 
words of an American expert,  
In a sense, law has to cease being simply a tool of the regime and has to be 
transformed into an instrument available to all economic actors. What is 
needed is flexibility without malleability. In other words, law has to be 
sufficiently supple so it can be used by economic actors in a wide variety of 
settings to help them achieve legitimate ends. At the same time, however, 
there has to be an inner core of reliability, sufficient to allow law to be used 
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as a shield to protect individuals and entities from arbitrary actions by the 
state and others (Hendley 1994, 29-30). 
 
Two conclusions are evident. First, a major legal reform was needed, one that would 
comprehensively regulate relationships between private firms, state enterprises and 
individuals. During Soviet times the law was a Communist Party instrument of control, 
could be easily changed and manipulated and was upheld by a judiciary that was 
appointed and controlled by the Party. Legal reform was supposed to improve procedural 
regularity: ensure independence of the judiciary, the accountability of officialdom and the 
stability, feasibility, availability and clarity of law (Hendley 1994, 31). Instead, in the 
messed-up political landscape of the 1990s too many interests were seeking influence 
through the legislature, stalling legal reformation and further compromising the 
legitimacy of the law in the eyes of entrepreneurs and the general populace.  
Second, once in place, new laws needed to be enforced. The problem of law 
enforcement emerged in post-Soviet Russia not simply as a problem of inadequate juries 
and judicial enforcers, but as a question of the state’s capacity, its ability to execute its 
decisions, its apparatus and infrastructure. The Soviet state had a system of 
implementation and control that operated along Communist Party lines. At the heart of 
this system was the Committee of State Security (KGB in Russian abbreviation), the main 
coercive power of the Soviet regime. During the Soviet period the KGB performed the 
functions of both the CIA and FBI, and employed an armed bureaucracy of over 500,000 
officers, 240,000 troops, tens of thousands of support staff, and millions of agents all over 
the world (Weller 2000, 96). The offices of public prosecutor and police forces (MVD)
served as KGB subordinates and accomplices. From the very beginning of its existence  
the KGB secured unprecedented power over both the Soviet government and general 
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populace, forming what observers and its own commanders called “a state within a state” 
(Weller 2000, 97). 
In his richly documented essay on the KGB and its role in post-Soviet Russia, Weller 
claims that at the dawn of new capitalism the old communist party apparatus used KGB 
networks to secure “the best piece of the pie”, when the national treasures and the most 
profitable enterprises were “privatized”. The Party used KGB officers in early joint 
ventures with Western companies to control all the profits from business with foreigners. 
When the first private banks and holding companies appeared they were also a creation of 
either Party or KGB officials. Weller also shows how the KGB operated as a “racket”: for 
example, privately founded in 1989 the Russian Commodities and Raw Materials 
Exchange all of a sudden started experiencing difficulties and problems on all levels of 
operation, when its founder received a KGB proposal to help to solve all the problems in 
exchange for representation on the board. According to the Weller’s sources, the KGB 
functioned as an organized crime syndicate that used its own agents as well as regular 
criminals for the purposes of personal enrichment of its top leadership. 
Understanding of the KGB’s post-Soviet activity is important for making sense of 
failures in law enforcement in contemporary Russia. As noted above, the KGB used to be 
the central enforcement agency of Soviet Russia, and this legacy shapes the landscape of 
law enforcement today. In the words of Weller, “the issue of KGB collaboration remains 
a major obstacle to effective, objective law enforcement and development of true civil 
society” (Weller 2000, 108). As long as chief state enforcement agencies stay outside and 
beyond the law, no hope for a truly lawful society can remain. 
 
93
In this chapter, I argued that there are two sets of reasons why state enforcement 
institutions are perceived as failing by Russian entrepreneurs. First, it was suggested that 
it is the changing role of the state in the economy that is considered responsible for the 
problems with contractual relations experienced by most small firms in contemporary 
Russia. The following factors were discussed as the most important components of the 
problem: diminished administrative power and diminished coercive power. Second, there 
is a historical and institutional legacy: lack of both norms and formal institutions 
designed to deal with contractual problems. I outlined three factors as essential for 
understanding the reasons for the failure of state contract enforcement institutions:  
a. Underdeveloped and inadequate legal infrastructure: the judicial system left over 
from the Soviet era was not prepared to handle new economic relationships. The number 
of courthouses and judges was insufficient; judges did not understand how a market 
economy functioned and were corrupt. 
b. Slow and partial legal reform: old laws were not appropriate, new laws were 
poorly written. 
c. Compromised law enforcement: the state’s coercive power was undermined 
during the reform years, and it affected state enforcement institutions on all levels, from 
the top enforcement authority – the KGB – to regular courts and police officers.  
All three components are important for understanding why the state enforcement 
institutions are perceived as untrustworthy by Russian entrepreneurs. The problems of 
legal infrastructure and legal reform are outside the scope of this work. The next part of 
this chapter will discuss what solutions were devised by firms to respond to the 
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challenges posed by an unsatisfactory legal framework and the absence of reliable 
contract enforcement by the state. 
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3.3. In search for solutions 
 
In the absence of the state as a reliable third-party enforcer firms have to find new 
ways to make their partners fulfill their contractual obligations. This process is costly and 
time-consuming. It commences with informal personal connections and is a hallmark of 
markets lacking institutions processing and distributing information about its participants. 
Many potentially beneficial relationships are not initiated because no incentives for 
fulfillment of obligations are seen.  
The use of informal personal connections became the first natural response of 
Russian small firms to the insecurities of the new capitalist market and to the 
inefficiencies of the state enforcement system. Based on reputation and trust, informal 
networks served as channels of information and enforcement, and helped minimize losses 
and keep enforcement costs under control (Polishchuk 2001). Old Soviet networks 
became a basis on which new networks were often built. These networks functioned as 
‘intangible capital’ of enterprises, defining their ability to adapt and prosper (Kuznetsov 
1997). The informal networks were the most common alternative to state enforcement.  
Many of the other contract enforcement strategies that firms developed related 
directly to the kind of state failure to guarantee impartial contract enforcement that firms 
experienced. For example, corruption among state officials, widely perceived as the most 
grievous problem faced by Russian entrepreneurs, could be used by some less scrupulous 
business managers to their advantage. Unreliability of state enforcement agencies meant 
that entrepreneurs could make deals with criminals as more effective enforcement 
partners. 
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New enforcement strategies had a profound effect on the structure of firms and 
business practices. In personnel decisions personal loyalty came to be prioritized over 
competence; stringent financial enforcement measures were adopted to deal with new 
business partners; firms created and maintained safety nets to protect themselves.   
 At the same time, private alternatives to state enforcement institutions began 
appearing on the market. Private protection firms were the most commonly used means 
of private enforcement of contractual agreements and property rights. They became 
widespread in the beginning of the 90s and competed with each other (explicitly) and 
with the state (implicitly) for the opportunity of collecting fees from firms in exchange 
for their enforcement services.  
On the basis of information obtained from the interviews with owners and/or 
managers of forty-five small privately owned firms, and secondary data analysis, I 
developed a typology of enforcement mechanisms currently used by Russian firms. In 
this typology, I draw a distinction between two basic types of contract enforcement: 
enforcement based on the internal resources of the firm, and enforcement commercially 
available in the marketplace, including state arbitrazh courts. Firm-based enforcement 
rests on networks, on values and norms, on continuity between present and future 
economic transactions. This type of contract enforcement exists in all economies to 
various extents, and is based on the social capital of a firm’s key figures. It has been 
observed in capitalist economies by many scholars since Macaulay described non-
contractual relationships among Wisconsin businessmen (Macaulay 1963). In Russia, 
however, firm-based enforcement acquired a meaning quite different from developed 
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countries: it is not considered a suitable and convenient complement to a functioning law, 
but rather as the only means to make a transaction possible. 
Extra-firm enforcement, on the contrary, is based on the coercive power of either the 
state, or other third parties – private enforcers. This type of enforcement is peculiar 
because since the modern state is defined in terms of a monopoly on coercive power and 
the means of violence, it is unusual for a state to transfer voluntarily some of its key 
function to private agencies. In Russia private enforcement agencies appeared in the 
beginning of the 1990s and took over a large part of the state’s enforcement functions.  
Figure 3.3 presents the graphical representation of the most widespread forms of 
contract enforcement available to businesspeople in St.Petersburg in 2002. Both types of 
non-state contract enforcement evolved rapidly during the 1990s. Their development was 
marked by gradual transition from primitive and crude forms of obtaining enforcement, 
to more civilized and lawful means of redress. The state enforcement institutions – courts 
– gradually acquired a more substantial place among contract enforcement strategies used 
by market participants.  
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Figure 3.3. Contract enforcement strategies available to small Russian firms. 
 
Firm-based enforcement 
strategies 
1. Information and closed 
exchange networks 
3. Arbitration by mutually agreed 
upon powerful individuals 
2. Threat of violence by 
criminals 
4. Threat of punitive 
action by state officials
Extra-firm enforcement 
strategies 
1. Professional associations 
(formalized) 
3. Private arbitration courts2. Private protection firms 
4. State arbitrazh courts 
5. Financial tools 
(prepayment, ‘hostages’).
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Below is a brief description of these contract enforcement strategies.  
Firm-based enforcement strategies:
1. Information and closed exchange networks. This strategy is based on business-
to-business relations, and evolved as a means to reduce uncertainty typical to the initial 
stage of market institutions building (Frye 2000). Small businesses lack resources to form 
monopolies and powerful conglomerates as larger enterprises can do, but they can limit 
their transactions to a number of well-known partners and work predominantly or 
exclusively with them. This enforcement strategy works by the threat of exclusion of a 
violator from the network, and consequently from all future transactions with members of 
the network, by ruining its reputation (Greif 1993). Reputation and reciprocated help are 
the basic levers of this strategy. Information networks facilitate information search and 
protection. 
2. Threat of violence by criminals. Ties to criminals allow firm managers to 
display a credible threat of violence against contract violators (Radaev 2000; Volkov 
1999, 2002). This strategy appeared when the state institutions began their disintegration 
in the beginning of the 1990s, due to economic crisis and political uncertainty (Greif and 
Kandel 1995). Two factors contributed the most: a) a weakening of the police forces that 
brought about the b) upsurge of criminal activity on all levels, from petty theft by 
teenagers to large-scale organized crime. The penetration of criminal influence into 
business dealings was the consequence of both factors. This most primitive and repulsive 
form of enforcement was unfortunately very popular in Russia in the first half of the 
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1990s. Criminals were paid to use force to obtain redress for breach of contract, or deter 
contract violation by credible threat of violence. 
3. Arbitration by mutually agreed upon powerful individuals. Parties that 
request unofficial arbitration agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision because of the 
respect they feel for his personality and/or his position. The position of an arbitrator often 
carries not only social prestige, but also real power to interfere with someone’s business. 
Various individuals can play a role of arbitrators: a prominent official in a local 
administration, a powerful mobster, a well-connected and respected banker, or other 
influential persons. The choice of an arbitrator depends on the social connections of the 
parties in dispute, since they have to have access to a potential arbitrator in the first place.  
4. Threat of punitive action by state officials. Ties to state officials allow firm 
managers to mobilize state enforcement institutions in their firm’s interests through a 
credible threat of punitive action. This strategy is based on the connections between 
businesses and governing institutions, and works by creating a credible threat of punitive 
actions for breaching contracts, as well as disseminating information about firms and their 
reliability as business partners. Many of them being underpaid, state officials are often 
ready to sell or exchange their information and enforcement favors to their friends in the 
business world (Ledeneva 1998). Government officials “for sale” are available through 
friendship networks, and used by some business owners and managers to deal with 
problems of non-payment.  
5. Financial tools. These include prepayment or property held ‘hostage’ which 
guarantees the transaction. This mechanism is applied to new business partners and clients 
and is used to ensure that there is no default. The size of the prepayment is often directly 
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correlated with the numbers of previous transactions (Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman 
2000). This mechanism can be viewed as the opposite of closed networks with its inherent 
lack of trust. 
 
Extra-firm enforcement strategies: 
1. Professional associations. These formal networks often take on duties of keeping 
the behavior of their members in check. Members of associations are supposed to follow a 
certain code of conduct with regard to other members, and if reported to have violated this 
code, the swift punishment will be exclusion from the association (Greif, Milgrom, and 
Weingast 1994). This measure can often equate with forcing a violator out of business, 
since for example a distributor of certain goods cannot function if all regional producers 
of these goods refuse to sell their products to him. Professional associations are a powerful 
enforcement strategy provided that a sufficient number of firms in the industry are 
incorporated into the network.  
2. Private protection firms (agencies). Many small businesses are connected to, 
and pay monthly fees to, a private protection agency (Radaev 2000). These firms can 
combine coercive power (used illegally) with more ‘civilized’ means like bribery and 
blackmail.  The law allowing such private agencies to exist was passed in 1993, and in six 
years their number in Russia grew from zero to over eleven thousand, most of which are 
concentrated in large urban centers. While some of these firms started their activity with 
the racketeering of the first Russian entrepreneurs in the end of the 1980s, a majority of 
the protection agencies were headed by, or even entirely composed of former KGB 
officers, other state law enforcement agents or military personnel (Volkov 2000). 
102
3. Private arbitration courts. Government licensed private arbitration courts - 
treteiskyi sud – first appeared in Moscow in the beginning of the 1990s as a response by 
business groups to the inefficiency of state enforcement which was expensive, slow, and 
could not guarantee the security of business information (Greif and Kandel 1995). This 
enforcement mechanism became a legal alternative to state courts. These courts are 
organized by various types of business groups and associations, and licensed by the state. 
Up to the summer of 2002 treteiskyi courts were regulated by a provisional article in the 
Russian legislation33. In July of 2002 a full-scale law (\102-]^) was finally passed that 
detailed their operation on Russian territory.  
4. State arbitrazh courts. Currently, there are two types of state courts where a firm 
can go to solve a dispute: a regular state court, and a state court of economic affairs 
(arbitrazh). The first of the two bears a close resemblance organizationally to its 
predecessor from Soviet times, and mainly serves to resolve disputes between ordinary 
citizens. The second type was transformed from the old Gosarbitrazh at the dawn of 
capitalist reforms in Russia, and was supposed to answer the demand for arbitration 
among new private firms. This type of courts deals only with disputes regarding economic 
affairs and managerial issues, where the sides are either registered firms or self-employed 
businesspeople. The hearings in this type of court are faster then in regular state courts, 
and significantly more expensive.  
 
33 Vremennoye polozhenie o treteiskom sude dlia razresheniya ekonomicheskikh sporov, postanovlenie 
Verhovnogo Soveta Rossijskoi Federatsii ot 24  iunia 1992 g. (Provisionary regulation of treteiskyi courts 
for economic disputes, adopted on June 24, 1992). 
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Although there are nine strategies described above, in fact, they each follow one of 
three basic logics of operation. Informal networks and formal associations work by threat 
of exclusion from future transactions; we can call them the strategies of positive 
incentive. Courts, security firms, private arbitration, use of criminals and/or connections 
work by threat of physical and financial punishment of the violator; we can call them the 
strategies of coercion. The remaining financial tools strategy works by prevention, 
making it impossible for the violation to happen. In essence, all nine strategies are 
distributed along the axes of the two specified types in relation to these three logics of 
operation in the following way: 
ENFORCEMENT 
TYPES 
PREVENTIVE POSITIVE 
INCENTIVE 
COERCIVE 
Firm-based strategies * Financial tools. * Information and 
closed exchange 
networks. 
* Threat of violence by 
criminals; 
* Arbitration by mutually 
agreed upon powerful 
individuals; 
* Threat of punitive action 
by state officials. 
Extra-firm strategies - * Professional 
associations. 
* Private protection firms; 
* Private arbitration courts; 
* State arbitrazh courts. 
The firm-based and extra-firm types of enforcement strategies are actually 
complementary; only commercially available strategies are in competition. This 
difference between firm-based enforcement and private enforcement is often neglected in 
the literature, although it is significant. Both self-enforcement and private enforcement 
have positive as well as negative consequences for inter-firm and state/firm relationships, 
and for capitalism building, and will be discussed at length in the following chapters.  
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Conclusion 
While problems with contract enforcement can occur in any economy, in the 
transitional Russian economy they have reached epidemic proportions. When state 
institutions cannot guarantee enforcement of contracts and property rights, firms 
increasingly rely on alternative (non-state) strategies of enforcement. In this chapter I 
presented the results of a series of in-depth interviews with owners and/or managers of 
small private firms in St.Petersburg, Russia, regarding the kind of problems with contract 
enforcement encountered by Russian entrepreneurs. I then discussed the historical and 
institutional roots of the problem of contract enforcement, and proposed a typology of 
available contract enforcement strategies that emerged from the field research and 
secondary data analysis. Next chapters will look at these contract enforcement strategies 
in more detail. 
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Chapter 4: FIRM-BASED ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an analytical description of firm-based contract enforcement 
strategies developed by small Russian firms in the 1990s, discusses origins of the 
particular institutional forms that they took, and outlines the patterns of their use by small 
Russian entrepreneurs, on the basis of my empirical data. Five strategies are discussed: 
Information and closed exchange networks, Threat of violence by criminals, Arbitration 
by mutually agreed upon powerful individuals, Threat of punitive actions by state 
officials, and Financial tools.  
Contract enforcement strategies are described in the following way. First, the 
strategy’s modus operandi is explained in the words of the respondents, and the origins of 
the strategy are described. Concrete examples of the strategy will help understand how it 
works. In the analysis of the origins of each strategy (apart from the last one, Financial 
tools) I adopt the logic of reasoning from a particular branch of neo-institutionalism in 
organizational analysis that emphasizes the impact of culture on the economic institutions 
and relations (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; DiMaggio 1994; March and Olsen 1989; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977; Fligstein 1996a, Dobbin 1994, Douglas 1986). I trace the roots 
of the contract enforcement strategies described in this chapter in both Soviet era norms 
and rules, and pre-Soviet values and traditions. These practices are not necessarily 
transmitted on the level of individual response; instead, they permeate the Russian 
society on the level of symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that define 
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actors’ preferences and their range of culturally acceptable choices. In the post-Soviet 
landscape, they become incorporated into the repertoires of contract enforcement 
strategies. Having become institutionalized, these repertoires can be seen as existing 
outside of individual actors who select strategies on the basis of a firm’s needs and 
availability of strategies, and also suitability for specific conditions. Different actors may 
perceive a strategy as more or less legitimate, more or less appropriate, or more or less 
effective for a particular context. These differences may be as much the result of 
individual predisposition and moral choice as previous exposure to similar practices. 
More often than not actors simply do not believe that they have alternatives: they are 
faced with a problem, and the solution arises from available resources.  
All firm-based contract enforcement strategies are based on the resources that are 
internally available to a firm. Four out of five presented strategies are network-based: 
information and closed exchange networks work by mutual commitment on the part of 
trading partners; organized criminals and state officials who can create respectively a 
threat of violence and a treat of punitive action are predominantly available through 
social relations, and arbitrators are likely to be found both through social and through 
trading connection. The structure of social relations of firm’s key figures plays an 
instrumental role in their preferences of contract enforcement strategies; it defines the 
very nature of firm’s economic exchange (Stark 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998; Kuznetsov 
1997; Tatur 2000; Rona-Tas 1998). The degree of embeddedness of firm’s decision 
makers in these social relations will define the choice between network-based strategies 
and financial tools strategy, or will determine the degree to which the two are combined. 
107
I will describe complementarities between strategies at the end of the next chapter, after 
having discussed in detail all contract enforcement strategies available to small firms.  
 
Each section of this chapter is devoted to one strategy; strategies vary a lot in 
frequency of their use by entrepreneurs. Consequently, sections of the chapter differ 
greatly in their length. In each section of this chapter after having described a strategy’s 
method of operation and its origins, I present data on frequency of its usage among the 
studied firms. An assessment of the frequency of usage of the strategy was made on the 
basis of the information from interviews. Four-point qualitative scale was used: 
0 = Strategy has never been used. 
1 = Strategy was used in the past once or a few times, but is not used anymore. For 
example, market research firm (#38) used to use a network strategy but abandoned it 
in favor of a financial strategy that they find more effective in preventing losses due 
to contract violations. 
2 = Strategy is used occasionally but not as the main strategy. For example, an 
advertising firm (#4) uses the network strategy to supplement the financial strategy. 
3 = Strategy is used as the main strategy. Not all firms would have one main 
strategy, however. Some firm use more than one strategy on a regular basis, 
depending on the nature of a transaction and partner. 
All contract enforcement strategies were evaluated in relation to the level of their usage 
among forty-five studied firms. The results of evaluation were used in determining what 
kinds of firms employ each strategy of contract enforcement.  
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4.1. Information and closed exchange networks 
4.1.1. Networks in action 
In his book on market institutions in Russia, Timothy Frye tells a story how in 1993 
he asked a broker on a commodity market exchange in Moscow how he knew when 
someone was planning to cheat him. The following answer was given: “Well, before we 
sign the contract, I look him straight in the eye, and if he blinks, then I know he is going 
to cheat me.” Understandably surprised, Frye asked whether this method ever worked. 
“Not usually,” broker responded, “but I don’t have anything else to go on” (Frye 2000:1). 
It is all about the classic problem of social order, Frye says, when “in the absence of 
reliable third-party enforcement, individual incentives to cheat on agreements are too 
tempting to ignore and lead to perverse results for society” (Frye 2000:1). According to 
his research, contract violation did become rarer as time went by and as brokers 
developed a system of self-enforcement – “by word of mouth”, he points out. Brokers 
learned rather quickly that good reputation brings more income than cheating. 
Small firms in St.Petersburg had the same ‘learning curve’ as brokers in Moscow. 
Entrepreneurs of the 1990s realized quickly that redress can be hard to obtain, and that a 
good name goes a long way. They became very cautious in choosing their business 
partners, and careful to maintain good relationships with those who they preferred to 
work with. Many chose to work only with a few reliable partners; others formed more 
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loose information networks34. This strategy of ‘networking’ in the environment of 
uncertainty and unreliable third-party enforcers is certainly neither new nor unique to 
Russia, it can be found in many different times and places35. In Russia networking 
became the easiest way for small firms to protect themselves from potential fraud. A 
manager of an advertising firm from my sample gives the following description to show 
how their informational network functions: 
Question: When you commence business relationships with a firm, how do you 
protect your firm against potential fraud? For example, you mentioned earlier 
that you started recently working with a new small publishing company. How 
do you know that having given them today your order along with 50% 
prepayment they won’t disappear together with your money tomorrow? 
Answer: Before the first transaction is made with a new firm I always check 
their clients. St.Petersburg is a small city, and it frequently turns out that we 
know someone who already works with a firm in question. I call them and 
ask them how they like working with that firm. They always gladly give me 
their opinion, because they know that tomorrow they will call me with 
similar question and I will share with them my experience. On a job market 
they even have a name for such type of networking relations that a manager 
can have. They call it “manager with connections in such and such area of 
business”. I have worked with quite a few firms in advertising, and know 
personally their management, and it makes me a very valuable manager. 
Question: So tell me about this small publishing company, with whom you 
started working relatively recently (last year). You mentioned that they were 
new on the market. How did you check their ‘credentials’? 
Answer: Well, at first when their manager showed up on our doorsteps and 
offered their services, we checked the quality of their work and liked it. Then 
we attempted to gather information about them, and could not find any. 
Nobody knew anything about them. So despite their good prices (15% 
cheaper than the publishing firm we worked with at the time) and good 
quality, we refused to work with them. For half a year their manager visited 
us regularly, seeking to convince us to give them a try. Finally, we took pity 
 
34 A social network can be defined as a specific set of linkages among a set of actors (where the actors can 
be individuals as well as firms), with the additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a 
whole may be used to interpret the social behavior of the actors involved (Seufert, von Krogh, Bach 1999).  
35 See, for example, an analysis of the medieval Maghribi traders’ coalition by Greif (1993), the study of 
Wisconsin businessmen’s networks by Macaulay (1963), and the study of the New York apparel industry 
by Uzzi (1997). 
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on him – he is such a nice young man – and decided to give them a small 
order. They coped fine. So we started working with them. Now we work with 
them on standard conditions: 50% prepayment and 50% after the fact of 
having completed the order. (Firm #5, Personal interview, July 2002) 
 
This quotation from the interview with the manager of firm #5 attracts attention to 
some important points regarding the usage of networks for contract enforcement. First, it 
highlights the role of personal relations among managers that form the core of 
information networks. The above-quoted manager characterizes her relations with her 
business partners as ‘trustful’. Many other respondents referred to their relations with 
business partners the same way, but also as, ‘informal’, and ‘unofficial’. In Russia one 
often goes with another, and once having formed trustful relationships, people often cross 
the threshold of formality, and develop personal friendships with their business partners. 
For example, the owner of a firm that sells medicinal cosmetics says that friendships and 
trustful relationships with business partners are central for conducting business in Russia. 
They are the foundation of any business, she says, and essential for the survival of small 
firms. Many business decisions are made as personal favors, like lowering prices for a 
good partner, or even warning about upcoming bankruptcies (Firm #22, Personal 
interview, July 2002). 
Trust is thus seen as an important variable in Russian business relations, and 
especially for small firms. Despite the fact that nearly all respondents (89%) declared that 
they have had difficulties with contract enforcement, and almost a third (29.5%) have 
been a victim of nonpayment, most of them (61.4%) do trust their business partners, 
however, not necessarily subscribing to having formed personal friendships with them, 
like the owner of the firm #22 quoted above did. Fourteen respondents (31%) maintain 
exclusively formal relations with their partners, while the remaining 69% claim that they 
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tend to establish friendships of various depth with some of their business partners. 
Eighteen respondents (40.9%) say that they occasionally or frequently have informal 
social gatherings with their long-term business partners, and 62.5% of respondents 
believe that informal relationships help avoid such potential problems as nonpayment or 
delayed payment. 
Another interesting insight that we can gather from the above quotation with the 
manager from firm #5 is that the importance of such personal relations – “social capital” 
of managers – is openly recognized and accepted as a part of one’s job description. 
Information about a firm’s past behavior thus becomes a commodity for which firms are 
willing to pay. Firms with limited access to information networks find themselves 
disadvantaged. On one hand, their risk of being cheated is significantly higher. On the 
other, many firms will not have any dealings with firms that do not have an established 
reputation on the market. The story about the publishing firm from this quotation 
illustrates the difficulties a newcomer encounters in attempts to enter the market. Even 
offering competitive quality of work and lower prices, it was very hard for them to get 
clients. Twelve respondents (29% of studied firms) said that have in the past refused to 
work with a firm only because their information network did not have any past 
experience of dealing with the firm in question. Six participants (13%) said that they 
would not work with a firm unless it came recommended by someone whom they know 
well.  
Managers with numerous connections to other firms have access to the information 
about reliability of various market participants that proves crucial to their firm’s 
prosperity. An information network supplies its participants with the timely knowledge 
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about past conduct of its members. Thus participants reduce their potential risks of losses 
due to dishonest behavior, or even due to bankruptcy, as a respondent from firm #22 
noted above.  
Participation in an information network, of course, works also to discourage its 
members from cheating by the promise of widely broadcasting the disreputable behavior 
of the offender. Negative information about a firm’s behavior transmitted via information 
networks can jeopardize firm’s financial well-being and even survival. For example, one 
business owner recalls how in 2001 she signed a contract with a store to sell some 
medicinal cosmetics that she supplied, for the total value of over $1,000, and the store’s 
administration refused to pay claiming theft. The respondent doubted the fact of the theft, 
but did not sue (I will discuss why in the chapter 6). Instead she notified her network of 
business partners. The store apparently went out of business quite soon after the event, 
because many of its suppliers terminated their contracts with it (Firm #22, Personal 
interview, July 2002). We do not know, of course, the definitive causes of the store’s 
bankruptcy, but it is probable that the respondent’s network sanctions played some role in 
it.  
 
If we imagine loose information networks on one side of the continuum of the 
network enforcement strategy, the other side would be closed exchange networks. This is 
a very conservative strategy deployed mainly by those small firms whose management 
feels comfortable working only with a small number of well-known business partners. 
These firms are not willing to take any risks in admitting new participants to their 
network, or do not see it as necessary for the success of their business. A co-owner and 
113
executive manager of an engineering firm describes their work within a closed exchange 
network, and why they limit their exchange to it, in the following way: 
Question: Do you have any problems with contract enforcement? 
Answer: We used to. We used to take orders from anybody, then sometimes we 
would fulfill the order, and receive no payment, the client would just 
disappear. Of course we then suffered losses. So we stopped taking orders 
from just anybody. Now we work only with a few reliable partners who we 
can trust. Some of them are those whom we know for long time [ie, from 
Soviet times], and some came to us recommended by long term partners. 
(Firm #20, Personal Interview, July 2002) 
 
For firms that evolved from state-owned enterprises of the Soviet period, old 
production networks are very important. The two firms in my sample that grew out of the 
remains of Soviet-era enterprises are both involved in production, and both use networks 
as their predominant contract enforcement strategy.  
If trustful relationships between business partners are valuable in information 
networks, they are absolutely imperative in closed exchange networks, as the above-
quoted respondent points out. Any enterprise that wants to have dealings with a firm that 
uses closed exchange network as its contract enforcement strategy would have to be 
highly recommended by someone trusted. The interviewee who manages a store that sells 
leather and fur clothing says that she accepts new suppliers only when they come 
recommended by someone she knows and trusts. She gives the following reasons: 
Question: Why are recommendations so important for you? 
Answer: Because I need to know the quality of a product, the quality of raw 
materials from which the clothes [leather and fur clothing] are made. If the 
raw materials are of low quality, then the clothes will be defective, even if 
they look nice, then we will have returns, problems with dissatisfied 
customers. And the supplier may turn out to be an opportunist, take money 
and disappear, so we will suffer losses. That is why we will work with a new 
supplier only when they come recommended by someone who we know well. 
(Firm #25, Personal interview, July 2002) 
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Participants in my study, however, do not agree on the definition of trust. While most 
respondents agree that trust is a significant variable in their relationships with their 
business partners, they disagree as to where exactly trust is bestowed. The respondent 
from a firm that sells consumer electronics says that it is his personal reputation that 
matters, not the firm’s, and that he feels personally responsible to fulfill his obligations 
under a contract that his firm enters. “If I am given a commodity credit by some other 
firm, they give it to me personally, not to a firm which I happen to run”, he says. “If I 
cannot live up to my promises, I cannot just say ‘sorry, the firm had difficulties…’ I run 
the firm, and they gave merchandises to me and not to the firm” (Firm #23, Personal 
interview, June 2001). 
Other respondents disagree. The respondent who co-owns and runs an 
engineering firm says: “We work not with people, but with organizations. If they changed 
their director – so what? We still have a connection on the organizational level, on the 
level of the chain of production” (Firm #20, Personal interview, August 2001). One 
quarter of respondents agree with this point of view, saying that when they build 
relationships with another firm, they work with them as with organizations, regardless of 
changing personnel. Significantly more respondents (42%) agree with the opinion of the 
respondent from firm #23, maintaining that they build trustful relationships with specific 
people and not with firms that these people work for. For example, the advertising 
manager from firm #5 has been providing advertising services for firm #23 for the past 
four years, although she changed three jobs in this time period, working for different 
advertising firms. Such practice is quite common. 
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Despite the fact that St.Petersburg is not a small town36, many business owners and 
managers who worked longer than a couple of years claim that they know everyone who 
works in their area of business, thus maintaining that they have a de facto closed 
exchange network. It is difficult for outsiders to penetrate such networks: 
 
If nobody [ie, managers of firms that operate in this area of business and are 
known to the respondent] knows anything about a firm, then it means that it is 
most probably phony. It would be unjustifiably risky to work with them, so 
we would never take an order from such a firm. Although if we did not have 
any other order at the time, and were really in a bad need, maybe we would 
take a risk, but so far we have never found ourselves in such situation. (Firm 
#35, Personal interview, August 2002) 
 
The fears expressed in this quotation that if nobody knows about a firm it must be phony 
are not groundless. Especially during first half of 1990s there were lots of shell 
companies, and if one was not careful, or lucky, one could easily fall victim to fraudulent 
schemes. The opinion expressed by the manager from firm #25 was the result of 
experience of working in trade – an area of business particularly vulnerable to fraud. An 
executive manager from a firm that sells consumer electronics explains why personal 
connections are crucial, and why it is risky to transact with outsiders: 
Say, one day you come to my office and offer for sale a consignment of 
consumer electronics that stores that I run can sell, and I am interested. First 
thing, I will be looking for people who know you, had dealings with you, 
and can confirm that you are an honest person. Everyone in this area of 
business knows everyone in St.Petersburg. If I can’t find anyone who could 
vouch for you, I won’t take the deal because it is very likely that this 
consignment that you are trying to sell me has been obtained by criminal 
means. And then I might have problems with the police, and hassle, and I 
don’t want that. I am not afraid of the police, but of a possibility that 
someone who I know who also deals with this type of goods will come to 
 
36 Its population is over four million people (for details, see chapter 2). 
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me and say “you know, this consignment was stolen from me a week ago”. 
And I don’t want that to happen. 
For example, two months ago a consumer electronics store got robbed; they 
stole goods for over $50,000. So what can one do with such a big 
consignment of consumer electronics? You cannot sell it at a flee market, 
you know. So they will try to sell it to people like me, and I am not 
interested. (Firm #23, Personal interview, June 2001) 
 
While worries about quality and origins of goods are very legitimate and common, they 
are not exclusive. Sometimes managers are wary of working with firms that they have not 
worked with before for other reasons. They are concerned whether or not a new firm will 
fulfill orders on time, whether they will provide adequate quality, whether they will pay 
accurately and in timely fashion. Many managers complain about sloppy and 
irresponsible partners that caused them problems in the past: 
I am afraid to work with people about whom I don’t know anything. There 
are so many careless managers around. Once there was a case when we had 
to carry out a big order, and we risked subcontracting one firm with whom 
we had not worked before. That firm specialized in such orders. And despite 
being quite big and well-known, that firm violated the terms of our contract 
pretty badly: they did not complete the order on time, and the quality of the 
final product was appalling. As a result, we lost a very good client, and they 
lost us as a potential business partner. (Firm #5, Personal interview, July 
2002) 
 
Because of the concerns of this sort, almost all surveyed firms (91%) have 
established routines of dealing with new firms, and information gathering prior to a first 
transaction is only one of them (figure 4.1.1):  
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Where: 
a = “Always try to gather information about a new firm before the first transaction.” 
b = “Will never work with a firm unless it is recommended by someone we know well.” 
c = “Everything depends on the impression that representatives of a new firm make.” 
d = “For the first few transactions 100% prepayment will be required.” 
f = “Other”: one respondent put “declaration from tax inspection about firm’s income”. 
 
Figure 4.1.1. Strategies used by studied firms toward a new supplier or a new customer 
(n=45), in %. 
 
About a third of all firms combine more than one approach. Eighteen respondents 
(42%) say their firms rely heavily on preventive measures – they would not work with a 
new firm without first receiving a payment in full. We will discuss this as a separate 
financial strategy further in this chapter. An even more harsh approach is used by 13% of 
firms, whose management refuses to even consider dealing with a firm about which they 
don’t have any information. 40% of all managers say that they routinely collect 
information about other firms from their information networks. But a third of respondents 
(33%) say that they predominantly trust their own opinion, and make a decision about 
collaboration with a firm on the basis of personal impressions from its representatives. 
Information networks are not always confined to a firm’s business partners. 
Occasionally other parties may get involved, especially when a firm’s well-being is at 
stake. The manager from an advertising firm explains that her firm’s management would 
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often look for necessary information from sources other than business acquaintances. For 
example, if their debtor has an account in the same bank as theirs, management could 
request information about the debtor’s state of affairs from the management of the bank: 
Being good clients, we know our bank’s management personally. We can 
go and explain the problem. The bank can then either call the debtor 
themselves, or suggest other ways of influencing the debtor. Sometimes 
what we need is just reassurance. Maybe, the debtor delays repaying for 
some legitimate reasons, but their finances are in order and they will pay. 
Or maybe not. The thing is, the debtors always say “I will pay”, but will 
they really? Any information about the debtor is essential because it helps 
determine our firm’s course of action with regard to the debt. (Firm #5, 
Personal interview, July 2002) 
 
Like in the case with business partner networks, referring to a bank manager serves 
as a means to reduce the unknown to manageable proportions. Such relationships are 
built on chains of personal dependencies and trust, are highly informal, and carefully 
maintained.  
Networks described in this chapter do not exist entirely outside of the state legal 
system, like in case of networks in the informal economy (Portes 1994; 2003). They 
interact with the state institutions as much as it is necessary, and parties do not depend on 
their networks for survival as much as it is the case in the informal economy. However, 
they are quite similar to informal economy networks in their reliance on trust, reputation 
and mutual help. The similarity becomes more pronounced if we take into account the 
frequency of cash transactions, unaccounted for by the tax authorities: a whooping 40% 
of respondents said that they declare only 20% or less of their firm’s income. Even more 
is concealed from tax authorities in terms of personnel’s salary: 53% of studied firms 
declare less than 20% of salaries. I will discuss this phenomenon in Chapter 6. 
 
119
4.1.2. Origins 
The particular character of the network enforcement strategy which has evolved in 
Russia in the past decade is deeply rooted in the nature of the Soviet system. The Soviet 
state’s ideology condemned individualism and promoted collectivism as a distinct feature 
of socialist society. Seventy years of propaganda pictured true Soviet citizens as 
subsuming their personal interests to the interests of their peer group, be it in the work 
place, at home, in the Party, or simply with a group of friends. The ultimate role of this 
propaganda was to ensure loyalty to the Party and the socialist system, but in the end of 
the day the same collectivism helped brew dissidents, a culture of silent non-compliance 
and shirking, and corruption.   
Communist emphasis on community as the foundation of social order and the 
shunning of everything individualistic and utilitarian was however neither original nor 
unpopular among Russians. As a number of authors poignantly show in their works 
(McDaniel 1996; Berdjaev 1990; Fedotov 1992; Kljuchevskii 1990), it was a part of the 
so-called “Russian idea” that existed for centuries among different strata of Russian 
society. “The rejection of egotistic utilitarianism; the desire for community; the suspicion 
of private property; the hatred of formalism in social relations, especially as concerns 
law; the desire for a state that will protect the subject against social elites; …” (McDaniel 
1996, 24) were the arguments of Russian intellectuals both under tsarism and under 
communism.  
Community in Russia, McDaniel (1996) argues, has always been experienced in 
local contexts and defined in oppositional terms to exogenous groups, be they ethnic, 
religious, or class-based. This binary logic delineates the world as “right” versus 
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“wrong”, “us” versus “them”, “community” versus “state”, and “truth” versus “law”. 
Cold and impersonal law is grouped by this logic with state, in opposition to the 
righteousness of truth that a community possesses. Traditionally the law has been weak in 
Russia, legal institutions inspiring more suspicion and intrigue than trust. To the contrary, 
friends and relations were the ones to be relied on and referred to at times of crises as 
well as in everyday affairs. Familial group identity among Russians traditionally served 
as a foundation for personal identity, and loyalty to the collective superseded one’s 
egotistic self-interest.  
This cultural emphasis on the collective was probably one of the reasons why 
Marxism won hearts and minds of many a Russian intellectual, and eventually gave rise 
to bolshevism. Bolsheviks used networks of supporters to advance the revolutionary 
cause; lacking formal organizational resources after the revolution and the civil war they 
relied heavily on informal networks in attempts to consolidate disintegrated pieces of the 
former empire (Easter 1996). 
Kuznetsov, along with other sociologists (Berliner 1988; Ledeneva 1998; Randall 
2001) claims that the Soviet economy was operating, from the very beginning, on the 
basis of informal networks, based on personal trust. Participation by Soviet managers in 
informal networks of influential people in the region was a key to success, or at least to 
keeping a job. As Burawoy and Krotov note, “In contrast to the capitalist enterprise, the 
secret of the successful Soviet enterprise lies in its bargaining relations with external 
organizations” (Burawoy and Krotov 1992, 28). This arrangement was embedded in the 
system of a centralized planned economy. It was formed under Stalin’s regime, when 
failure to achieve planned quotas could easily send a manager to the GULAG, and 
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matured during the decades of Brezhnev’s sleepy rule. The main reason for the “survival 
networking” was of course the incongruities of the system, which led to frequent 
disruptions of supply schedules, and then it was up to a manager to ensure that the 
production quotas were met: 
A manager who had the right contacts in other economic enterprises within the 
Soviet Union could unofficially swap or barter for needed materials. Therefore, 
Soviet managers developed networks of people within their enterprise, local 
party officials, and managers from other enterprises in order to facilitate the 
acquisition of these necessities. … If the director of the enterprise or one of its 
top managers had these connections or acquaintances, then both enterprises 
would receive secret shipments, many times at night, so that production quotas 
could be met. The use of personal influence, or blat, saved many managers. 
This system required the unofficial support of a number of people in the 
enterprise, in the local party, and sometimes even in the government. (Randall 
2001, 56) 
 
Thus the success for Soviet managers was often defined by their skills in networking, and 
not in optimizing production or stimulating innovation, like in a capitalist enterprise. I 
will discuss Soviet-style networks in more detail later in this chapter, in the section 
devoted to the Treat of punitive action by state officials strategy. 
At the time of economic and political upheaval in the beginning of the 1990s the 
social value of trust increased dramatically. People referred to their friendship networks 
as one of the last things to believe in, and count on. Information and closed exchange 
networks were frequently formed by people who knew each other from before they 
entered the business worlds, and who relied on their feelings of friendship as an ultimate 
enforcement guarantee. These people might often have displayed opportunistic behavior 
toward outsiders, but they tended to maintain loyalty to their group.  
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4.1.3. Usage of networks enforcement strategy among studied firms 
To determine how frequently participants of my study relied on the network strategy 
I first asked those entrepreneurs who do not experience problems with contract 
enforcement to assess the significance of networks in their enforcement arsenal. Second, 
all respondents were asked to evaluate the ratio of long-term business relations to short-
term/rotating ones, thus uncovering existing de facto networks, regardless of their use in 
contract enforcement by those firms. Third, a wide range of questions were asked 
throughout the interviews that were meant to indirectly indicate reliance on networks for 
contract enforcement. For example, question #3.5 asked whether long-term or new 
business partners are given priority in a tight financial situation (which happens often to 
nearly all respondents); question #4.13 asked about speed and reliability of the 
dissemination of information about contract breaches. Finally, section #7 of the 
questionnaire is fully devoted to relationships between firms and asks questions about the 
level of trust that exists between respondents and their business partners and clients, level 
of formality in communication, and sources of information about business partners. 
The inference about degree of usage of networks as a contract enforcement strategy 
was made on the basis of all of these questions (2.1; 2.2; 3.2; 3.5; 4.13; 4.14; 7.1 – 7.14). 
Four types of strategy usage are identified (Figure 4.1.2):  
a) strategy has never been used; 
b) used once or several times in the past but unlikely to be used it again; 
c) currently used to some extent, when necessary or possible; 
d) currently used as a main strategy. 
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Figure 4.1.2. Usage of Information and closed exchange networks contract enforcement 
strategy among studied firms (n=44), in %. 
 
Who are these firms that use networks as their contract enforcement strategy? Statistical 
analysis of intensity of usage of networks as a contract enforcement strategy and five 
explanatory variables produced the following results. Sector of economy appears to 
matter to a certain extent: firms in service tend to choose this strategy a little more 
frequently than firms in trade or production. Firms organized earlier tend to use networks 
as a contract enforcement strategy more frequently than firms organized later. This can be 
due to two reasons: either because they organized at such time when you only could 
survive through networks, or because they had enough time to create networks. It is likely 
that both reasons are in play. Neither of these two correlations is statistically significant.  
Correlation between the size of the firm and likelihood of choosing this contract 
enforcement strategy is statistically significant: smaller firms are more likely to use 
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networks to enforcement their contracts37. Small firms have fewer resources, losses are 
more costly to them, and they more rarely can afford the costs of debt recovery via the 
courts or other third parties. Consequently, they prefer to rely on strategies that do not 
require financial investment, even though this can potentially limit new business 
opportunities.  
Criminal involvement of firm’s management correlates negatively with using this 
strategy38, which means that firms whose upper management has connections to criminal 
world on the level of investment or personal ties are less likely to enter information and 
closed exchange networks for the purposes of contract enforcement than firms without 
such connections.  
In essence, we can say that the Information and closed exchange networks 
enforcement strategy is based on business-to-business relations, and evolved as a means 
to reduce uncertainty in the 1990s. This strategy is widely used by small businesses that 
lack the resources to form monopolies and powerful conglomerates as larger enterprises 
can, but can limit their transactions to a number of well-known partners, and those firms 
that were organized in the first half of 1990s. 
This enforcement strategy encompasses a whole range of behaviors, from relying on 
networks for information about a (potential) business partner to limiting a firm’s 
 
37 Correlation between the size of the firm and usage of exchange and information networks for contract 
enforcement purposes has a coefficient = -.319 (Kendall’s tau_b) and -.340 (Spearman’s rho), significant at 
the .05 level, 1-tailed (due to small sample size, non-parametric correlations were used). Correlation 
coefficient shows that larger firms are significantly less likely to use exchange and information networks 
for contract enforcement purposes than smaller firms, within the given sample. 
38 Correlation between criminal involvement and usage of networks for contract enforcement purposes has 
a coefficient = -.288 (Kendall’s tau-b) and -.307 (Spearman’s rho) significant at the .05 level, 1-tailed. 
Correlation coefficient shows that firms that have criminal involvement on the level of investment or 
personal connections of upper management are significantly less likely to use networks for contract 
enforcement purposes than firms without criminal involvement, within the given sample. 
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transactions to a few well-known partners. It works by relying on trust and reputation as 
well as by threat of exclusion of the violator from the network, and consequently from all 
future transactions with members of the network, by ruining its reputation.  
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4.2. Threat of violence by criminals          
4.2.1. Criminal groups in post-Soviet Russia 
Ever since perestroika opened up new possibilities for private entrepreneurship, 
violence and criminality became both an integral part of private business, and arguably its 
biggest problem. Even today it is common to see advice in the media, especially in the 
business press, on how to deal with people and groups from the other side of law. Most 
businesspeople in St.Petersburg either have some kind of connections to the criminal 
world, or at least are aware of its existence in their close vicinity.  
There is little information about the scope, sources and functions of criminal groups 
in the business world of post-Communist Russia, without doubt largely due to the 
difficulties of studying such a subject.  Much of the existing body of theoretical research 
on the role and place of crime in modern Russia (Sachs and Pistor 1997; Leitzel 1997; 
Åslund 1997) is based on the seminal work of Diego Gambetta (1993) who explored the 
economics of private protection by the Mafia in Southern Italy. However, with the lack of 
hard evidence, theoretical speculations seem to be based more on “anecdotal or 
impressionistic evidence” (Frye and Zhuravskaya 2000, 478) spurred by “‘excitation’ on 
the part of mass media”  (Radaev 2000, 42) than on the realities of present day Russia. 
A number of empirical studies have been done in the recent years attempting to fill in 
this void. Fry and Zhuravskaya (2000) collected substantial empirical evidence on a 
particular aspect of criminal involvement in Russian business: the role of rackets in the 
retail trade. They discovered that small Russian shops tend to rely heavily on private 
protection rackets, especially when compared with shopkeepers in Poland and Romania. 
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In particular, they found a strong positive link between the level of official regulatory 
demands, and the level of reliance on protection rackets. 
Another important empirical study of Russian private enterprises was conducted by 
Russian sociologists in 1997-199839. This survey tackled the issue of violence in Russian 
business, including rackets, protection services by both criminal groups and registered 
protection agencies, evolution of criminal involvement in business relations, and changes 
in state power structures. Overall, the survey found that the media reports about the 
prevalence of criminal means of problem-solving in business conflicts are exaggerated. 
The researchers list a number of factors responsible for a general decline in application of 
forcible methods in Russian business. First, while most business people, according to 
survey results, pay for protection services “just in case”, they prefer not to use them. 
Second, protection agencies themselves changed: more of them now are respectable 
registered enterprises and not criminal groups who are after quick money. And finally, 
state power structures are perceived as becoming somewhat more forceful and effective 
than a decade ago (Radaev 2000). 
Research by Russian sociologist Vadim Volkov (1999, 2000, and 2002) provides a 
very valuable insight into the nature of the relationships between the criminal and 
business worlds in Russia, and also is extremely helpful in conceptualizing these 
relationships which he calls “enforcement partnership”. Enforcement partnership refers to 
strategic alliances formed by agencies capable of violence, and (sometimes unwilling) 
entrepreneurs, in which the former is hired to perform debt recovery, contract 
 
39 The study was conducted by the Center for Political Technologies (managed by I.Bunin ), on order from 
the Center for International Private Enterprise of the United States (CIPE), reported by V.Radaev (2000). 
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enforcement, dispute settlement, and negotiations of various kinds, including those with 
state  officials. Enforcement partnership frequently results in violent entrepreneurship 
which Volkov defines as “a set of organizational decisions and action strategies enabling 
the conversion of organized force (or organized violence) into money or other market 
resources on a permanent basis” (Volkov 1999, 741). In his own work, Volkov 
distinguishes between three types of the ‘violent entrepreneurial agency’: state agencies 
illegally acting as private enterprises, non-state private protection companies, and 
organized criminal or bandit groups. In this part, I am focusing on the role of the last in 
the enforcement services in St.Petersburg.  
For the purposes of analytical clarity, I also would like to point out the distinction 
between extortion/racketeering and enforcement services by criminal elements. Here I am 
including in the analysis only those contacts between business managers and the criminal 
world which result in enforcement of the firm’s contracts. This enforcement strategy 
presents a particular challenge for analytic exploration not simply because it is often 
virtually impossible to distinguish between racketeering and enforcement services, but 
also because of its convergence with private protection companies. The organized groups 
that offer enforcement services along with extortion can be seen as moving in and out of 
the legal framework as they acquire or lose a state’s license to offer security and 
protection services; offer services that are allowed by law, or not; and properly document 
the nature of their relationships with their clients for the regulatory authorities, or not. 
These variables make it extremely hard to differentiate between enforcement by threat of 
force offered illegally, and the same type of enforcement that comes from licensed 
private protection agencies.  
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Although the dividing line is thin, I draw the distinction between the two on the basis 
of availability of the services. Private protection agencies offer, or are supposed to offer, 
their services to an entire business community. This type of commercially available 
enforcement will be discussed in depth in the next chapter. Enforcement by threat of 
force from criminals that is not available to the business sector and can be obtained only 
through immediate connections to them is in the focus of this part. 
 
4.2.2. Origins of the strategy 
Criminal groups started offering services of enforcement by threat of violence in the 
beginning of the 1990s, when for those of them engaged in lucrative racketeering of co-
operatives of the late 1980s it became clear that it pays to support the business you milk. 
Gone were the days of random and violent extortion; competition on the “market” of 
extortion and racketeering made them seek more regularized relationships with their 
“clients”, and look after their clients’ well-being: 
As extortion became regular, it turned into a protection racket – an 
institutionalized practice whereby tribute is collected on behalf of a criminal 
group that, in exchange, claims to offer physical protection from other such 
groups. But as the private sector expanded and the intensity of business 
transactions grew, criminal groups got engaged in more sophisticated 
activities such as debt recovery, contract enforcement, dispute settlement, 
and negotiations with the state authorities concerning registration, export 
licenses, tax exemptions, and the like. (V.Volkov 2000:491)  
 
At that time, perhaps the biggest concerns faced by most businesspeople were 
premeditated non-payment on the part of dishonest business partners, and the threat of 
violence on the part of numerous rival criminal and semi-criminal groups. Most 
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St.Petersburg business owners in the beginning of 1990s ended up entering into some 
kind of relationships with at least one such group.  
What did those criminal groups look like? Frequently, they would initially be formed 
on the basis of either some region or place (like students in St.Petersburg who came there 
to study from a town nearby could form a group named after that town), on the basis of 
ethnicity (Chechens are probably the most notorious), or athletes on the basis of some 
sport club (boxers, wrestlers and the like). Later they inevitably blended together, adding 
to the mix quite a few professionals from the KGB, military and police forces 
(Konstantinov 1997; Volkov 1999, 2000). Many young street thugs start out in this 
particular “career” by offering protection services to local business owners for cash. 
Private protection and enforcement services became one of the major engagements and a 
source of regular revenue for criminal groups in the beginning of the 1990s. 
The general transition to more legal and less violent means of settling the conflicts 
during the 1990s meant that more and more such groups were becoming legalized private 
protection firms, or started their own businesses altogether. But of course, far from all 
took this road. And to those business owners who did not shy away from drastic measures 
to recover their debts or cope with a competitor, criminal groups offered certain 
advantages. They were less picky in their means than their legalized competitors, and as 
was maybe the case with some prominent criminal organizations, their reputation 
frequently worked for them: 
The name of the group has a specific function in the practice of violent 
entrepreneurship: it guarantees the ‘quality’ of protection and enforcement 
services and refers to the particular kind of reputation that is built from the 
known precedents of successful application of violence and ‘question 
solving’. Because the functional necessity of the institution of enforcement 
partners derives from high entrepreneurial risks, the media stories about 
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‘horrible’ and ‘omnipowerful’ bandit groups only help to sustain the 
functional necessity of this institution and support the reputation of such 
groups. (Volkov 1999, 746) 
 
There is very little evidence on how widespread enforcement by threat of violence by 
criminals is. Numerous figures have been cited in both Russian and Western sources, all 
being crude estimates. For example, in 1998 the MVD40 published the following 
information concerning involvement of the criminal world into the business world in 
Russia: criminal gangs were said to control or own 40,000 economic subjects, including 
1,500 state enterprises, over 500 joint enterprises, and over 500 banks41. According to 
the results of an all-Russia survey conducted in 1997, about a half of 227 studied firms 
made regular payments for protection services to various organizations (Radaev 1998). It 
however remains unclear whether such payments are made voluntarily or they represent 
old-fashioned extortion in a new “protection services” guise, and how many of these 
protection services are provided illegally by criminal groups. A survey in 1997-1998 
conducted by the Center for Political Technologies found that 11% of entrepreneurs are 
inclined to use force in conflict situations, like deception on the part of a partner. Overall, 
sociologists who conducted the study estimate that around 15% of Russian private firms 
“gravitate toward criminal segments of the market”. That is in spite of the fact that 42% 
of those surveyed said that they have experienced threats and forcible extortion, and 53% 
said that they pay to some organization for protection services (Radaev 2000). 
 
40 MVD stands in Russian for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a mother organization of police forces. 
41 Zaschita i bezopasnost’ 1998(2):4-5, cited in V.Volkov (1999, 748). 
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4.2.3. The patterns of the strategy operation 
The results of my study are somewhat consistent with the results of prior surveys. 
Eighteen respondents out of forty-five (40%) indicated that their firm makes regular 
payments to a private protection agency. How many of those are illegal bandit gangs is 
not clear, and even the most frank interviewees were reluctant to disclose any details that 
could shed some light on this matter. During some interviews, when answers to certain 
questions led me to believe that the respondent’s firm may be affiliated with a criminal 
group (regardless if it happened of their own accord, or was forced on them) and I tried to 
dig a bit deeper, I typically heard “It is better for you not to know”42. Some respondents 
did admit that they employ criminals, and a few made an explicit distinction between 
using criminals for contract enforcement, debt recovery and various negotiations, and a 
protection agency for office security. I will discuss the usage of protection agencies and 
how they differ from criminal enforcement in the next chapter. 
Realizing that inferences from indirect question will always be inferior to exact 
information, I still attempted an “informed guess” to estimate the level of active presence 
of criminals in a firm’s enforcement repertoire. This guess is based on a number of 
questions from the questionnaire: question #4.1.5 asked if a firm ever hired somebody to 
use unlawful violence or a threat of violence against a dishonest business partner; 
question #4.1.3 asked if a firm’s management requested help from friends or relatives to 
use unlawful violence or a threat of violence against a dishonest business partner. Those 
 
42 There was one respondent whose amazingly candid account of her encounters with criminals made me 
want to include it in full. It can be found in the Appendix 2: “Luba’s story”.  
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respondents who answered yes to either of these two questions were asked to explain the 
circumstances, and the frequency of occurrence.  
 Four respondents said that their firms had paid criminals to use the threat of violence 
against dishonest business partners in the past, and four more admitted having long-term 
relationship with a criminal group. Two out of these eight respondents said they have 
close, informal relationships with those criminals that they hired. There are also a 
substantial number of respondents – eleven out of forty-five (24.4%) – who said that they 
were not in the position to know whether or not criminals have ever been hired to address 
contract enforcement problems. 
These numbers are quite likely to underestimate how frequently enforcement by 
threat of violence by criminals is actually employed. As indicated in chapter two, a third 
of all respondents admitted having some criminal involvement in their business, either on 
the level of connections, or on the level of financial investment. Having such an 
important resource available means that these firms are much more likely to use it at 
times of trouble than firms without such connections. It is also reasonable to suggest that 
just like the reputation of a criminal group works to discourage any violations against 
those under its protection, so does the reputation of criminals if they start their own 
business. For example, an advertisement manager from firm #5 who has also four-year 
long personal and business relationships with firm #23 reports the details of firm #23’s 
operations that their executive manager was reluctant to share: 
Question: Tell me about this firm you have been working for [in addition to 
your main job]. How do they solve their problems with contract 
enforcement? 
Answer: Their owner is a real, well-known bandit, he owns a few firms in 
St.Petersburg. My friend V. (the executive manager) manages one of his 
firms very well, and they are quite happy with each other. My friend once 
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told me that if I ever have any problems with bandits, that if ever someone 
threatens me, I should just let him know, and his boss will fix it immediately. 
Question: You say he is such a good manager. Why does not he open his own 
business? 
Answer: With his own business he would be completely unprotected. The way 
things are now, all his problems are solved before he even knows about them. 
Nobody dares to cause his boss’s business any harm [because of the boss’s 
reputation in town as a tough criminal], even state authorities. For example, 
he placed an ad banner on Nevski (the main thoroughfare in St. Petersburg) a
while ago, and in theory he was supposed to make a substantial payment to 
the City Center of Advertisement Placement for this ad, but he did not. And 
guess what? Nobody did anything against him. If my friend was the owner, 
being unprotected and small, they would make him pay in full, plus fine. 
(Firm #5, Personal interview, June 2001) 
 
Unfortunately, but understandably, the executive manager from firm #23 refused to 
provide more details on the role of his boss’s reputation in town in the business relations 
of his firm. However, he did not deny that all the above-said were true. This example 
demonstrates that such unseen factors as a business owner’s past and present connections 
can play a considerable role in preventing contract violation from happening.  
But how does the strategy of contract enforcement by threat of violence by criminals 
operate when it is actually used by managers? Respondents reveal two major patterns of 
usage. In the first one, the upper management hires criminals to use force against 
dishonest business partner as a last resort, does so reluctantly, and prefers to dissociate 
themselves from the criminals they hired as soon as the job is done. A good example of 
such pattern was described by the owner of a firm that develops geophysics equipment: 
It happened once, when our client refused to pay what they owed us, they 
said they went bankrupt. Unfortunately, we owed money to our supplier for 
the materials we used to make that order that the client could not buy out. 
The supplier started demanding repayment quite aggressively. I explained to 
them that I did not have the money because my client went bankrupt. They 
said they did not care and threatened me. I had to do something, so I found 
people who could credibly threaten my debtors. Criminals, of course. It all 
worked out well in the end, my debtors paid the debt to my supplier, and they 
135
[=the supplier] left me alone. Unfortunately, things like this happen these 
days. (Firm #9, Personal interview, June 2001) 
 
This firm is engaged in the development of highly specialized geophysics equipment, 
their profit margin is very low, they deal with a small number of large enterprises, and all 
the transactions are done through banks. They also do not advertise their services. 
Because of these reasons they rarely experience problems with contracts that may require 
such drastic and expensive measures as the one described above.  
For firms that use cash transactions more than bank transfers, have large number of 
clients and suppliers, and are highly visible through their offices and advertising, the risk 
of coming in contact with the criminal world is much higher43. The second pattern of 
usage of this contract enforcement strategy is more typically found to be employed by 
this kind of firms. In this pattern, firms tend to form strategic alliances with a criminal 
group, involving stable financial and personal connections. Criminal groups in this 
pattern of relationships receive monthly payments, separate bonuses for “solved 
problems”, and their leaders frequently socialize with leaders of the firms. The monthly 
payments can vary, depending on the firm’s turnover, from a hundred to several hundred 
dollars a month. For example, an accountant from a firm that manufactures labels says 
that her firm pays $800 to a criminal gang whose services they occasionally use, a sum 
equivalent to a monthly salary of an upper manager in a small or medium-sized firm 
(Firm #18, Personal interview, August 2001). Any actual work is paid for separately, 
 
43 The idea that the nature of one’s business is an important determinant of the likelihood of criminal 
involvement is supported by the findings of an all-Russian survey of entrepreneurs conducted in 1997-1998 
by the Center for Political Technologies. Results of this survey show that enterprises in the retail trade, 
public catering, domestic services and other areas of business that are highly visible and depend on 
advertising are much more susceptible to criminal interference, be it welcome or not (Radaev 2000, 41,43).  
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depending on the level of difficulty, the respondent says. Retrieving debts from non-
payers is paid the highest, up to 50% of the sum in question44. This criminal gang that 
they use does not consist of any highly-trained professionals, she says, they are just “boys 
from the street”, friends of the executive manager (Firm #18, Personal interview, August 
2001).  
Another respondent, an accountant from the firm that manufactures advertisement 
banners, says her firm hires both, an official protection agency, and criminals: 
Question: What happens when your partners do not fulfill their contractual 
obligations? Do you use your protection agency? 
Answer: No, no. A protection agency is hired to guard the office, they don’t deal 
with our problems. For that we have a “roof”. I see this guy every month, he 
comes for his salary. If our firm has any problem with business partners, he 
solves these problems. 
Question: How does he do it? 
Answer: I don’t know the details, but he has his methods. I know that often it is 
sufficient for him to show up in the office of the offender, the way he is, with 
all his props that identify him as a criminal, like gold chain on his neck, leather 
jacket, very short haircut and an obligatory Mercedes car. And the problem 
will be solved immediately; no one wants to inflict violence upon 
themselves… (Firm #32, Personal interview, June 2001) 
 
In the case of this firm, according to the respondent, it was the criminals who showed 
up one day on the doorstep of the firm and offered their services. Few firms ever dared to 
refuse an offer of such kind, largely due to the massive amount of scare stories about 
“what happens to those who…” in mass media. Most of those who pay however do not 
use their services; they just pay to avoid violence against their family members and 
damage that can be done to their property. The owner of a chain of construction goods 
stores describes his experience with bandits: 
 
44 Other empirical studies give similar figures: see Volkov (1999), Radaev (2000), Bliahker (2000). 
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It happened a few years ago. I think it was one competitor of mine who gave 
information about my firm to a Chechen gang, and they paid me a visit. It 
was quite scary, to be honest, they threatened violence against my wife and 
daughter if I didn’t agree to pay them monthly. I took the threat seriously and 
made my family go to the USA for a while, to visit my wife’s relatives. What 
happened after is that some local gang stopped by, and offered their 
protection services. At first I thought the two were connected, but it turned 
out that they were not. The locals contacted the Chechens, they both sent 
representatives to me and offered me a choice, who do I want to “work with”. 
I chose the locals, and paid them the first monthly installment, something 
around $90, I remember. And then they never showed up again. I later 
learned that their chief got jailed, and the rest scattered. I never initiated 
contact myself, not wanting to have anything to do with them. (Firm #39, 
Personal interview, August 2001) 
 
Differently from this businessman, some other business owners actively seek out 
contacts with bandits. Criminal groups with whom a firm forms a partnership are 
commonly called a “roof” (krysha). The term originated in the professional vocabulary of 
the intelligence service where it meant an official cover-story for a spy (Volkov 2000, 
493). Although it can be used to refer to any persons or groups of people that actively 
protect the interests of a firm45, but who are not actual employees of the firm, it most 
commonly refers to criminal gangs. 
The owner of a real estate agency says he started looking for a “roof” of a criminal 
kind when he decided to open his own firm, because “in our business, you need one”. He 
found one through a friend of a former colleague. He says he is very happy with their 
collaboration, his “roof” proved itself very useful. “There are lots of problems in our 
business,” - he says. – “Like a person signs a contract to sell an apartment, takes money, 
 
45 Since the term is entirely unofficial, its usage is hardly precise. State officials like a police official, a city 
hall bureaucrat, or a tax inspector, are as likely to be called a “roof” as a protection agency or a criminal 
gang that are hired to protect firm’s interests. The main criterion is the ability to help entrepreneurs in one 
way or another, be it a credible threat of violence, or an unexpected tax revision against a debtor or a 
competitor. Observers have noted that the latter is becoming more and more common (Radaev 2000, 
Morozov 2002). 
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and then refuses to vacate the premises. If you try to sue him or her, that will take years, 
and no one has this kind of time. So we need speedy solutions, a team that can get to that 
person and ‘explain’ that it is time to go. In 90% of cases my ‘roof’ uses psychological 
pressure, and only maybe in 10% physical violence” (Firm #43, Personal interview, 
August 2001). 
He still tries to avoid using them too much, he says. Although the times when bandits 
used to routinely take over firms that they initially “protected” are gone, there is still a 
danger that it can happen. This danger makes him very sensitive to the amount of 
information he is willing to disclose to his ‘associates’:  
If I can cope myself, I do not request their help. A few years ago, it was 
typical that a ‘roof’ would appoint their own accountant to a ‘protected’ firm, 
and then it was only a matter of time before they would fully take over. But I 
realize that even without an accountant my ‘roof’ can show up one day and 
ask me ‘Who are you here?’. 
Question: How frequently do you need their help in solving problems? 
Answer: Lately not that often. Mostly people have problems when they just 
open, when no one knows you, and people ‘probe’ you. When you are in 
business for a few years, it tends to diminish. When I just opened my firm, I 
had problems all the time. Even a year ago I had to use my ‘roof’ once a 
month at least. Now it is much more rarely, I think last time I used their help 
was half a year ago. 
Question: But do you still meet these guys regularly? 
Answer: Of course, we socialize. I like them, they are not as thick as most 
people in their business. I play pool with them. (Firm #43, Personal 
interview, August 2001) 
 
The above-quoted owner of a business firm is a young man with a good education 
who did not used to have anything to do with the criminal world. His decision to recruit a 
criminal group was a calculated choice based on the information he possessed about how 
things work in his chosen area of business. Before opening his own real estate firm, he 
worked in the real estate business for a number of years, and knew about potential 
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problems that a business owner can encounter in this field. He would be very happy to 
terminate his relationships with the criminal gang, he says, but so far the advantages of 
using it outweigh the risks. He does not see any possibility of things changing in the near 
future either, he says, the judicial system is in too big a mess for it to become useful to 
businessmen like him any time soon. 
 
4.2.4. Usage of the strategy among studied firms 
A number of questions were used to determine the frequency of usage of this 
strategy by participants of my study. First and foremost, the questions #4.1.5.3 (“[Have 
you ever] hired someone who can physically threaten the violator, [to use violence 
against a dishonest business partner, to obtain redress, or force them to comply with the 
terms of a contract]?”) and #4.1.3.3 (“[Have you ever] asked friends or relatives who 
can physically threaten the violator [to use violence against a dishonest business partner, 
to obtain redress, or force them to comply with the terms of a contract]?”) were used to 
determine if this strategy was ever used by a firm; and if yes additional questions were 
asked to clarify the circumstances. Figure 4.2.1 shows that the majority of studied firms 
have never used this strategy, and only a few firms currently use this strategy to address 
their enforcement problems: 
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not used
81.8%
used in the 
past
9.1%
use when 
necessary
6.8% main strategy
2.3%
 
Figure 4.2.1. Usage of Threat of violence by criminals as a strategy of contract 
enforcement, among studied firms (n=44). 
 
The eight firms that admitted having used this strategy are evenly spread across 
different sectors of the economy, they were all organized in different time periods, they 
are of different sizes, and some of them have management with Soviet experience. Out of 
all explanatory variables only criminal involvement seems to have an effect on the 
probability of using enforcement by threat of violence by criminals46.
Whether it is indeed the nature of the business that is the decisive factor here, like the 
owner of firm #43 maintains, or the personalities of the firms’ leaders, those firms that 
use the threat of violence for contract enforcement purposes, also become the victims of 
such threats. Question 4.8 of the questionnaire was designed to reveal if there is 
reciprocity in dealings with the criminal world, and the analysis of the interviews 
suggests that indeed there is. Out of eleven firms (25.6%) that have been threatened 
 
46 Correlation between criminal involvement and usage of criminals for contract enforcement purposes has 
a coefficient = .277 (Kendall’s tau_b), and .284 (Spearman’s rho), significant at the .05 level, 1-tailed (due 
to small sample size, non-parametric correlations were used). Correlation coefficient shows that firms that 
have criminal involvement on the level of investment or personal connections of upper management are 
significantly more likely to use criminals for contract enforcement purposes than firms without criminal 
involvement, within the given sample. 
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because of contractual obligation not being fulfilled, six resorted to threats of violence 
themselves; the correlation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level47.
In conclusion, it has to be said that while enforcement by threat of violence by 
criminals is undoubtedly the most primitive and repulsive form of enforcement in the 
contract enforcement repertoire available to business people in Russia at the moment, 
many business people still choose to use it despite the risks involved. Two patterns of its 
use were discussed: one is very occasional, as a last resort when no other means seem to 
work; and the other is a long-term partnership that a firm in a particularly high-risk 
business area forms with a criminal group to receive contract enforcement services on a 
regular basis for a monthly fee and additional payments for debt recovery and dispute 
resolution. In both patterns entrepreneurs are aware of the risks involved in dealing with 
criminals, and often are reluctant to use their services, but deem the alternatives to be 
catastrophic for the survival of their businesses.  
 
47 Correlation between usage of criminals for contract enforcement purposes and having been threatened at 
least once has a coefficient = .378 (Kendall’s tau_b), and .389 (Spearman’s rho), significant at the .01 level, 
1-tailed.  
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4.3. Arbitration by mutually agreed upon powerful individuals 
 
Arbitration by mutually agreed upon powerful individuals emerged as a contract 
enforcement strategy during the field stage of data collection. Consequently, there is no 
sufficient evidence to suggest how widespread it might be without substantial additional 
research; therefore, the analysis offered here has a tentative and heuristic character. There 
were only two instances where this strategy came up in conversations with managers 
whose firms had used it in the past, although it was mentioned by a number of other 
managers as a strategy they heard of but did not have any first-hand experience with. It 
would have been logistically difficult to incorporate this new information into the 
existing questionnaire. However, as a separate contract enforcement strategy, arbitration 
by powerful individuals appears to be both too analytically interesting and strikingly 
different from other strategies to ignore it as an odd case. 
Arbitration is a private dispute resolution process in which the parties agree to take 
their dispute to a neutral third party for a decision, and to abide by this decision, rather 
than litigating the dispute through the formal courts. It is a common strategy of dispute 
resolution in non-capitalist and early capitalist societies, and it functions on the premise 
that impartial observers could decide issues that the disputing parties could not resolve 
themselves. There is a vast literature on how arbitration was developed by medieval 
merchants who preferred to refer to other merchants to help resolve contractual disputes 
rather than rely on expensive, complicated and often partial formal legal system (Jaffe 
2000; Argenti 1958; Greif and Kandel 1995).  
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In Soviet Russia, private arbitration was widespread in the criminal world. Disputes 
among criminals or criminal groups were often brought to criminal authorities for so-
called treteiskii sud, or trial by a third-party48. With the beginning of perestroika and the 
collapse of the Soviet institutional and normative structure the boundary between the 
criminal world and new business world became thin. Criminals, old and new, brought 
into business not only their money, but also their methods of dealing with problems, 
including treteiskii sud by criminal authorities. With former criminals resurfacing from 
the underground en masse in the end of 1980s, both the business world and that of public 
service found themselves infiltrated by people with questionable pasts and suspicious 
affiliations (McDaniel 1996; Konstantinov 1997; Klebnikov 2000).  
There is no way of knowing exactly how frequently business disputes were resolved 
via unofficial arbitration by powerful personalities. We can however infer from the 
known and well-documented examples of usage of private arbitration in pre-capitalist and 
early capitalist societies that its effectiveness depends on a number of factors. Parties that 
request unofficial arbitration agree to be bound by the arbitrator’s decision because of the 
respect they feel for his personality and/or his position. The position of an arbitrator 
would often carry not only social prestige, but also real power to interfere with 
someone’s business. In the modern Russian context, such a figure could be a prominent 
official in a local administration, a chairman of a trade association, a powerful mobster or 
a well-connected banker. Consequently, the non-compliance with the arbitrator’s decision 
could be very damaging, if not lethal, to the reneging party’s business. 
 
48 Not to be confused with the government licensed private courts that are also called treteiskii, but that 
operate legally since the beginning of 1990s. See section 3 of the next chapter. 
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In my research only two respondents indicated that the firms they worked for had 
resorted to this strategy. The executive manager who runs an advertising firm says that 
they occasionally use this contract enforcement strategy when they have disputes with 
their clients: 
There is a professional association of advertising makers in St.Petersburg, 
and they do dispute resolution on demand. We contacted them a number of 
times when we had disputes with our clients. The association sends a 
competent and well-respected person to serve as a treteiskii judge in our 
dispute. Both sides voluntarily agree to abide by this person’s decision. 
(Firm #4, Personal interview, July 2002) 
 
Another respondent who reported the strategy in use - a manager from a business 
consulting firm - had not been working for the firm long enough to know the details: who 
the arbitrators were, under what circumstances their services were requested and what the 
remuneration was. The respondent was only able to report that one of the arbitrators that 
the firm periodically used was the governor of St.Petersburg (Firm #7, Personal 
interview, July 2002). 
A number of other respondents said that they “have heard” of private arbitration as a 
way of resolving disputes between firms, but could not report any knowledge as to how 
the strategy operated. Most of these respondents associated the strategy with criminal 
involvement of either the disputing parties, or arbitrators, although without any real life 
examples to support it. Consequently, it is reasonable to suggest that such an opinion 
among Russian business people can be based on stories in the media of questionable 
accuracy rather than on concrete evidence. 
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4.4. Threat of punitive actions by state officials 
 
Grassroots corruption (blat49) was ubiquitous in socialist societies. The economy of 
short supply and great demand provided an excellent breeding ground for it. In everyday 
life people routinely exchanged favors to obtain everything – from food to good grades in 
college to family vacation packages (Ledeneva 1998). Connections also played a crucial 
role in economic exchange among enterprises. The success of an enterprise and its 
management with reaching output targets set by a five-year Plan depended on timely 
supply of the necessary raw materials, something that was far from certain in the 
economy of shortages (Berliner 1957; Randall 1997). Soviet managers had to be skilled 
in establishing the right kinds of connections at the level of fellow management from 
other enterprises, but mainly at all levels of communist party administration, if they 
wanted to keep their jobs: 
Plans could not normally be fulfilled by formal means. As remarked by 
Mikhail Yarikov, famous for his sarcastic observations: ‘in the fourth year 
of a five-year plan, blat is decisive in fulfilling the plan.’ Enterprises either 
negotiated the planned targets or had to engage in informal efforts to obtain 
extra resources. The system of relationships with suppliers, mutual trust and 
support between partners were the practical necessity for the functioning of 
socialist production. (Ledeneva 1998, 86) 
 
The system of blat collapsed together with the socialist system of distribution, 
undermined by the free-market reforms at the beginning of the 1990s. However, the 
moral permissiveness of exchange of favors that had permeated socialist society 
 
49 A.Ledeneva defines  blat as “the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods and 
services in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures” (Ledeneva 1998, 1). 
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remained, albeit shorn of its Soviet-era mask of friendship. To paraphrase the classic, in 
modern Russia the spirit of nascent capitalism developed an elective affinity with the 
[a]morality of blat. Not only goods and services can now be sold or bought, but favors, as 
well.  
How can favors for sale translate into contract enforcement for small firms? There is 
a multitude of ways in which state institutions can affect a business in a negative (or 
positive) way. Health inspection can always find a reason to shut down a café or a 
restaurant; fire inspection can find a violation and shut down a manufacturing enterprise, 
and tax inspectors have the authority to seize assets of a firm for “inspection” for an 
indefinite length of time even for a minor book-keeping mistake. Even a police officer 
can instill enough fear to pressure management of the offending firm to comply with the 
terms of an agreement50. The owner of a construction firm says that when he has 
problems with contract enforcement his policeman friend contacts the offender and 
“asks” them to live up to the agreement (Firm #2, Personal interview, June 2002). Non-
compliance with such a “request” is rare, the respondent says. 
Tax inspectors and the tax police are particularly feared by Russian entrepreneurs. A 
powerful and vindictive version of enforcement is “to set the tax inspectors” on a firm. 
With his advance to power in 1999, President Putin made an effort to increase tax 
revenues, and in the following years tax inspection has become one of the most powerful 
structures in the contemporary Russian state, especially, in large cities like St.Petersburg 
and Moscow. Raids by tax police, who can arrive without any warning, in masks and 
with machine guns, can easily end with the management in jail, the firm’s activity halted 
 
50 See Appendix 2 “Luba’s story” for some additional examples. 
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and assets confiscated. Many of the raids are triggered by a phone call, or a letter from a 
competitor or disgruntled client of the firm51. Bribing tax inspectors to conduct an extra 
careful inspection of a firm is also not uncommon. 
One interviewee reported a particularly ingenious solution that a firm she worked for 
found to deal with enforcement (and other kinds of) problems: 
This firm only appeared two years ago. And now they are leading in the area 
of advertising banners manufacturing, no one can compete, or would risk a 
conflict with them. How did they achieve this? They paid a huge bribe to the 
City Center of Advertisement Placement, made friends there. Then they hired 
the son-in-law of the director of the Center to be the director of their firm. 
Smart move. Now he walks around, does not understand a thing about what 
they do, but has a salary and status. And the real director – the owner of the 
firm – is officially unemployed. But he does drive a Mercedes (Firm #32, 
Personal interview, June 2001). 
 
It has to be understood that the City Center of Advertisement Placement is perhaps 
of little importance to many firms, but for firms involved in advertising it is omnipotent. 
It distributes rights to advertisement placement on the streets of St.Petersburg to various 
firms, in theory on the grounds of fair competition, but not in practice. The interviewee 
claims the firm she works for now has a virtual monopoly on the most lucrative streets of 
St.Petersburg, due to its connection to the director of the Center. This connection is quite 
instrumental in the firm’s contract enforcement strategy, as well, she says. 
The owner of a firm that manufactures advertising posters says he only used his 
connections once to recover a debt: “The sum of money was really large, so I could not 
just let it go. I happen to have some acquaintances in the government in Moscow, and I 
had to ask them to do us a favor and help with the debt recovery. They successfully 
 
51 For an illustration, see the Appendix 2 “Luba’s story”. 
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settled the matter, and we paid them with our services” (Firm #24, Personal interview, 
July 2002). 
Those firms that work with large post-Soviet enterprises and that are lucky to have 
influential acquaintances in Moscow, still can use “Soviet-style” types of pressure to 
handle a debt situation. The respondent from a firm that develops geophysics equipment 
says about the owner of the firm: 
If something goes really wrong, my boss can always pressure the offender 
through his connections in the Ministry. He has lots of connections, from 
his old job. He used to manage a large enterprise before perestroika, and 
knew all relevant people in Moscow. Many of them are still there. Our 
clients are all large enterprises, and they are very dependent on the 
government. Although the Ministry does not have its former power, it still 
is essential to the survival of those enterprises. It distributes state orders and 
allocates loans (Firm #9, Personal interview, July 2002).  
 
The respondent says that most of the time they manage to sort things out peacefully, 
and it is rare that his boss has to “pull strings” in Moscow. Such favors have a steep price, 
the respondent says, and the owner of the firm cannot really afford it.  
 
Answers to a few questions from the questionnaire were used to determine frequency 
of usage of this strategy. Question #4.1.3.1 asked whether a firm’s decision makers ever 
contacted a friend or a relative who works in a state agency to help to pressure a business 
partner in case of a conflict. Question #4.1.5.1 asked whether a firm’s decision makers 
ever paid a state official for unofficial help in solving problems with business partner. 
Question #4.11 helps to assess the possibility of using this strategy in the future by asking 
whether or not a firm has connections in tax inspection, state inspection organs, city 
administration or other public organizations, and whether these connections potentially 
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could, or even were in the past (question #4.12) exploited to exert pressure on a business 
partner in a conflict situation.  
Overall, I found fewer instances of using this strategy than I expected. Respondents 
from only six firms said that they resort to using state officials to pressure an offender, 
most frequently to recover a debt. Figure 4.4.1 shows that another seven firms (16% of 
studied firms) used this strategy in the past, but indicated that it is unlikely they will use it 
again: 
not used
70.5%
used in the past
15.9%
use w hen 
necessary
13.6%
 
Figure 4.4.1. Usage of Threat of punitive actions by state officials contract enforcement 
strategy among studied firms (n=44), in %. 
 
Almost a third of interviewees said that they have the ‘right connections’, without 
implying that they ever intend to use them for enforcement purposes. Firms that use, or 
used, the Threat of punitive actions by state officials as a contract enforcement strategy 
capitalize on different kinds of connections with different results. They can bribe low-
level officials from state regulatory organizations to conduct unscheduled check-ups and 
then bury the offender in fees and fines; or they can use high-level state officials to 
threaten the offender in various ways. The use of this strategy among the studied firm has 
occasional rather than regular character; no firm uses “ties to state officials” as the main 
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contract enforcement strategy. No explanatory variable out of the five suggested seems to 
be an effective predictor of the probability of the strategy’s use. 
It appears that the Threat of punitive actions by state officials is more a relic of the 
past for small firms than a viable alternative to other available contract enforcement 
strategies. By no means do I want to imply that corruption is on the decline in Russia; in 
fact, quite the contrary is likely to be the case, as other research shows (Sergeyev 2001; 
Radaev 1998; Levin and Satarov 2000; Khlebnikov 2000). But small firms seem to be 
much less engaged in building alliances with state structures than more weighty 
economic players. The overarching impression that I received from my interviews is that 
small entrepreneurs have neither the resources, nor desire to get involved with state 
officials any more than it is absolutely necessary. I will discuss the issues that 
entrepreneurs have with state institutions in more detail in chapter 6. 
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4.5. Financial tools 
 
Most small business owners and managers I interviewed do not like taking risks. 
Their businesses operate in a fragile balance between the liquid resources that come in 
and go out. Any unforeseen expense puts an immediate strain on this balance, and one 
unpaid debt can push a firm into a bankruptcy. Lack of reliable information about 
trustworthiness of other economic actors and widespread dishonesty put business owners 
and managers in a very difficult position of having to make badly informed decisions 
regarding the choice of their business partners. The risks taken by suppliers and 
customers are perceived to be uneven: “the customer’s ability to pay is much more 
difficult to ascertain than the supplier’s ability to produce” (Hendley, Murrell, and 
Ryterman 2000, 639).  
Most suppliers opt for minimizing risks of potential loss, even if it comes at the 
expense of limiting the number of business partners and business transactions. The 
simplest and by far the most common way to achieve this end is to require up to a 
hundred percent pre-payment. The owner and manager of an advertising firm describes 
the policy of his firms toward new clients: 
Question: What guarantees are you looking for to start working with a first-
time client? 
Answer: If we don’t know anything about this firm, they came as we call it 
“from the street” [= was not introduced by someone known and trusted], 
then we require 100% pre-payment.  
Question: How do you process the next order from this new client? 
Answer: If the first time went well, the payment was timely, and the order is 
of significant size, we may reduce the amount of pre-payment to 60%, 
occasionally even to 50%. But not less. (Firm #31, Personal interview, 
August 2002) 
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Respondents who use pre-payment as a warranty against default on contractual 
obligation stress that the amount of required pre-payment depends on the level of 
personal trust they have toward their customers. As trust grows with the experience of 
working together, the amount of pre-payment goes down. Thus prepayment serves as a 
safe-guard strategy in dealings with new firms, while trust of Information and the closed 
exchange networks strategy is used to deal with old-time customers. This type of 
combination of two strategies is quite common. An interviewee from a firm that designs 
and manufactures radiology equipment explains how their system works: 
Question: How much pre-payment do you normally require? 
Answer: When we begin to work with a new client, we always require 100% 
pre-payment. The first transaction is actually very important; we look at 
how people pay, how they communicate with us. If we like them, we 
decrease the amount of pre-payment, gradually, in subsequent transactions. 
Question: You decrease it to zero? 
Answer: No, we have standard pre-payment of 30% with our established and 
reliable clients. However, if we ever experience problems with payments of 
the remaining 70%, in the next transaction we will require 100% again. 
(Firm #42, Personal interview, August 2002) 
 
If a firm is not capable of paying up-front in full, some firms may agree to accept 
collateral (Firm #27, Personal interview, August 2002), but it is not common. Most 
respondents stressed that they use different approaches with different clients. The amount 
of pre-payment is rarely rigidly preset, as described by the respondent quoted above. 
Most often, the amount of requested prepayment would vary from client to client, and 
even from transaction to transaction. Customers who make larger orders will typically be 
requested to pre-pay a smaller percentage of the total. Older customers who are perceived 
as more reliable tend to enjoy smaller, if any, pre-payments. Thus this strategy stands in 
opposition to the networks strategy in its inherent lack of trust. It is interesting to note, 
however, that trust does not preclude business partners from breaching the agreements: 
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the majority of respondents complained about delayed payments, non-payment problems, 
and breaking of the terms of delivery. Clearly, if first-time customers are usually 
requested to make 100% pre-payment, firms experience problems with those customers 
who are considered to be “trustworthy”. Some of the interviewees complained that the 
worst damage to their firms was done by business partners whom they considered to be 
the most reliable, with whom they worked together for significant period of time and 
whom they fully trusted (Firm #1, Firm #9).  
There were two questions in the questionnaire that helped determine the frequency of 
usage of the Financial tools strategy: question #2.5 (“How do your business agreements 
with your clients and suppliers look  in terms of required prepayment? [If prepayment is 
required, how much?]”), and question #7.12 (“How do you establish relationships with 
new firms? [A firm is put on a ‘trial period’ with special conditions (100% 
prepayment)]”). Answers to these questions served to evaluate the usage of this strategy 
among the studied firms. Figure 4.5.1 shows the distribution using four-point qualitative 
scale: 
not used
35.6%
used in the past
2.2%use w hen 
necessary
44.4%
main strategy
17.8%
 
Figure 4.5.1. Usage of Financial tools contract enforcement strategy among studied firms 
(n=44), in %. 
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Almost two-thirds of interviewed firms’ representatives said that their firms rely on 
the Financial tools strategy to protect themselves against potential loss due to non-
payment, delayed payment or other violations of contract. It is interesting to note that 
business owners and executive managers with higher education tend to choose this 
strategy over others52. Firms that have little or no possibility of using this strategy are 
mainly engaged in certain kinds of production, in the retail trade and in public catering; 
they take products from suppliers and pay suppliers back when the products are sold.  
Virtually every firm that can require pre-payment due to the nature of their activity does 
so, and 42% of all studied firms require 100% pre-payment when they deal with new 
customers. Business owners and manager stressed that the advantages of the financial 
tools strategy in loss prevention and its ease of use far outweigh any drawbacks: reduced 
turnover by limiting the number of potential customers. 
 
52 Correlation between level of education of firms’ decision-makers and usage of Financial tools strategy 
for contract enforcement purposes has coefficients = .433 (Kendall’s tau_b) and .461 (Spearman’s rho), 
significant at the .01 level, 1-tailed (due to small sample size, non-parametric correlations were used). 
Correlation coefficient shows that the higher the level of education of decision-makers is (ranked from high 
school diploma to graduate degree) the more likely they are to select this strategy as their main contract 
enforcement strategy. 
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Conclusion 
The proliferation of non-state strategies of enforcement among small firms has both 
positive and negative consequences for inter-firm and state/firm relationships. The main 
positive feature is that these strategies of enforcement make transactions possible. Among 
the negative consequences are the institutionalization of non-market relationships and the 
weakening of the state. I will discuss the general implications of non-state strategies of 
enforcement for the development of capitalism in Conclusion; here I will show some 
implications that they may have for relationships between small firms, and between the 
state and small firms. 
The formation of information and closed exchange networks as an enforcement 
strategy makes entrance and exit a much more complicated process, preventing the 
development of healthy competition among firms. While on the one hand trading with 
only a fixed group of partners decreases transaction costs by minimizing information and 
enforcement expenses, on the other hand it does not create incentives for improving 
economic performance, and blinds firms to the possibility of better choices of trade 
partners which the market might have to offer. Closed exchange networks frequently 
evolve out of personal friendship, and can take years to form. To enter such a network is 
a very difficult task for a new firm. Information networks, on the other hand, are looser, 
and perform a function undertaken by credit rating agencies in developed capitalist 
societies. Exchange and information networks help small firms to survive in the world of 
an unstable economy and political chaos.  
This enforcement strategy may also impact negatively firms’ relations with the state. 
Self-enforcement by networks of trading partners makes managers view the state as an 
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irritating nuisance rather than a useful third party which can be referred to when needed, 
and corrupt officials further erode managers’ trust in the state’s fairness and impartiality. 
The threat of violence by criminals works by creating a temporary or permanent 
“enforcement partnership” between businesses and criminal groups. This contract 
enforcement strategy brings criminal methods into the business conflict resolution 
process, ultimately giving advantage to those who can intimidate and spread violence. By 
violating most fundamental laws and norms set by the state this strategy of contract 
enforcement demonstrates the utter contempt for the power of the state and legitimacy of 
its authority. For all parties involved, the trust in the state’s crime fighting abilities is 
eroded. 
Arbitration by mutually agreed upon powerful individuals serves a positive function 
for business people involved in that it gives them an option in resolving their disputes. 
They may choose this strategy over state courts for numerous reasons, such as privacy, 
price and speed of resolution.  
Informal ties between managers and government institutions are rarely visible to a 
firm’s trade partners. Enforcement through the favors of corrupt officials lacks legitimacy 
and predictability, often complicating the exchange instead of facilitating it. Transaction 
costs as a result grow dramatically. Business owners and managers identify corrupt state 
agents with the state as an institution, their trust in impartiality and fairness of the state 
wanes. Corruption of state officials also eases tax evading53.
53 There is a statistically significant correlation between using Ties to state officials as a contract 
enforcement strategy, and percent of concealed revenues to avoid taxation: coefficient = .231 (Kendall’s 
tau_b) and .277 (Spearman’s rho), significant at the .05 level, 1-tailed (due to small sample size, non-
parametric correlations were used). Correlation coefficient shows that firms that use connections to state 
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Financial tools used as an enforcement strategy, like prepayment, restrict entrance of 
new firms to the market by demanding extra resources, which start-up companies often 
lack. But at the same time, such measures may promote competition. This strategy also 
appears to be chosen by most law-abiding entrepreneurs: the level of tax paying among 
those who use Financial tools as their main contract enforcement strategy is significantly 
higher than among those who do not use this strategy54.
To sum up, the major negative consequence of firm-based strategies of contract 
enforcement for inter-firm relations is the serious entrance restriction they present to new 
firms. All discussed strategies disadvantage new firms because they may lack social 
capital to participate in the information and closed exchange networks; have no 
connections to state institutions, powerful individuals and criminal groups; and have 
inadequate financial resources to provide full prepayment for every service they need to 
purchase.  
Table 4.1 summarizes characteristics and origins of each firm-based contract 
enforcement strategy, shows what types of firms tend to use this strategy, and lists the 
implications it has for infirm and firm-state relations. 
 
officials for contract enforcement are likely to conceal a higher percentage of their revenues from tax 
authorities than firms that do not use this strategy, within the given sample. 
54 The correlation between using Financial tools as a main contract enforcement strategy, and percent of 
concealed revenues to avoid taxation is negative: coefficient = -.231 (Kendall’s tau_b) and -.268 
(Spearman’s rho), significant at the .05 level, 1-tailed (due to small sample size, non-parametric 
correlations were used). Correlation coefficient shows that firms that use Financial tools as a main contract 
enforcement strategy are likely to conceal smaller percent of their revenues from tax authorities than firms 
that do not use this contract enforcement strategy, within the given sample. 
Table 4.1. Summary of characteristics, origins and implications of firm-based enforcement strategies.
IMPLICATIONS FORFIRM-BASED
ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGIES
CHARACTERISTICS OF
STRATEGY
ORIGINS OF
STRATEGY
FIRMS USING
STRATEGY INTERFIRM RELATIONS FIRM/STATE RELATIONS
1. Information
and closed
exchange
networks.
Business-to-business
relations; trust, reputation and
threat of sanctions are the
keys to enforcement.
Russian values of
collectivism reinforced by
Soviet-style “survival
networking”.
Small firms that were
organized in the early
1990s and that do not
have criminal
involvement.
(-) Restricts entry and exit;
(+) gives stability and
predictability to exchange.
(-) The strategy is resorted
to because the state is
perceived as incapable of
guaranteeing protections.
2. Threat of
violence by
criminals.
“Enforcement partnership”
between businesses and
criminal groups.
Underground criminal
world methods of the
Soviet time.
Firms with criminal
involvement on the
level of investment or
personal ties.
(-) Brings criminal methods
into the business environment
(-) Inherent opposition to the
power of the state in its
disregard for the law; erodes
managers’ trust in state’s
crime fighting ability.
3. Arbitration by
mutually agreed
upon powerful
individuals.
Respect for the personality
and position of an arbitrator
ensures enforcement of his
decisions.
Norms of pre-perestroika
criminal world.
Insufficient
information.
(+) Gives an option in
resolving disputes.
(-) The strategy is resorted to
because the state courts are
perceived as less efficient.
4. Threat of
punitive action
by state officials.
Business-to-governing
institutions, unofficial ties;
used for information and
enforcement favors.
The Soviet economy of
shortages brewed
grassroots corruption (blat)
and reinforced pre-existing
norms of corruption.
Insufficient
information.
(-) Corruption introduces
non-market ways of
competition, makes difficult
to predict outcomes.
(-) Provides ease of evading;
erodes firms’ trust in fairness
and impartiality of the state.
5. Financial tools
(prepayment,
‘hostages’).
‘Arm’s length’ business-to-
business, based on
competition relationships.
Desire to minimize losses
due to non-payment or
other violations of contract:
withhold work until
payment received.
Most firms that can
use it due to the nature
of their activity.
(-) Restrict entrance by
demanding extra resources;
(+) promotes competition.
(-) The strategy is resorted
to because the state is
perceived as incapable of
guaranteeing protections.
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Chapter 5: EXTRA-FIRM ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss four strategies of contract enforcement that are widely 
available to all firms in the marketplace, origins of institutional forms that they took, and 
the patterns of their use by small Russian entrepreneurs from my sample. In the end of 
this chapter, an additional section will outline complementarities among all nine contract 
enforcement strategies, and give a general summary of their use by Russian 
entrepreneurs. 
The strategies in the focus of this chapter include professional associations, private 
protection agencies, private arbitration (treteiskii) courts, and state arbitrazh courts. 
These strategies provide contract enforcement services for a fee: professional associations 
require membership fees, protection agencies collect monthly fees and separate fees for 
each contract enforcement service performed, and both private and state courts charge 
numerous fees for dispute resolution. 
While the presence of alternatives in the contract enforcement services market is 
certainly a positive thing, how much the four strategies are actually in competition can be 
questioned. As the analysis below will hopefully demonstrate, each of the four strategies 
has a very different way of operating. Professional associations are really just formalized 
networks, and their enforcement tool is the threat of exclusion from future transactions 
with association members. Protection agencies have various means of achieving their 
goals, from (decreasingly) reliance on physical violence to (increasingly) usage of their 
own networks among agents of state and non-state institutions. Finally, the private 
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arbitration court is a formal version of the arbitration by mutually agreed upon powerful 
individuals, although just like state arbitrazh courts they rely on state enforcement power 
to enforce their rulings. 
two types of courts are best at addressing different kinds of problems with 
contractual obligation.  
The chapter is structured in the same way as the chapter 4. Each contract 
enforcement strategy is explained in the words of the respondents, and the origins of the 
various strategies are described. The data on frequency of strategies’ usage among the 
studied firms is presented in the same manner as in the chapter 4. 
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5.1. Professional associations 
 
In Weber’s definition, professional associations belong to the category of 
“economically regulative organizations” that seek to regulate both the ends and the 
procedures of economic activity (Weber 1999, 210). They do so by collecting and 
disseminating information, promoting high professional standards, advocating 
cooperation, imposing sanctions, and providing various types of assistance to its 
members.  
In the present work, I am particularly interested in the contract enforcement 
capabilities of professional associations. There are well-researched historical examples of 
professional associations functioning as an important, if not exclusive, contract 
enforcement institution. For example, Greif (1993) in his research of eleventh-century 
Mediterranean trade shows how a coalition of Jewish merchants (known in the Arab 
world as “Magribi traders”) established contractual relations with their agents overseas. If 
an agent violated an agreement with a merchant, the whole association would react 
against him by ostracizing him. It was essential for the success of sanctions that all 
merchants would join in.  
A study of merchant guilds in the late medieval period by Greif, Milgrom, and 
Weingast (1994) provides another illustration to how a professional association can be a 
powerful contract enforcement institution. This institution evolved as a response to 
serious security problems faced by foreign merchants in medieval European trading 
centers, when local rulers could at will abuse or withhold legal protections from foreign 
merchants. Merchant guilds were able to solve this commitment problem by coordinating 
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the responses (typically, an embargo) of a large portion of the merchants to an offence. 
Merchant guilds represented the legal rights of their member merchants in all 
communications with local rulers; they provided merchants with leadership and the 
strategies of information transmission. 
In the course of the development of capitalism in Western European countries, other 
institutions have emerged that took upon themselves enforcement functions of formal 
professional associations.  However, in post-Soviet Russian capitalism professional 
associations once more perform the role of contract enforcers. Among the forty-five firms 
that I studied, four firms used professional associations to help them solve contractual 
disputes. Two of these four used this contract enforcement strategy only once in the past, 
and are not members of any professional association. They appealed to an association that 
the party they had a dispute with was a member of (firm #7 and firm #42). The other two 
firms are members of professional associations, and quite frequently resort to the 
association’s help. The executive manager of a firm that sells beer and soft drinks 
explains how the association his firm is a member of works: 
There is this association of firms that sell alcohol, in St.Petersburg. If some 
firm ever fails to pay to a firm that is a member of this association, or 
breaks a contract in other way, no other firm from the association will sell 
its goods to this firm. This is a condition of a membership in our 
association. Almost 90% of firms that sell alcohol in St.Petersburg are 
members of the association. (Firm #13, Personal interview, July 2002) 
 
The interviewee makes it clear, however, that in case of non-payment the association 
has no ways of making the offender pay. The most it can do is withdraw the business of 
its members, and this strategy is certainly effective for those firm owners who came to 
business with honest intentions and long-term plans. But clearly it cannot be effective 
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against dishonest opportunists whose main goal is to rip short-term benefits and 
disappear.  
Another function that professional associations perform is dispute resolution. The 
executive manager from an advertising firm says that her firm repeatedly used the 
Association of Advertisement Makers in St.Petersburg for dispute resolution with their 
clients. As a rule, both disputing firms would agree to abide by a decision of the 
association representative, the interviewee says (Firm #4, Personal interview, July 
2002)55.
Despite such essential services that professional associations can offer to their 
members, their popularity among entrepreneurs remains quite low. Apart from four 
respondents whose firms used this strategy already, only four other said they knew about 
existence of professional associations in their area of business in St.Petersburg, and thus 
potentially may become members and use professional associations for contract 
enforcement purposes in future. 
The Leontieff Centre of economic and sociological research evaluated in 1999 that 
only about 6% of small firms in St.Petersburg were members of any association at that 
time (quoted in Kihlgren 2001, 462). One possible explanation is historical weakness of 
civil society in Russia. Under the Soviet regime, various associations and voluntary 
organizations were typically not initiated from the grassroots level, but instead instituted 
from above, by party authorities at various levels, and were considered important tools of 
Soviet propaganda. Even though nowadays associations can be completely different from 
those of the Soviet epoch, the average Russian entrepreneur is still reluctant to trust them.  
 
55 This case is discussed in more detail in the section of informal arbitration of chapter 4. 
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5.2. Private protection firms 
 5.2.1. The beginning of private protection firms 
In the period of time between 1992 and 1993 the Russian state voluntarily gave up its 
monopoly on the means of violence by legalizing private security firms and private 
protection agencies. It happened partially as a result of structural pressures from within 
the state institutions themselves, and partially because protection agencies had already 
existed de facto for a number of years. The structural pressures mounted as the 
restructuring of state security services continued throughout the beginning of 1990s, 
spurred by both popular demand and fiscal crisis that made it difficult for the state to pay 
the salaries of an army of special service agents. In just a few months between September 
1991 and June 1992 more than 20,000 officers were discharged or left the service, and 
many others left before and after this time. All these specially trained agents needed 
employment. New laws allowed private agencies to sell protection and security services, 
informational support, dispute resolution, and contract enforcement (Volkov 2000, 485). 
Private protection agencies that existed de facto before these laws were passed were 
by and large criminal groups that infiltrated the business environment of St.Petersburg at 
the end of 1980s and brought in the practice of using force in business relations. Many of 
the first Russian private business owners had been operating in a shadow economy before 
private business activity was legalized, and they often had fallen victims to organized 
criminal groups who would extort payments from them under the threat of violence. As 
private businesses were moving from the shadow economy to more open and legal forms 
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of activity, so did criminal groups (Volkov 2000, 2002; Radaev 2000). Eventually they 
started offering protection to those firms that they extorted money from, first from other 
criminal gangs, and eventually against the dishonest actions of other economic actors56.
Many such criminal groups were subsequently legalized by registering as either 
private protection companies, or private security services. In the six years between 1993 
and 1999 the number of private protection agencies in Russia grew from 0 to 11,652, 
most of them concentrated in large urban centers. Some of them were former criminal 
gangs, some were composed of former athletes, and many of the agencies were headed, 
or even entirely composed of former KGB or other state law enforcement or military 
personnel. Overall, private protection and security firms employed nearly 50,000 former 
officers of the state security and law enforcement organs (Volkov 2000, 487-489). 
The law, in fact, established the difference between the private security services,
which could be set up by private and state enterprises and financial institutions for 
physical and economic protection, and the private protection companies, that could be set 
up as an independent enterprise. However, few Russian business people pay much 
attention to this distinction. Most of them, just like ordinary citizens and the media, refer 
to both types as “protection agency” or “protection service”. In this work I will discuss 
those protection agencies that are specified in the law as “private protection companies” 
because these are the ones that small businesses normally deal with. Small firms have 
neither the necessity, nor resources to form their own security services which thus remain 
outside of this analysis. 
 
56 Contract enforcement strategy Threat of violence by criminals is discussed in detail in chapter 4, section 
2. 
166
The discussion of private protection agencies is made difficult by the fact that they 
are not always clearly differentiated from criminal gangs engaged in the same business57,
or that they may lose the state’s license for some violation and still continue to operate. 
These factors make it hard to distinguish Private protection agencies as a contract 
enforcement strategy from the Threat of violence by criminals strategy. Many 
participants of my study who use the services of a protection agency were not able to tell 
whether their agency is officially registered, or not. To make the analysis possible, in 
differentiating the two I used the assumption that all mentioned private protection 
agencies are legal, state licensed entities, unless respondents would definitively state 
otherwise. This assumption is based on the general trend toward more legality and 
transparency in Russian business, noted by some experts (Volkov 2000; Hendley, 
Murrell, and Ryterman 2000). 
Conceptually the relationship between private protection agencies and small 
businesses is in some aspects similar to those between criminal gangs and businesses, 
described in section 2 of chapter 4. Russian sociologist Vadim Volkov (1999, 2000, and 
2002) calls this relationship an “enforcement partnership” which is a strategic alliance 
formed by agencies capable of violence, and entrepreneurs. Both criminal gangs and 
private protection agencies can be hired by entrepreneurs to perform debt recovery, 
contract enforcement, dispute settlement, and negotiations of various kinds, including 
those with state officials. Besides the obvious emphasis on the legality of private 
protection agencies and the illegality of criminal gangs, I distinguish between the two on 
the basis of availability, and methods of operation. Officially registered and licensed 
 
57 See Appendix 2 “Luba’s story” for an illustration of this point.  
167
protection agencies typically make their services available to any potential client, while 
criminal gangs operate in much more closed and secretive manner. The method of 
operation of protection agencies will be discussed in the next section. 
 
5.2.2. Private protection agencies as contract enforcers 
Interviews with business owners and managers reveal three major patterns of 
collaboration between private protection agencies and small businesses. In the first one a 
firm – typically a store or an office with some valuable equipment – hires a protection 
agency to perform basic security services. A protection firm supplies its client with a 
requested number of specially trained security personnel, usually for a flat daily rate, or 
provides a “panic button” that ensures a rapid response by security personnel in case of 
emergency. A café owner says that a contract with a protection agency is a necessary 
condition of operation of all cafes and restaurants that sell alcohol in St.Petersburg. He 
says that he hired a local protection agency that is police-based. They installed a “panic 
button”, and the owner pays them $100 monthly for this service, although so far he did 
not need to use it (#44, Personal Interview, August 2002).  
This type of arrangement has nothing to do with contract enforcement. Firms that 
need help with contract enforcement, debt recovery and help with negotiations in case of 
a dispute form an “enforcement partnership” with a private protection agency.  This type 
of service entails a much more trustful and involved relationship than simple office 
security. Realizing that not only the life of their business, but sometimes their own life 
can depend on their enforcement partners, business owners say they rely a lot on the 
recommendations of someone they trusted when selecting a protection agency. The 
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executive manager from a firm that sells consumer electronics describes how his 
protection agency operates: 
Question: You have on the door of your store a plate that says that this store is 
under protection of such and such protection agency. This agency also 
supplies you with these guys who work as security in the store? 
Answer: No. The security guys I hire myself, they are either ex-police 
officers, or ex-military. They protect the store from you know, teenagers 
who want to steal a player, or the like. But what the plate says, that we are 
under protection, those guys “solve problems”58. They can create problems 
for those who created problems for us. They can, of course, “beat out” the 
money from a debtor, if they find him. If someone owes us and does not 
pay, they will find him and say “You owe money”. A debtor can say yes, I 
know, I will pay. Or he can say no, I disagree, and call his own protection 
agency. The most interesting thing, I think, is that when two protection 
agencies meet to represent the interests of their partners, they nearly always 
come to a consensus! It is like in the West they show in movies, where 
disputing parties send their lawyers to negotiate and try to settle. We have a 
similar thing here, although not with lawyers, but with protection agencies. 
They are not all gangsters, you know; in fact some protection agencies have 
regular lawyers on their staff. Although, from what I understand, they rarely 
use formal law in their negotiations, most of the time they rely on plain 
common sense. (Firm #23, Personal interview, June 2001) 
 
In the third type of relationship between a firm and a protection agency the firm 
purchases the whole “package” of services, from office security to “problem solving” if 
necessary. The co-owner and executive manager of a firm that manufactures and sells 
hiking equipment says that they hired their protection agency at the very beginning of 
their operation, in 1992. At that time, he says, everyone needed to be affiliated with a 
protection agency, otherwise a firm would be constantly harassed by competing criminal 
groups. They found one after the recommendation of a friend in a police department, and 
worked with them ever since. At first, he says, they provided protection against both 
 
58 To “solve problems” is a common euphemism in Russian business vernacular that refers to contract 
enforcement, dept recovery, conflict resolution and other types of responses to activities that grievously 
hinder a firm’s functioning. The term frequently, although not always, implies illegal means of achieving a 
desirable outcome for the firm. Firms may hire external help to “solve problems”, or may have a special 
person in staff whose job is to resolve conflict situations. 
169
criminal elements and dishonest partners, but now they only provide office and store 
security. The interviewee said that the owners prefer it this way; they fear the leverage 
that the agency can acquire if asked to help with debt recovery or other problems (#45, 
Personal interview, August 2001). 
The first and the second patterns of firm-agency relationships are the most common. 
Interestingly, many firms hire one agency for office security, and another agency for 
“problem solving”. In looking for a security service, firms typically shop around for 
what’s cheapest, and this service is quite inexpensive: from a hundred to a few hundred 
dollars a month, depending on a level of security provided. “Problem solving”, on the 
other hand, is a much more expensive service, and the price, as several respondents 
noted, depends on the turnover of the client firm. Entering an “enforcement partnership” 
with a protection agency, a firm must be prepared to pay up to 1% of monthly turnover as 
a monthly fee, plus a bonus for each successful operation. The most common problem - 
debt recovery – costs a client from 30% to 50% of the sum in question (Firm #19, firm 
#43, firm #10, Personal interviews). 
In the position of contract enforcers, protection agencies use different methods. 
Fewer and fewer agencies use brute force and the threat of physical violence in attempts 
recover a debt or settle a dispute. The executive manager from a firm that sells beer and 
soft drinks says that methods of physical violence do not pay off for two reasons: first of 
all, the offender may simply not have money, so no amount of intimidation can make him 
repay the debt. Second, the offender may at any time contact the police and report threats 
of violence. With the general strengthening of state enforcement institutions in recent 
years, police forces are much more capable of causing problems for both business firms 
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and private protection agencies than a decade ago (Firm #13, Personal interview, July 
2002). Few business firms perceive such risks as worth taking, and those firms tend to 
cooperate with criminal gangs. 
A much more common method of contract enforcement used by protection agencies 
involves pressuring an offender through various state institutions (like tax or sanitary 
inspection), or non-state establishments (for example, commercial banks or professional 
associations). In this scenario, a protection agency has a wide network of useful contacts 
in state organs, like tax inspection, sanitary inspection, and city administration, and non-
state organizations, like banks and professional association. Through these connections, a 
protection agency can create a credible threat of damage to one’s business in a short time. 
The head of a finance department in a firm that sells computers explains in detail how 
their protection agency operates: 
 We typically sell computers wholesale on credit, to distributors. Sometime 
distributors stop paying. We check out if the debtor has money to pay, and 
normally they do. Such cases we pass to our protection people. We call them 
“roof”, but in fact they are a protection agency. They are not criminals, and 
not former police or KGB, they are very well-connected people. Their main 
“weapon” are credible threats of the kind “it will be worse for you if you 
don’t pay”. They won’t physically assault anyone, but kill their business 
through various inspections, check-ups and the like. It works marvels.  
Question: Do you use their services often? 
Answer: From time to time. Strangely, it happens more frequently with long-
time customers, who probably think that because of good relationships we are 
just going to let it go. When we have an unpaid debt of over $10,000 we 
always contact our protection people. If between $5,000 and $10,000 we 
consider contacting them, depending on the circumstances. If the debt is 
smaller, we usually don’t bother. 
Question: What if a debtor does not have any money? 
Answer: If it is a good distributor, and he tells us honestly that he has problems, 
we try to help, sometimes giving additional credit. In any case, we won’t 
pressure them to sell their personal property, or something, like some other 
people do. 
Question: How effective is your protection agency? 
Answer: Practically 100%. (Firm #10, Personal interview, July 2002) 
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The interviewee stressed that her firm deliberately stayed away from police-based 
and gangster-based agencies, whom they don’t trust. They opted instead for a new kind of 
protection that uses their own firm-based enforcement strategies, most commonly ties to 
state officials. In effect such an agency serves as a middle-man who connects a buyer and 
a seller of a particular kind of service using their own extensive contacts. Thus a contract 
enforcement request entails three sets of negotiations for such an agency: negotiations 
with their client regarding the nature of the enforcement request, negotiations with 
appropriate state or non-state officials who can create problems for a debtor, and finally 
negotiations with a debtor. 
There are virtually no examples in my study of protection agencies using threats of 
physical violence against an offender in the past three to four years. Most respondents 
describe it as a change from the beginning of the 1990s and attribute this change to two 
factors: an improved business environment, and strengthened state law enforcement 
agencies. The business environment improved in the sense that there are significantly 
fewer cases of premeditated non-payment, and also the fact that most firms that survived 
through the 1990s learned how to protect themselves against potential fraud. 
Strengthened law enforcement agencies provide a disincentive for open violations of the 
criminal code. Thus those business owners and managers who need speedy solutions 
based on the threat of violence choose criminal groups as their “enforcement partners”.  
Besides contract enforcement services, protection agencies are capable of a wide 
range of other services. The co-owner and executive manager of the firm that 
manufactures tents says that at first he cooperated with criminals who protected him 
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against other criminals. But when he encountered problems with tax inspection he had to 
look for a well-connected protection agency that could solve those problems. He found a 
police-based protection agency that had extensive connections with state inspection 
organs. “Today gangsters in Russia can only recover debts, and only some debts”, he 
says. “Police-based protection agencies can resolve any dispute with state inspection 
organs. The complexity of the problem will determine how much it costs. All problems 
are solvable, although some can be very expensive” (Firm #1, Personal interview, June 
2002). 
Sometimes private protection agencies can even be used to enforce court decisions. 
The co-owner and executive manager of an advertising firm recalls how one of his clients 
had to use their protection agency to enforce a court decision which was in their favor. 
The dispute was over premises, and judicial enforcers could not make the other party 
vacate them. Finally, the client of my respondent called their protection agency who 
arrived, broke in, caught the personnel of the other firm, showed them out and stood 
guard at the door until the transfer of premises was fully completed (Firm #31, Personal 
interview, June 2001).  
 
The examples given above show that “protection” became a much more complex 
phenomenon compared to how it used to be a decade ago. Negotiations now appear to be 
the main function of protection agencies in the alliance between a business firm and a 
protection agency. Besides contract enforcement, most protection agencies are capable of 
providing a wide range of services on demand. Most firms distinguish between protection 
agencies who provide security for offices and stores, and those with whom they form an 
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“enforcement partnership” – a business-agency alliance in which a protection agency, 
among other services, helps enforce contracts. Differently from criminal groups hired for 
the same purpose, protection agencies tend to use negotiations and pressure on one’s 
business through state and non-state officials, not threats of physical violence.  
 
5.2.3. Usage of the Private protection firms strategy among studied firms 
As I discussed above, protection agencies can by used by a firm for different 
purposes, and contract enforcement is just one of them. A number of questions were used 
to identify whether, and if yes how, firms use protection agencies (questions NN 4.1.2; 
4.3 – 4.8 of the Questionnaire) While eighteen firms out of forty-five (40%) indicated 
that they use the services of a protection agency, a significantly smaller number actually 
uses them for contract enforcement (fig.5.2.1). 
 
not used
81.8%
used in the past
9.1%
use when 
necessary
4.5% main strategy4.5%
 
Figure 5.2.1. Usage of Private protection agencies as a strategy of contract enforcement, 
among studied firms (n=44). 
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As figure 5.2.1 shows, only four firms (9%) use private protection agencies for 
contract enforcement rather frequently, and four firms used protection firms for contract 
enforcement once or more in the past. Out of those eighteen firms that use protection 
agencies for other kinds of services, two-thirds (69%) used them from the founding of the 
firm. Half of those who use protection agencies said they are quite happy with the 
collaboration and find their agency to be quite useful; the other half does not really use 
the agency that much, preferring to keep it available “just in case”. Two-thirds of 
respondents said that they found the agency themselves, usually through a 
recommendation from a friend or business partner.  
All four firms that use a protection agency for contract enforcement are in trade. As I 
already discussed in chapter 2, firms in trade have a significantly higher profit margin 
than firms in production and in service. They tend to experience more dishonesty on the 
part of their partners, and consequently to survive they need to have more aggressive 
contract enforcement strategies59.
Interviewees from firms in trade and services say that most small firms they know 
use a protection agency for various purposes. Most respondents from firms in production 
say that their business friends and partners do not use a protection agency. Firms in 
production tend to have a smaller profit margin, and unless they are directly engaged in 
selling what they make, they rarely need security services for their premises.  
The founding period of a firm also seems to have an impact on the probability of 
picking this strategy. Most of the firms that use, or have used protection agencies for 
 
59 Correlation between being in the trade area of business and usage of protection agencies for contract 
enforcement purposes has a coefficient = .280 (Kendall’s tau_b), and .288 (Spearman’s rho), significant at 
the .05 level, 1-tailed.  
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contract enforcement started working in the first period (before 1995), and the remaining 
in the second60. This is possibly due to the fact that contract enforcement with the help of 
protection agencies was quite widespread in the beginning of the 1990s, and some firms 
keep using their services habitually. 
Larger firms tend to use protection firms for contract enforcement purposes more 
frequently than smaller ones61, partly because this service is quite expensive, and many 
smallest firms cannot afford it, and partly because larger firms may feel a greater need for 
it. Neither criminal involvement, nor Soviet experience of management appear to have 
any connection with the choice of Private protection agencies as a contract enforcement 
strategy. 
 
60 Correlation between the founding period and usage of protection agencies for contract enforcement 
purposes has a coefficient = -.288 (Kendall’s tau_b), and -.312 (Spearman’s rho), significant at the .05 
level, 1-tailed. Correlation coefficient shows that firms that were founded earlier are significantly more 
likely to use protection agencies for contract enforcement purposes than firms founded more recently, 
within the given sample. 
61 Correlation between the size of the firm and usage of protection agencies for contract enforcement 
purposes has a coefficient = .263 (Kendall’s tau_b), and .271 (Spearman’s rho), significant at the .05 level, 
1-tailed. Correlation coefficient shows that larger firms are significantly more likely to use protection 
agencies for contract enforcement purposes than small firms, within the given sample. 
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5.3. Private arbitration (treteiskii) courts 
 
Private arbitration is perhaps the most ancient form of dispute resolution. In chapter 
4, I already discussed unofficial private arbitration that some firms find more appealing; 
this part is about the same service, but performed by government licensed private 
arbitration (treteiskii) courts.  
The first law that legalized private arbitration on Russian territory was passed on 
June 24, 199262, and very soon after the first official private arbitration courts appeared in 
Moscow. State courts at that time were slow, expensive, corrupt, and could not satisfy the 
demand for dispute resolution from a rapidly growing private sector. In the thirteen years 
after the first law, over 400 private arbitration courts were created all over Russia, most 
of them concentrated in the North-West of Russia. St.Petersburg has thirty-two 
functioning private arbitration courts, one of which was created by the Agency of Support 
for Small Business specifically for the needs of small business. 
The law that currently regulates private arbitration courts was passed on July 24, 
200263. According to this law, any private enterprise can found a private arbitration court, 
and appoint judges. The only requirement about the qualification of judges is that they 
must have a legal degree. Private arbitration courts can also be created by private 
enterprises for a particular dispute, and then dismissed. Parties who decide to bring their 
 
62 Vremennoye polozhenie o treteiskom sude dlia razresheniya ekonomicheskikh sporov, postanovlenie 
Verhovnogo Soveta Rossijskoi Federatsii ot 24  iunia 1992 g. (Provisionary regulation of treteiskii courts 
for economic disputes, adopted on June 24, 1992). 
63 Federal’nyi zakon o treteiskikh sudakh v Rossiiskoi Federatsii, \102-]^ (Federal Law about Private 
Arbitration Courts in Russian Federation), adopted on July 24, 2002. 
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dispute to a private arbitration court must sign a bilateral agreement (treteiskoe 
soglashenie) in which they agree to be bound by the arbitrators’ decision. There can be 
no appeal. In the case of the arbitrators’ decision not being voluntarily complied with, the 
plaintiff can petition to the state arbitration court, which then proceeds to enforce the 
private court’s decision.  
Private arbitration courts are cheaper, faster (most decisions are typically achieved 
within 20 days, while state arbitrazh court can sometimes take years to process a single 
case) and are considered to be more secure in terms of guaranteeing privacy. All these 
reasons should make private courts very appealing to private entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, 
most of the participants in my study said that they never heard of these courts. There are a 
number of reasons why this may be the case. First, in St.Petersburg the majority of 
existing private arbitration courts have been created by large enterprises, banks or 
commodity exchanges for their own private use, and they do not advertise their services 
to outsiders. Second, a fundamental distinction of private courts from state arbitrazh 
courts is that the former requires an agreement signed by both sides for the proceeding to 
be initiated. The most serious problem for small entrepreneurs is non-payment, and it is 
common that the debtor simply cannot be found: the office is closed and phones don’t 
answer. Clearly, in such cases private courts become quite useless.  
In interviews with business owners and managers I asked them whether they ever 
used a private arbitration court, whether they know of someone who used a private court, 
and I asked the respondents to evaluate costs, corruption and effectiveness of private 
courts. No participant of my study used private courts, but four respondents knew 
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someone who did. All respondents said they could not evaluate private courts because 
they did not have sufficient knowledge of them to make any kind of assessment. 
Although very few small firms in St.Petersburg use private arbitration courts, as a 
contract enforcement strategy it is extremely important, since it is the only strategy that 
breaks the state’s monopoly on dispute resolution and thus potentially decreases 
transaction costs (Greif and Kandel 1995). Competition in this area will probably become 
more beneficial to Russian entrepreneurs as the Russian market matures. 
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5.4. State arbitrazh courts 
 
Currently, there are two types of state courts where a firm can bring a dispute: a 
regular state court, and a state court of economic affairs (arbitrazh). The regular state 
court has remained virtually unchanged since Soviet times, and mainly serves to resolve 
disputes between ordinary citizens. The arbitrazh court was transformed from the old 
Gosarbitrazh at the beginning of the capitalist reforms in Russia, and was supposed to 
answer the demand for dispute resolution among new private firms. This type of courts 
deals only with disputes regarding economic affairs and managerial issues, and the 
disputing parties are either registered firms or self-employed businesspeople. The 
hearings in this type of court are faster then in regular state courts, and significantly more 
expensive.  
Courts should be, perhaps, the most significant state institution for dispute resolution 
for entrepreneurs. A quarter (24.4%) of all participants of my study said that their firm 
sued, or was sued by another firm or organization. The most common reasons for suing a 
business partner is non-payment. It may seem that the number of firms that used court 
litigation as a strategy of contract enforcement is rather high, but in fact it is low, given 
that over a half (51.1%) of all studied firms have been victims of non-payment, and 89% 
reported having experienced various violations of terms of contract by their business 
partners. Many respondents said that they do not even consider courts as an option. “I 
know that it is completely useless,” - says a manager from an advertising firm. “The thing 
is, there has been no positive precedent that one firm would sue another for non-payment, 
and the victim would receive a big compensation in a timely manner. We all know what’s 
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going on with other firms, and if such thing ever happened, everyone would know. But 
it’s never happened” (Firm #5, Personal interview, June 2001).  
The issue of timeliness appears to be of particular importance to entrepreneurs. The 
owner of a publishing company explains that a skilled lawyer can stretch a court hearing 
for a number of years, and even if the injured party wins in the end, inflation will eat up 
most of the penalty payments (Firm #6, Personal interview, July 2002). In fact, most of 
those respondents who said that they used courts, could not report the results of the 
hearing because it was still in process, in most cases for more than a year. Entrepreneurs 
need their disputes resolved within weeks or months, not years, so they could deal with 
the consequences and get on with their business. 
The executive manager of a firm that sells beer and soft drinks thinks that the 
problem with the court system is not only the speed of procedures, but enforcement of 
court decisions. He says, his firm tried suing a number of dishonest partners, but having 
won the cases, has never been able to get penalty payments from the offenders (Firm #13, 
Personal interview, July 2002).  
This inability of courts to enforce their rulings probably is an important factor in why 
so few respondents believe in the state courts’ effectiveness (fig.5.4.1). Corruption 
among judges and judicial enforcers is also perceived by respondents as being a serious 
problem (fig.5.4.2)64:
64 For an example of corruption among court officials, see Appendix 2 “Luba’s story”.  
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Figure 5.4.1. Perceptions of effectiveness of state courts by respondents from studied 
firms, in % (n=38).  
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Figure 5.4.2. Perceptions of corruption of courts officials among the respondents from 
studied firms (n=37), in %. 
 
While both those interviewees who have dealt with the court system, and those who 
have not evaluate its level of effectiveness and corruption similarly, the evaluation of 
how expensive it is depends on experience. Most respondents said that they think the 
state court system is too expensive, while those respondents who actually used the system 
said it is not. This is a good example of how people’s preconceptions can sometimes be at 
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odds with reality. It is also interesting to note that managers and owners who use courts 
as a contract enforcement strategy on average have higher education than those who do 
not65. This is probably due to the fact that higher education gives managers confidence 
that they can deal with the system of state courts and use it to their advantage. 
 
Not all of those entrepreneurs who tried using state arbitrazh courts for contract 
enforcement purposes were happy and satisfied with the courts’ performance. However, 
there are more entrepreneurs willing to give it a try now than there were even a few years 
ago, respondents themselves admit. Figure 5.4.3 shows that only 25% of my interviewees 
said they would readily consider an arbitrazh court option if they were faced with a 
serious violation of contractual obligations. However, an additional 29.5% of respondents 
said that while they would be very reluctant to do so, they do not dismiss arbitrazh courts 
as a possibility. These firms are grouped together with 40.5% of firms whose owners or 
managers said that would never consider state courts as a contract enforcement option, 
under the category “not used”. Perceived costliness, corruption and low effectiveness of 
state courts were sited as the reasons, as well as a lack of trust in state institutions in 
general. Finally, those 4.5% of firms described as having “used the strategy in the past” 
said that they had such a negative experience that they are unlikely to use it again. 
 
65 Correlation between the level of education of the firm’s owner/manager and likelihood of picking state 
courts as a contract enforcement strategy is statistically significant, coefficient = .299 (Kendall’s tau_b) and 
.317 (Spearman’s rho). 
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Figure 5.4.3. Usage of State arbitrazh courts as a strategy of contract enforcement, 
among studied firms (n=44). 
 
Overall, performance by the state judicial system is perceived by entrepreneurs as 
poor, particularly concerning enforcement of court rulings. It makes entrepreneurs feel 
vulnerable to the dishonest behavior of others. However, for those firms who cannot or 
do not want to rely on criminals and protection agencies, and who do not have 
connections to powerful state officials, arbitrazh courts remain the only hope for 
retrieving money lost to non-payment or other kinds of fraudulent behavior. 
Out of five explanatory variables only area of business seems to have an effect on the 
probability of a firm’s decision to use state courts as a contract enforcement strategy: 
firms in service seem to be less likely to use state courts66, while firms in trade seem to be 
more likely to use them67. As discussed in the previous chapters, trade remains the most 
profitable area of business, and it also attracts more opportunists than other areas, thus 
 
66 Correlation between service as a business area of a firm and likelihood of picking state courts as a 
contract enforcement strategy has a coefficient = -.269 (Kendall’s tau_b) and -.276 (Spearman’s rho), it 
show that firms in service are significantly less likely to use state courts. 
67 Correlation between trade as a business area of a firm and likelihood of picking state courts as a contract 
enforcement strategy has a coefficient = .267 (Kendall’s tau_b) and .275 (Spearman’s rho), it show that 
firms in trade are significantly more likely to use state courts. 
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requiring more versatile and aggressive contract enforcement strategies on the part of the 
management of firms in trade. These firms frequently use courts as a last resort strategy, 
when networks, financial tools and other strategies fail to protect them against contractual 
violations.  
Quite opposite to firms in trade, firms in service typically have lots of small 
transactions that they rarely document properly, relying instead on informal business 
agreements. As a result, when a violation occurs, they rarely can use a state court to seek 
redress because of the lack of a proper contract. In addition, the small scale of 
transactions makes litigation not worth the investment.  
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5.5. Complementarities among strategies, and summary of their 
use 
 
Now that we have discussed a method of operation for each of nine contract 
enforcement strategies available to small Russian entrepreneurs we can look at how they 
work together. This section of the chapter will start with the analysis of the patterns of 
usage of contract enforcement strategies among studied firms, then will present the 
analysis of complementarities of these strategies, and conclude with the summary of their 
use, compared across all studied firms. 
It is rare that a firm does not use at least one contract enforcement strategy. The 
choice of what contract enforcement strategy to use is largely predetermined by two 
circumstances: the frequency of contract enforcement problems (typically determined by 
the nature of a firm’s business) and associated losses experienced by a firm, and the 
availability of social and financial resources at firm’s disposal to address these types of 
problem.  
There are three firms that did not use any contract enforcement strategy at the time of 
interviews (Firms ## 28, 37, and 40). One of these firms is a café (Firm #40) whose 
owner purchases goods for cash. The two other firms do suffer losses due to contract 
violations, but they lack appropriate resources to take either preventive or punitive 
measures toward contract violators; their self-described approach is to “beg and wait”. 
Fourteen firms (31% of all studied) have used only one contract enforcement strategy, 
twelve firms (27%) have used two strategies, eight firms (18%) have used three 
strategies, and remaining eight firms have used four or more strategies, with seven 
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strategies being the maximum used by one firm (Firm #13). None of the studied firms 
have used all nine contract enforcement strategies. Figure 5.5.1 shows the distribution of 
the number of contract enforcement strategies used by firms over their lifetime, out of 
nine contract enforcement strategies analyzed in this work. Each category includes 
information about strategies that firms used in the past, but don’t use anymore, as well as 
currently used strategies.  
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Figure 5.5.1. Number of contract enforcement strategies used by firms over their 
lifetime, among studied firms, in % (n=45). 
 
Figure 5.5.1 includes both strategies that have been used by firms in the past, but not 
considered any more at a time of interviews, and strategies that constitute the contract 
enforcement repertoire of each firm at the moment of interviews. Firms that have used 
more than two contract enforcement strategies have both the need and the resources for it. 
They are typically larger; they either were founded in the beginning of the 1990s and 
accumulated significant resources that help them deal with all kinds of problems (Firms 
## 2, 3, 17, 24, 36, 42, 45), or they were founded quite recently but operate in a high-risk 
business area in which it is imperative to aggressively tackle contract enforcement 
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problems – wholesale trade (especially alcohol), the highly competitive real estate 
business, and some areas of manufacturing (Firms ## 13, 27, 32, 43).  
To evaluate which strategies were actively used by firms at the time of interviews I 
combined responses to questions about what strategies had been used in the past (section 
4.1 of the questionnaire) with the hypothetical question about a possible course of action 
if a respondent’s firm faced a contract violation today (question #4.3 of the 
Questionnaire). So, for example, if a firm used its connections to state officials for 
contract enforcement in the past, but does not indicate this course of action as possible in 
an event of a contract violation in the future, then Threat of punitive actions by state 
officials is not considered to be actively used by this firm. Alternatively, if a firm’s 
representative indicates that if a case of violation he or she intends to use a state arbitrazh 
court, then State arbitrazh court is considered an active strategy of this firm, even if they 
did not use it before. Calculated in this manner, thirty-four firms out of forty-five (75.6%) 
actively employ one or two contract enforcement strategies (figure 5.5.2).   
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Figure 5.5.2. Number of contract enforcement strategies currently used by studied firms 
(n=45). 
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The overall characteristics of firms actively using more than two contract enforcement 
strategies are similar to those of firms having used multiple contract enforcement 
strategies in their life course: they tend to be older, larger and have a higher need for 
enforcement solutions due to the nature of their business.  
In chapter 3 I briefly touched upon how all nine contract enforcement strategies can 
be seen as following one of three logics of operation: logic of prevention (financial tools), 
logic of positive incentive (networks and professional associations), and logic of coercion 
(criminals, state officials, arbitration, courts and private protection agencies). These 
differences among strategies are particularly illuminating in explaining the patterns of 
usage of strategies among firms, in terms of temporal dimension of transactions. 
Strategies of prevention (financial tools) and positive incentive (networks, associations) 
are typically employed by firms routinely, in the majority, if not in all, transactions, prior 
to the occurrence of the transaction. Many potential problems are prevented with the help 
of these strategies. If a problem with contract enforcement then arises, firms can turn to 
strategies of coercion (use of criminals, state officials, arbitration, courts and private 
protection agencies), to seek the redress. The following table shows the distribution of 
nine contract enforcement strategies with regard to the three logics of operation: 
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Stage I: Action prior to transaction     
(seeks prevention) 
Stage II: Action after 
transaction (seeks redress) ENFORCEMENT 
TYPES PREVENTIVE POSITIVE INCENTIVE COERCIVE 
Firm-based strategies * Financial 
tools. 
* Information and closed 
exchange networks. 
* Threat of violence by 
criminals; 
* Arbitration by mutually 
agreed upon powerful 
individuals; 
* Threat of punitive action 
by state officials. 
Extra-firm strategies - * Professional 
associations. 
* Private protection firms; 
* Private arbitration courts; 
* State arbitrazh courts. 
The choice of action at the stage of redress is determined by a number of factors. First 
and foremost, it is the firm’s social resources – like pre-existing access to state officials 
or criminals - and the availability of the financial means necessary to initiate a court 
hearing or hire a protection agency. Another factor of significance is the amount of actual 
damage done to a firm by a contract violation. Most managers say that they will only 
proceed with active attempts to retrieve lost funds through coercive measures in a case of 
a severe damage. For some firms, it may mean as little as $500, and for others it can be 
$10,000.  
Table 5.5.1 demonstrates that the data generally supports this proposition of a two-
stage system of contract enforcement. Eighteen firms that actively use only one contract 
enforcement strategy (40% of studied firms) chose either the strategy of prevention 
(financial tools), or a strategy of positive incentive (networks). Formal associations – the 
other strategy of positive incentive – are still not very common in Russia, so it should not 
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surprise us that few entrepreneurs choose to rely on them as part of their approach to 
contract enforcement. 
Those twenty-four firms that actively use more than one contract enforcement 
strategy (53.3% of all studied firms) show all kinds of variation with regard to 
complementarities among strategies. Almost all firms use either networks or financial 
tools for the first – preventive – stage of contract enforcement. Firms’ available resources 
predetermine the choice of coercive strategies utilized in the second stage.  
Table 5.5.1. Usage of contract enforcement strategies by studied firms (n=45).
# FIRM
’S 
ACTIVITY 
FOUNDED IN 
#OF STAFF 
A1   = 
networks 
A2=  
criminal ties 
A3 = private 
arbitration 
A4 = state 
connections 
A5 = 
financial 
B1 = 
associations 
B2= 
protection 
firms 
B4 = state 
courts 
N umber of 
strategies 
used in the 
past 
Number of 
currently 
used 
strategies 
1 manufacturing of tents 1992 105 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 two one
2 construction 1993 35 3 1 0 2 0 0 1 0 four two
3 media retailer 1991 3 2 2 0 1 0 0 3 0 four three
4 advertising 1996 13 2 0 2 0 3 2 0 0 four four
5 advertising 1995 12 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 three three
6 publishing 1999 6 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 two two
7 business consulting 1992 200 2 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 three one
8 art gallery 1992 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 two two
9 geophysics equipment development 1997 8 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 four three
10 computer wholesale 1991 200 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 two two
11 packaged bread snacks production 1998 20 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 two two
12 construction 1997 35 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 two two
13 beer, soft drinks wholesale 1996 35 2 1 0 1 2 2 2 2 seven five
14 restaurant 1987 12 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 one one
15 mobile phone retail 2000 7 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 one one
16 design and manufacturing of furniture 1994 28 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 two two
17 oil refinery parts manufacturer 1992 19 3 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 five three
18 labels, packaging manufacturing 1996 40 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 0 two two
19 chemicals wholesale 1991 120 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 2 four three
20 engineering 1992 8 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 two two
21 import and wholesale of lime 1995 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 one one
22 medicinal cosmetics wholesale 1997 10 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 two two
23 sales of consumer electronics 1995 54 3 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 three two
# FIRM’S ACTIVITY DATE STAFF A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 B1 B2 B4 PAST ACTIVE
24 manufacturing of advertising banners 1992 40 2 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 three two
25 fur and leather clothing retail 1998 19 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 two two
26 publishing 1999 2 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 two two
27 manufacturing of beer packaging 1998 110 3 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 three two
28 lease of offices 1997 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 zero zero
29 musical instruments wholesale 1999 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 one one
30 sales of musical instruments 1992 30 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 one one
31 advertising 1995 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 two one
32 manufacturing of advertising banners 1998 200 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 0 three three
33 consumer electronics retail 1994 150 0 0 2 one one
34 telecommunications 1993 100 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 two two
35 ship electronics repair service 1987 20 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 one one
36 business consulting, market research 1991 25 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 three two
37 construction parts manufacturing 1995 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 zero zero
38 consulting, market research 1995 15 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 two one
39 sales of construction goods 1996 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 two two
40 convenience store and cafeteria 1995 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 zero zero
41 sales of video and audio equipment 1993 100 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 two two
42 radiology equipment design, manufacturing 1989 150 3 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 four two
43 realtor 1999 180 0 2 0 1 2 0 0 2 four three
44 café 2000 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 one one
45 hiking equipment retail and wholesale 1992 20 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 three three
Empty cells denote missing data. Eight out of nine strategies are listed; the ninth (B3 private courts) has no occurrences. Each strategy is assigned a value from
zero to three, based on the information from interviews. In total, four types of strategy usage are identified:
0 = never used;
1 = used once or more in the past but unlikely to be used again;
2 = currently used to some extent, when necessary or possible;
3 = currently used as a main strategy.
Green font (A1; B1) denotes the strategies of positive incentive; blue font (A5) denotes the strategy of prevention; red font (A2-A4; B2; B4) denotes the
strategies of coercion.
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Firms may actually use more than one strategy in addressing a problem with 
contractual obligations. A manager from the firm that sells chemicals says that he was 
hired to deal with such problems – primarily with non-payment – and over the time that 
he was with that company he saw many interesting combinations. He describes the 
general pattern of how his firm deals with contractual disputes:  
Question: How do you deal with contractual violations, especially with non-
payment? 
Answer: Well, typically I first get on the phone and try to find out whether a 
debtor has a legitimate reason for the delay of payment, and has all intentions 
of paying, or he does not. Frequently he does not. Then I submit my findings 
to our lawyer, and she initiates a court hearing. After we win the hearing, the 
court typically cannot do anything to get our money back, the firm can be 
officially bankrupt, with zero funds on their account. In such cases we pass 
the information on to our protection service, they know people everywhere, 
in the police forces, among criminals, everywhere. 
Question: But what can your protection agency do to obtain the debt if the 
debtor is bankrupt? 
Answer: They find out whether the debtor has money “unofficially” – say, in 
cars or multiple houses, bought stuff before declaring bankruptcy. If yes, they 
will get on the case. First of all, they will find out whether the debtor has a 
‘roof’. If the debtor does not have it, they will organize ‘negotiations’ 
(basically, threaten the debtor), in which they try to settle. They could send 
their criminal associates to ‘beat out’ the money. In one of my cases, they 
seized three Mercedes cars from the debtor to settle the debt, counting 
$10,000 per car.  
Questions: How much would it cost to the firm? 
Answer: Half of the debt. (Firm #19, Personal interview, July 2002) 
 
This example demonstrates how a firm uses multiple strategies in a case of a single 
contract violation. In fact, according to the respondent, at first this firm uses a preventive 
strategy - partial prepayment. Then, if the violation does occur and the losses are 
significant, the management resorts to using the state court and to its private protection 
agency that in turn can employ criminals or use their connections to state officials (for 
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example, in tax inspection or police forces) to achieve the goal. Other respondents also 
reported instances of criminals acting through corrupt state officials, as means of 
intimidation. Such usage of a number of strategies in a single case of contract violation is 
not very common among small firms. Only a few respondents said that their firms have 
capabilities to use multiple means to obtain redress. More commonly, the management 
consider themselves lucky if they can afford being proactive in pursuing a debtor at all, 
be it going to a court, or calling friends for help.  
Another way of looking at complementarities among contract enforcement strategies 
is to identify the functional resemblance between strategies under certain circumstances 
that may result in the merging of two analytically separate strategies to the point that it 
becomes hard to distinguish one from another. Such merging is particularly apparent in 
three instances. First, as I have already discussed in earlier chapters, the distinction 
between organized criminals and private protection agencies can at times be murky, since 
the latter can move in and out of legality by holding or losing a state license, by using 
legal or illegal means in achieving their goals, and by documenting properly their activity 
or not. 
Second, the distinction between state courts as a contract enforcement institution, and 
treat of punitive action by state officials can also disappear if the state officials who are 
used through connections are actually a part of a state court system. A corrupt judge 
issuing a verdict that was paid for by one of the disputing parties clearly belongs to a 
category of corrupt state officials, but in the eyes of a disputing party that had lost and is 
unaware of corruption, he or she belongs to the state court system.  
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Third, in practice it may be difficult to distinguish instances of private arbitration that 
in theory appear as a separate strategy. Arbitration by mutually agreed upon powerful 
individuals can actually be the same as private court’s arbitration, but with formalities 
skipped. To make the distinction even more difficult, professional associations can by 
law establish their own private arbitration courts, or they can instead offer private 
arbitration services without formally creating private courts. In a close-knit web of social 
relations permeating all institutions and organizations involved, participants may 
themselves not realize what kind of arrangement they are involved in.  
Figure 5.5.3 illustrates these different types of complementarities. Green solid arrows 
denote the merging between different strategies. Red dashed arrows show the links 
between strategies that are created when one strategy operates through another. 
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Figure 5.5.3. Overlapping of contract enforcement strategies. 
 
Firm-based enforcement 
strategies 
1. Information and closed 
exchange networks 
3. Arbitration by mutually agreed 
upon powerful individuals 
2. Threat of violence by 
criminals 
4. Threat of punitive 
action by state officials
Extra-firm enforcement 
strategies 
1. Professional associations 
(formalized) 
3. Private arbitration courts2. Private protection firms 
4. State arbitrazh courts 
5. Financial tools 
(prepayment, ‘hostages’).
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It is quite apparent from the analytic description of each the of nine contract 
enforcement strategies offered in chapters 4 and 5 that they are not equally popular 
among small Russian entrepreneurs. For various reasons, chiefly being the availability of 
a strategy, its costliness and effectiveness, and also the perceived need for its deployment, 
entrepreneurs select some strategies more frequently than others. Figure 5.5.4 shows the 
comparison of use of eight contract enforcement strategies among the studied firms. The 
ninth strategy – private arbitration courts – had no instances of use.  
This figure was constructed in the following manner. First, each contract 
enforcement strategy was evaluation in relation to each firm, to determine whether the 
firm ever used this strategy (see Appendix 3). Second, each strategy was evaluated in 
relation to each firm, to determine whether a strategy is currently actively used (mainly 
through a direct question regarding a firm’s course of actions if a contract violation 
occurs today). Then, the two corresponding numbers were computed for each strategy. 
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Figure 5.5.4. Comparison of use of contract enforcement strategies among studied firms, 
in the past and in the present time, in % (n=45). 
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It is clear from this figure that networks and financial tools are the unquestionable leaders 
among strategies. Only one firm used to use networks as a contract enforcement strategy 
and does not do it anymore, and only one firm used to use financial tools but stopped. 
The reasons for their popularity were discussed earlier in this section, primarily the 
availability of these strategies, ease of use, an preventive nature of these two strategies.  
The use of strategies changes with time; some strategies retained their popularity 
among entrepreneurs far better than others. The Threat of punitive action by state 
officials appears to have had the most dramatic change: more firms used this strategy in 
the past but stopped than actively use it now. Information from interviews with the 
business managers and owners indicates that “violent” strategies – Threat of violence by 
criminals and Protection agencies – are also on decline due to the strengthening of state 
enforcement bodies and the overall development of more civilized business relations in 
the market. Half of those respondents that said that their firms used to use one of these 
two strategies do not use them anymore. 
The strategies that are gaining recognition as effective are state arbitrazh courts, and 
professional associations. Increasing levels of education among small entrepreneurs, as 
well as continuous legal reform have had a positive impact on the level of use of state 
courts for contract enforcement purposes. Professional associations slowly gain weight, 
too, as more and more entrepreneurs become aware of their existence, and the benefits 
that their membership may offer. 
 
Finally, I would like to draw some conclusions with regard to the explanatory power 
of the five explanatory factors laid out in chapter 2. These five factors include the sector 
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of economy in which the firms operates (trade, service, production), the size of firms 
(small or medium), period of founding (1990-1994; 1995-1998 (crisis); 1998-2001), 
Soviet experience of the management, and criminal involvement on the level of 
investment or personal connections. In the analytic description of contract enforcement 
strategies in chapters 4 and 5 each factor was considered in relation to the usage of each 
strategy, by means of non-parametric correlations between intensity of usage of 
strategies, and each factor as a characteristic of a firm. Overall, the sector of economy, 
size and criminal involvement were each found to be significant in explanation of usage 
of two contract enforcement strategies; the period of founding helped predict the usage of 
one contract enforcement strategy; and Soviet experience of management was not found 
to be significant at all.  
The sector of economy was found to be significant in relation to usage of state courts 
and private protection agencies. Firms in trade were found to be more likely to use both, 
private protection agencies and state courts, while firms in service were found to be less 
likely to use state courts as a contract enforcement strategy.  
Size mattered in explaining the usage of Information and closed exchange networks 
strategy, and private protection agencies. While bigger firms were found to be more 
likely to use private protection agencies, they were significantly less likely than smaller 
firms to use networks to enforce their contracts. It is partially consistent with the 
prediction made in chapter 2 that bigger firms are more likely to use more expensive 
strategies. The usage of other contract enforcement strategies that are considered to be 
expensive by respondents, like state court system, and state officials, were not found to 
be determined by the firms’ size. 
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The only strategy whose usage strongly correlates with the period of founding is the 
usage of private protection agencies. Consistent with the predictions made in chapter 2, 
protection agencies are used overwhelmingly by firms that were founded in the first 
period (1990-1994), when their use was common practice among private firms. The use 
of other strategies that were thought to be related to different periods of founding (like 
networks or state officials in the first period, and financial tools and courts in the third 
period) did not show any significant correlation.  
Soviet era experience of upper management was not found to be a determinant of 
any particular contract enforcement strategy, even the Threat of punitive action by state 
officials. The documented instances of its usage are distributed among all types of the 
studied firms. And lastly, criminal involvement was found, as expected, to correlate with 
the usage of the Threat of violence by criminals strategy. Interestingly, it was also found 
to correlate negatively with usage of the Information and closed exchange networks 
strategy. 
Thus, out of five specified explanatory factors, three (sector of the economy, size and 
criminal involvement) were found to be rather powerful. The other two (period of 
founding and Soviet experience of upper management) were not found to have any 
significant impact on the choice of contract enforcement strategies by studied firms.  
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented an analytic description of four extra-firm contract 
enforcement strategies and analysis of some complementarities among strategies. 
Overall, these strategies have a positive effect on inter-firm relationships by providing 
options in contract dispute resolution, and a mostly negative effect on state-firm 
relationships. Professional associations, just like information and closed exchange 
networks, aid contract enforcement mainly through the threat of exclusion from future 
transactions, but differently from the latter this strategy does not hinder entrance of new 
firms. One of the major incentives for firms to enter professional associations is the 
perceived inability of the state to protect firms against dishonest behavior in the 
marketplace. Professional associations facilitate contract enforcement by spreading 
information about the reliability of firms, ostracizing dishonest firms, and assisting firms 
in settling their contractual disputes.  
Private protection firms play an ambiguous role in inter-firm relationships. They may 
be viewed positively since they do help legitimate contracts get enforced. However, the 
means they use to achieve this goal are far from legitimate. Whether they use the threat of 
violence against the other party, or the threat of financial punishment through corrupt 
state officials, such types of enforcement are clearly illegal. Entrepreneurs employ this 
strategy out of frustration with the inefficiencies of the state legal system that cannot 
resolve contractual disputes quickly and fairly. Since the contract enforcement services of 
private protection agencies are very costly, the state’s claims to taxation are perceived as 
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unjust68. Another negative implication is the dispersion of the state’s authority. The state 
has traditionally been defined in terms of its monopoly over means of violence (Tilly 
1986; 1990), and the fact that other third parties now serve as enforcers of rules means 
that the state’s authority is diminished (Volkov 1998; 2002). 
Private courts operate within the legal framework defined by the state, so they may 
be in competition with, but not in opposition to the state court system. Breaking the 
state’s monopoly on dispute resolution can be seen a good thing in the long run, insofar 
as it reduces costs, increases effectiveness and thus may lead to decreasing transaction 
costs for firms. But so far for small firms private courts do not appear to be functionally 
essential. 
Contract enforcement via state arbitrazh courts should in principle have an overall 
positive effect on inter-firm relationships and state/firm relationships. In reality, however, 
state courts are perceived as ineffective and corrupt, and this reputation reinforces 
negative attitudes towards the state. I will discuss entrepreneurs’ attitudes to the state in 
the next chapter. 
Table 5.1 summarizes characteristics and origins of each extra-firm contract 
enforcement strategy, shows what types of firms tend to use each strategy, and lists the 
effects a strategy has for inter-firm and firm/state relations. 
 
68 There is a correlation between having an “enforcement partnership” with a private protection agency and 
the percentage of concealed revenues to avoid taxation: coefficient = .215 (Kendall’s tau_b) and .259 
(Spearman’s rho), significant at the .05 level, 1-tailed (due to small sample size, non-parametric 
correlations were used). Correlation coefficient shows that firms that have an “enforcement partnership” 
with a private protection agency are likely to conceal a larger percentage of their income from tax 
authorities than firms without connections to private protection firms, within the given sample. 
 
Table 5.1. Summary of characteristics, origins and implications of extra-firm enforcement strategies.
IMPLICATIONS FOREXTRA-FIRM
ENFORCEMENT
STRATEGIES
CHARACTERISTICS OF
STRATEGY
ORIGINS OF
STRATEGY
FIRMS USING
STRATEGY INTERFIRM
RELATIONS
FIRM/STATE
RELATIONS
1. Professional
associations
Operates by the threat of
exclusion from future
transactions with members.
Desire to provide information to
members about contract violators
and thus minimize losses.
Insufficient information. (+) Provides an incentive
for honest behavior.
(-) State is perceived as
not doing enough to
punish contract
violators
2. Private protection
firms
Can rely on violence like
organized criminals, or
create threats through
connections to state
officials.
Extortion forces in Soviet shadow
economy in conjunction with
inflow of former special forces
into the protection business.
Mostly medium-sized
firms in trade that were
created in the early
1990s.
(-) Brings non-capitalist
means into business
relations.
(+) Contracts get
enforced.
(-) Firms perceive state’s
attempts to collect revenue
as illegitimate.
(-) The state’s authority is
diminished.
3. Private arbitration
(treteiskii) courts
Operates like private
arbitration, but state
regulated and supported.
Developed in response to
inefficiencies of state courts.
Insufficient information (+) Gives an option inresolving disputes.
(+) Enhances the state’s
image because it helps
resolve disputes legally.
4. State arbitrazh
courts
Relies on the legal code and
state legal system.
Was transformed from the old
Gosarbitrazh at the dawn of
capitalist reforms in Russia
All firms; in particular
firms in trade. Firms in
service are least likely to
use courts.
(+) Resolves disputes in
a legal manner.
Can foster either negative,
or positive attitudes to all
state institutions,
depending on experience.
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In the last section of this chapter I first offered an analysis of the patterns of usage of 
contract enforcement strategies among firms, complementarities among strategies, and 
the summary and trends of their use. The patterns of strategy usage among firms were 
explained through three logics of strategy operation: logic of prevention (financial tools), 
logic of positive incentive (networks and professional associations) and logic of coercion 
(criminals, state officials, protection firms, arbitration and courts). Almost all firms were 
shown to apply strategies of prevention or positive incentive to their transactions, and 
some firms then proceed to coercion strategies if prevention fails. The choice of strategies 
was explained by firms’ need and available resources.  
I described two types of complementarities among strategies. One type has to do 
with a strategy operating through other strategies (protection agencies using either 
criminals or state officials to achieve their goals; criminals using state officials). The 
other type of complementarity is based on the functional resemblance between some 
strategies under certain circumstances that may occasionally result in their merging. 
Finally, in the summary of the strategies’ use I showed that while two-thirds of all 
studied firms use the preventive networks and financial tools strategies, significantly 
fewer firms use other strategies. Some strategies – Threat of punitive action by state 
officials, Threat of violence by criminals, and Protection agencies – appear to be on the 
decline in popularity among small entrepreneurs, while state courts and professional 
associations are getting used more often than before. This part concluded with an 
overview of the explanatory power of five factors that were specified in chapter 2 as 
possibly having a substantial impact on the choice of contract enforcement strategies by 
the studied firms. Three out of five explanatory factors were found to matter most: sector 
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of the economy the firms are in (trade, service, production), the size of the firms, and 
criminal involvement on the level of investment or personal connections. 
My general conclusion concerning the dynamics of the use of contract enforcement 
strategies was that they are developing from more primitive and cruel, like bribing and 
use of violence, toward more “civilized” ones, like using associations and state courts. 
This finding contradicts popular belief of currently occurring de-formalization of Russian 
economy, supported by some scholarly work (Radaev 2001).  
In the next chapter I will discuss the attitudes of Russian entrepreneurs toward the 
state with regard to contract enforcement, and their implications for the development of 
Russian capitalism.  
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Chapter 6: ENTREPRENEURS AND THE RUSSIAN 
STATE 
 
Introduction 
 
Scholars of contractual relations may ask how the extensive reliance by Russian 
entrepreneurs on informal means of contract enforcement differs from informal contract 
enforcement strategies documented by Macauley (1963), Uzzi (1997) and Ellickson 
(1991). Those authors also described how economic actors rely on informal means of 
contact enforcement, in the context of developed western economies. The difference 
between the Russian ways of enforcing contracts, and their western counterparts is 
profound in what these ways are formed as a response to, what undergirds their 
functioning, and what effect they have on the market institutions. While non-state 
contract enforcement strategies in western economies developed within a political and 
legal system that offers reliable and impartial legal ways of dispute resolution and 
protections against the unlawful actions of other actors, in Russia the situation is 
dramatically different.  
As this chapter will attempt to document, the Russian ways of enforcing contracts 
are formed in the context of, and largely by, what entrepreneurs perceive as the state 
failure to secure a stable and lawful business environment and provide adequate property 
rights protection. The state is seen by entrepreneurs as a hostile entity, capable and 
willing to harm private businesses through its agents. Strategies that small firms develop 
to protect their property and enforce their contracts are formed as a response to the 
environment of economic, political and legal uncertainty and instability that the state is 
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deemed to be responsible for. In addition, predatory behavior by state agents reinforces 
entrepreneurs’ negative opinions of the state, further widening the gap between the two.  
Since the state is frequently defined by social scientists in terms of authority and 
enforcement and viewed as critical in economic development, the problem of obtaining 
support and obedience on the part of its subjects makes it necessary to analyze it in its 
relations with society (Migdal 1997). Erosion of authority occurs when the state fails to 
live up to the expectations of its subjects regarding provision of the most fundamental 
services, including enforcement of contracts, provision and maintenance of infrastructure, 
accessible health care and education (Evans 1992).  
State institutions undoubtedly play a central role in the processes of post-communist 
transformation, whether we look at these processes on the level of governance, on the 
level of the recipient populace, or on the level of state institutions that are themselves 
being transformed. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet regime and the launch of free-
market reforms in Russia, Russian reformers have been widely criticized for failing to the 
take “institutional factor” into account. Both western social scientists and Russian 
scholars observed the discouraging resilience of old Soviet models, and surprising 
normative hybrids that resulted from the imposition of new rules onto old blueprints 
(Nelson, Tilly, and Walker 1997; Stark and Bruszt 1998; McDaniel 1996; Rona-Tas 
1998). Along with other factors shown in chapter 3, the old Soviet normative structure 
compromised the ability of the state institutions to function well and thwarted the 
government’s efforts to advance free-market reforms. 
But what made state institutions even more incapable of carrying out their functions 
is the general ‘mood of distrust’ among Russian people toward the state and its agents. 
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This mood emerged from years of increasing poverty, unexpected and unjust monetary 
reforms, unrestrained crime, the withdrawal of social support that the Soviet state was 
committed to, and finally the state default of August, 1998, that robbed millions of people 
of their savings and bankrupted thousands of businesses.  
The most crucially important factor, perhaps, unrealized by the actors themselves, 
that spurred the hostility and distrust among both entrepreneurs and the general populace 
toward the state was the rapid destruction of essential social norms and institutions, a 
cruel “unmaking” of an accustomed way of life (Humphrey 2002). It created many 
chances for opportunistic behavior that people were neither used to, nor knew how to 
deal with. Some observers claim that it is this condition of normlessness resulting from 
the manner in which both economic and political reforms were conducted, that was 
mainly responsible for the failure of the reforms:  
One of the most difficult parts of a transformation, such as the transition from 
socialism to a market economy, is the transformation of the old ‘implicit 
social contract’ to a new one. If ‘reformers’ simply destroy the old norms and 
constraints in order to ‘clean the slate’ without allowing for the time-
consuming processes of reconstructing new norms, then the new legislated  
institutions may well not take hold. Then the reforms will be discredited and 
the ‘reformers’ will blame the victims for not correctly implementing their 
ill-considered designs. (Stiglitz 1999, 8-9) 
 
Much of the present work is about just that – how new norms, practices and attitudes 
appear to address the failures of both the state and the market. Such norms cannot be 
imposed from above; they arise spontaneously when people are faced with new kinds of 
challenges, like small Russian entrepreneurs were throughout the 1990s. The state 
however is not absent from this process; state-society relations powerfully influence it. 
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The state’s legitimacy69 determines how much the new norms will deviate from the letter 
and the spirit of the legal code. When a state experiences a crisis of legitimacy, 
noncompliance with the law tends to be deep and universal (Fish 2001). This 
noncompliance gets encrypted into the new normative structure and gets reproduced 
through new sets of practices and attitudes.  
Entrepreneurs’ perceptions of the state are particularly important because of the 
symbiotic relationship between the state and private business. The state depends on the 
tax revenue from firms while firms need the state to provide security and predictability of 
the business environment. When entrepreneurs perceive the state and its legal system as 
untrustworthy they are not willing to support it by compliance with the law. In his “Tax 
Morale in Transition Countries”, Torgler (2003) argues that it is lack of trust  in the 
government and state institutions in the countries of the former Soviet Union that 
accounts for much lower “tax morale” in these countries than in Central and Eastern 
European countries. According to Torgler, governments’ ability to create a proper 
“structure of interaction” for firms directly influences entrepreneurs’ willingness to 
accept the rules of the game suggested by the state.  
The first section of this chapter will analyze the attitudes of small Russian 
entrepreneurs toward the Russian state and those state institutions that are pivotal for 
economic exchange, on the basis of interviews with owners and managers of the studied 
firms. These attitudes may not necessarily reflect the objective reality concerning, say, 
effectiveness of the police or corruption of tax inspectors. What they do reflect are the 
 
69 In socio-economic literature the legitimacy of the state is rarely discussed as an important variable; more 
commonly it is either ignored, or assumed to be unvarying. Some political scientists talk about legitimacy 
as a “generally positive orientation among the populace toward the political regime” (Fish 2001, 18). 
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perceptions that many economic actors share with regard to state institutions, and the 
state itself. Understanding these perceptions is critical if we want to gain insight into why 
the state plays such an insignificant role in the contract enforcement of small firms, as 
discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The second section of this chapter attempts to search for 
the roots of current state/entrepreneurs relations beyond the events of the past decade. 
Three main sets of traditions are considered: weak traditions of property rights, of civil 
society, and of rule compliance in Russia. 
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6.1. Attitudes of Russian small entrepreneurs to the state 
 
My grandmother, who used to be an ardent communist in her time, always used to 
keep a portrait of the current Party leader on the wall in her living room. She believed all 
the slogans and spent her life building communism, just to discover in the end of it that 
the king was naked. The last leader whose portrait she had on the wall was Gorbachev, 
who told the country that communism is a lie, and ain’t gonna happen. Now she has an 
icon on her wall instead of a poster of the president. 
The personal journey of my grandmother through the ideological rollercoaster of 
Stalinist repressions, Khrushchev’s thaw, Brezhnev’s stagnation, Gorbachev’s 
reformation, and finally the realm of total confusion of post-perestroika is very typical in 
Russia. Since the Bolsheviks’ revolution of 1917 people’s attitude to the state was filled 
with emotions. Today, most people talk about the Russian state70 with anger and 
disappointment. A majority of entrepreneurs in my sample spoke of how the state 
“betrayed” them, violated its obligations to provide quality education, medical care, 
pensions to the elderly, quality infrastructure. Social benefits provided by the state during 
the Soviet era are seen by many Russians as natural rights of citizenship that people can 
demand from the state. Over half of all respondents claim that they do not receive 
 
70 It has to be made clear that in their attitudes to the state Russian people tend to identify the state with 
state institutions and state officials, and rarely with the main executive office and the head of the state. This 
peculiarity of Russian culture has been discussed in numerous works of the 18th – 19th century Russian 
historians who puzzle over the question why the czar was portrayed in the folklore as a “father-protector” 
who would save the simple people from the arbitrary rule of the bureaucrats, if only he knew how his 
people suffered. This attitude was also quite common in Soviet Russia, with many people believing that the 
heads of the state were unaware of what was going on. It persists up to this day; in the last presidential 
elections Putin was reelected with 69% of votes, despite the fact that public opinion polls show that 
Russians share very low opinion of the Russian state in general. 
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anything from the state for the taxes they pay (figure 6.1). The remaining respondents 
believe they receive infrastructure (roads, communication, etc); social provisions (free 
education, free medical care, unemployment and disability benefits, etc), law and order in 
society, and personal safety provided by police forces71.
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Figure 6.1. Perceptions about state services being received for taxes, among the 
respondents from studied firms (n=43), in % (multiple choices were possible). 
 
From the latter group, most respondents specified that they are not satisfied with the 
quality of services provided by the state (bad roads and corruption of state officials were 
particularly frequently mentioned). Two-thirds of the respondents (62.2%) said that they 
don’t believe they should pay taxes at all because they are not happy with how the state 
treats them. 
Taxation indeed seems to be a major stumbling block in the relationships between 
the Russian state and small entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs’ grievances are not only about 
the amount of taxes demanded by the state, however, but also about tax collection 
procedures and about corruption among tax inspection officers. This is the most common 
 
71 For the wording of the question, see Question 6.7 of the Questionnaire. 
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complaint that I heard from my interviewees concerning state institutions and officials. 
The respondent from a firm that manufactures beer packaging says: “I cannot even say 
that the level of corruption is high, because in truth it is more than high, it is the 
maximum possible! And you never know whether the amount of bribes they extorted 
from you is going to be enough. Someone can always ‘order’ you: pay to the tax police or 
a tax inspector to organize an unscheduled and biased revision72. It is a quite common 
tool for dealing with competitors today, especially in more lucrative areas of business, 
like tobacco or alcohol sales” (Firm #27, Personal interview, July 2001). The owner of a 
real estate firm admits that bribing tax inspectors to conduct an extra careful inspection is 
a viable option in dealing with his competitors: 
Say, you have problems with another firm, can be because they did something 
to you, or infringing on your market share. You can go to a tax inspector and 
say: “Here is $1,000, I want you to check that firm”. A tax inspector would 
not say no, it is all the same to them which firms to check. 
Question: Have you done it? 
Answer: Myself and a few partners… We shared the cost. We had to deal with 
one firm that went against us on the market. It actually worked out quite 
cheap, less than $500. 
Question: Did you approach just a random tax inspector? 
Answer: Well, not quite. One of my partners knew someone in tax inspection. 
(Firm #43, Personal interview, August 2001) 
 
The executive manager from a firm that sells consumer electronics explains why 
bribing tax inspectors, as well as officials from other regulatory institutions, became such 
a common thing. The law is written in such a way, he says, that it is impossible to fulfill 
all the requirements, especially for a small business. So why even bother, spending time 
 
72 These practices have been documented in some of the academic literature; see, for example, Levin and 
Satarov (2000). 
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and money for endless paperwork, if it is so much easier just to give tax inspectors $100 
and they will ‘overlook’ the problem? “We simply have to share [with tax officials], and 
in the end everyone will be happy. In the beginning of my career I did my darnedest to 
have all certificates, pay all taxes, follow all regulations… The only lesson that I learned, 
and the hard way, is that if you want to do it, you may as well just hang yourself. Because 
it is impossible” (Firm #23, Personal interview, June 2001). He maintains that it is 
common among state officials to feel entitled to all the ‘contributions’ received from 
entrepreneurs, and they are willing to offer their assistance in exchange. “Tax police 
officers, however, are afraid to take identifiable gifts, or even money. They do it 
differently. They came to me once and said: ‘Could you make a donation to our 
department, we really need mobile phones’. So we presented them with a number of 
mobile phones. In the process of presenting I said: ‘If I have questions about taxes, can I 
contact you?’ They said ‘Of course’. And like this connections with them are built.”  
The executive manager from a firm that imports and sells lime says that ever since he 
graduated from business school a few years ago and got his job to run this firm, he was 
determined to keep his books as transparently and honestly as he could. However, the 
first tax inspector, he says, skillfully found a few minor mistakes and threatened to hit his 
firm with a large fine. The inspector made it clear that he was looking for a bribe, the 
respondent says. The respondent did not offer a bribe, but instead found a friend with 
extensive connections who negotiated the fine to be reduced. Since then, while not giving 
up his attempts to reach faultless book-keeping, the respondent instituted a special budget 
category to cover such ‘unforeseen expenses’ as bribes to state officials (Firm #21, 
Personal interview, August 2001).  
215
Not only tax inspectors are notorious for corruption among Russian entrepreneurs. 
Public health inspectors, fire inspectors, environmental inspectors, and all the others in 
whose power it is to make entrepreneurs’ life miserable provoke bitter complaints. For 
example, the owner of a roadside cafeteria says that his business suffers far more from 
extortion by state officials than from extortion by criminal gangs:  
I pay a monthly “protection fee” to a criminal gang, just to avoid trouble. All 
the cafeterias in the area where mine is do so. I am used to it, and don’t mind 
that much. The price has not changed for years already, and I know what to 
expect from them for this price, and what not to. But with state officials you 
never know what to expect. They are insolent. The head of the local public 
health service stops by my cafeteria every time she has a party, she takes 
food, alcohol, cakes, as much as she wants, and never pays. When I asked for 
payment once, she impressed on me how easy it is for her to close down my 
café. Even though I keep everything in order, I know that I will never win 
against her. That’s why I say that state inspectors are worse than criminals. 
(Firm #40, Personal interview, August 2002) 
 
It is typical that business owners do not perceive such clearly unlawful actions of 
public servants as episodic, but see them as inherent in state institutions. It is hardly 
surprising given the daily allegations in the media about corruption of prominent public 
figures that have became so common they are considered almost a norm (Levin and 
Satarov 2000, Sergeyev 1998). According to the Corruption Perception Index 2004 by 
Transparency International73, Russia occupied an abysmal 90th place, out of 145, 1st being 
the least corrupt (Transparency International 2004). Owners of small businesses seem to 
be affected the most by corruption of state officials on all levels. Experts from the 
National Institute of Systematic Research of Problems of Entrepreneurship estimate that 
owners of small businesses in Russia spend a minimum of half a billion dollars monthly 
on bribes to state officials, which constitutes about 6 billion dollars annually 
 
73 The Index is based on surveys of business people, academics, and risk analysts. 
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(Shestoperov 2003). Newly organized firms suffer the most; starting a new business 
entails obtaining various licenses and permits from about 50 bureaucrats. As one of the 
respondents in my study observed, “Our whole state apparatus is preoccupied with only 
one thing: how to enrich themselves using their positions of power” (Firm #5, Personal 
interview, June 2001). The combined corruption-related payments to both state and non-
state organizations are estimated in the range of $10-20 billion a year (Levin and Satarov 
2000). 
Many respondents pointed out pieces of legislation that they find bewildering, and 
the only explanation that appears reasonable to them is that such legislation is designed to 
generate revenue for a particular state office. For example, to obtain a license to engage 
in construction one is supposed to demonstrate three or more previously completed 
building projects. How is one supposed to build them without a license? A common bribe 
is $200 to circumvent the requirements and get a license (Firm #1, Personal interview, 
June 2002). The fire department is also notorious for the large number of permits that one 
is required to obtain from them in order to open a store or a small workshop (Personal 
interviews: firm #16, July 2002; firm #39, August 2001). The problem of confusing and 
unintelligible legislation was listed as the second most serious problem for small 
businesses after taxation. 
Many respondents gave examples from their work experience where state officials 
used the power of their position for personal enrichment. The executive manager of a 
chain of stores that sells fur and leather clothing describes how shortly after having 
reported to the police an incident of theft in the store, she was paid a visit by police 
officers. Their visit was not about theft in the store, however, but about the clothes that 
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the store sells. Police officers asked a “favor” – permission to purchase goods that they 
desired for the wholesale price [that the store pays to the suppliers]. “We never do it, not 
even to friends or family,” the respondent says.  “At best, assistant buyers receive up to 
10% discount, and managers get up to 15%. And here we see these guys who we don’t 
even know come in and request a huge discount! In response, we asked them – ‘Did you 
catch our thief? No, you did not. So why do you want a reward?’ It was a very unpleasant 
episode” (Firm #25, Personal interview, July 2002). 
Another respondent had an even more negative experience with the police. An owner 
of an art-gallery, he came to the local police station to report some violation against his 
firm that in his knowledge was a criminal offense. A police officer on duty refused to 
take a report from him: 
The conversation was very short. “Are you a businessman?”, - he asked me. I 
said yes. “Then please go to our protection department, they are dealing with 
private businesses.” Meaning that if you are in private business, you are no 
longer eligible for free protection against the unlawful actions of others. 
Their “protection department” competes with private protection firms; they 
offer the same set of services, and for a similar price. It happened in 1999, 
and I don’t believe things have changed since then. (Firm #8, Personal 
interview, July 2002) 
 
A similar attitude from the police was reported by a respondent whose full story was 
included in the Appendix 2 (“Luba’s story”). When she was attacked by gangsters, the 
police refused to accept a report from her, on the grounds that business people should 
themselves sort things out with criminals.  
A third of all respondents (31.1%) had to deal with the police for various reasons as 
firm representatives, and over a half (57.8%) as individuals. The majority of the 
respondents evaluated their experience with this principle civil protection agency as very 
negative. Over two-thirds (68.9%) of all respondents in my study evaluate police 
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effectiveness as low or extremely low, and 81.8% evaluate corruption among police 
officers as high or extremely high (fig.6.2 and fig.6.3).  
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Figure 6.2. Perceptions of police effectiveness among the respondents from studied firms 
(n=45), in %. 
 
0 0
18.2
50
31.8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
extremely
low
rather low tolerable rather high extremely
high
evaluation of police corruption
%
of
res
po
nd
en
ts
Figure 6.3. Perceptions of police corruption among the respondents from studied firms 
(n=44), in %. 
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It is interesting to note, however, that those respondents who went to the police for 
personal reasons, also tended to use police services to address their firms’ problems74,
despite the fact that they had just as low an opinion about their effectiveness as those who 
never had any contacts with the police. Those respondents who evaluated police 
effectiveness as very low, tended to rate its level of corruption as very high75.
Respondents point out that the main reason why corruption is so detrimental to the 
development of private business in Russia is that it creates an environment of 
destabilizing unpredictability. Actors are never sure what to expect from state 
institutions. The executive manager of a chain of stores that sell consumer electronics 
says: “I need fully functioning executive power. We need firm rules, and even if these 
rules are tough, we will figure out how to live with them. Right now we have a situation 
when one day we have rules, and the next we don’t, in one situation the state regulates, 
and in another it does not. It is completely destabilizing” (Firm #23, Personal interview, 
June 2001). It is hardly surprising that most business owners and managers find long-
term planning difficult: two-thirds (67.4%) of all respondents said that they do not make 
business plans for more than a year ahead, and only two respondents said that they 
attempt some kind of long-term (four years and more) planning of their firms’ 
development. 
The owner of a firm that manufactures and sells tents views the corruption problem 
from the point of view of market competition. Some firms that have connections to state 
 
74 The correlation between the fact of having gone to police to report a personal problem, and to report a 
firm’s problem is statistically significant at 0.05 level (one-tailed), coefficient = .283. Due to small size of 
the sample, non-parametric correlations (Kendall’s tau_b and Spearman’s rho) were used. 
75 Correlation is statistically significant at 0.01 level (one-tailed). Kendall’s tau_b correlation coefficient = -
.467, Spearman’s rho = -.519. 
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institutions have an unfair advantage, he says: “If you have serious connections in the tax 
inspectorate or higher, you can skip paying taxes and various regulatory fees, and nothing 
bad will happen to you. I on the other hand don’t have such connections, and am forced 
to pay. Who do you guess will have a competitive advantage in the market? That’s the 
problem, that unlawful and dishonest behavior is being rewarded” (Firm #1, Personal 
interview, June 2002). The respondent admits that he evades taxes, but claims that he 
does so to equalize his chances in the market with those who have an unfair advantage. “I 
would very much like to pay all the taxes, it itches me that I don’t, but I cannot afford to 
put my company in such a disadvantaged position. I wish everyone paid.”  
It is common among entrepreneurs to perceive state institutions as predatory, seeking 
not to fulfill their public duties, but instead to maximize rents that state officials can 
collect76. As a result, the corruption of state officials undermines the rule of law in 
society by making law enforcement much more difficult. Over a half (60%) of all 
respondents in my study disagree or strongly disagree that the Russian state is currently 
capable of enforcing its own laws and only 10% think that it is in fact capable of 
enforcing its laws. Almost a half of all respondents (47.5%) also think that the state is too 
weak to be able to maintain law and order and a third of the remaining 52.5% said that 
they do not perceive the state as weak because state officials have the power to destroy 
their business.  
Most of those respondents who own and run their own businesses said that they feel 
they are victims of extortion from state institutions on the one hand, and from organized 
crime on the other. Like the owner of the roadside cafeteria who was quoted earlier, 
 
76 On the subject of predatory states see Levi (1988), Tilly (1985; 1990). 
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many find that criminal gangs are easier to deal with. Overall, most respondents in my 
study find the level of corruption among state officials in Russia high or very high 
(fig.6.4).  
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Figure 6.4. Perceptions of level of corruption among state officials by respondents from 
studied firms (n=42), in %. 
 
The majority of respondents talk about what they see as extortion on the part of the 
state and/or its agencies with the mixture of desperation and defiance, but invariably very 
emotionally. The head of the finance department at a firm that sells computers says that 
she “hates and despises” tax inspectors, because “it is only the worst scum that can work 
as a tax inspector. They rob people. That’s why the state pays them so little, because 
everyone knows that they will collect bribes” (Firm #10, Personal interview, July 2002). 
Other respondents reason the opposite way: “It is the state’s fault that we have so much 
corruption among state agents. They have tiny salaries; people cannot survive with such 
salaries if they don’t take bribes. Look at police officers, for example. The average 
monthly salary of a road police officer is about 2,000 rubles [=$62], sufficient only to pay 
utility bills, and not to feed the family” (Firm #22, Personal interview, July 2002). The 
emotions regarding the state and its agents often dictate how firms’ leaders deal with tax 
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paying. A co-owner who runs his firm that manufactures packaged bread snacks shares 
his experience: 
There was a time, back in the middle of the 1990s, when I earned a good 
income on shares and short-term government bonds. I paid all the taxes I was 
supposed to. But then there was the 1998 crisis, and I lost everything. I sued 
the state, and won, but the state paid the penalty only in 2000, and after 
inflation it was only a fraction of what I had lost… And so I stopped paying 
taxes: if the state is so ugly with me, why should I be good? (Firm #11, 
Personal interview, July 2002) 
 
Many other owners of small business reported that they started their firms in good 
faith regarding honesty of their book-keeping, and had a change of heart when they 
realized how much extra cash all the regulatory requirements, bribes and additional 
payments would take. The restaurant owner and executive manager says that it is 
retroactive taxes that kill her: “We already lived through that time, and now suddenly we 
get notified that this new tax is introduced, and we have to pay it for all the time while we 
were in business!” (Firm #14, Personal interview, July 2002) Most (87%) respondents 
admit that their firms do not declare a significant part of the firm’s income to tax 
authorities; 40% say that they hide over 80% of their total revenue to avoid paying 
taxes77.
Business owners and managers in my study identified taxation as the direst problem 
that they face today.  Taxation is not simply a problem of the excessive payments that the 
state demands, and of corrupt state officials; it is a problem of taxation procedures and of 
an extremely confusing tax code that a person without special training has difficulties 
figuring out. The owner of an art-gallery is convinced that the tax code is purposefully 
77 See chapter 3 for more details on tax evasion. 
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designed in such a manner, to secure a sure source of income for the state from all the 
fines and penalties for mistakes that small entrepreneurs will invariably make. “It is the 
unnecessary complexity of tax legislation that pushes small entrepreneurs into the 
shadow economy. They cannot afford to hire a qualified accountant to keep books in a 
perfect order, and they cannot do it themselves. Hence the outcome: either go bankrupt 
because of all the fines that you will accrue, or skip the books altogether. So in my 
opinion, it is our state that pushes honest people into dishonest business” (Firm #8, 
Personal interview, July 2002). He points out that the main problem with tax legislation is 
not even that it is so complicated, but that it changes constantly, and it is indeed a full-
time job to keep up with it.  
To draw some conclusions, we can identify four major grievances regarding state 
institutions expressed by the interviewees, in addition to the problems with the state court 
system discussed in the previous chapter:  
• Extortion by state officials. It is viewed by most respondents as both an injury, 
and an insult. 
• Corruption on all levels of public authority. It compromises the legitimacy of state 
institutions, and distorts market competition.  
• Confusing and frequently changing tax legislation and a high level of regulatory 
involvement are seen by entrepreneurs as tools of a predatory state to generate 
more revenue, and are perceived as unjust.  
• Finally, an unreliable police force leaves entrepreneurs unprotected against 
organized crime.  
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All these are serious concerns, and explain why the majority of entrepreneurs think 
that the Russian state attempts to destroy rather then develop small business (fig.6.5). 
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Figure 6.5. Perceptions of the Russian state’s efforts to create favorable conditions for 
the development of small business by respondents from studied firms (n=42), in %. 
 
The complaints of private entrepreneurs about the state’s policies and institutions are 
undoubtedly valid. However, much of the emotion and hostility that entrepreneurs feel 
toward the state is a legacy of the past. The next section of this chapter will attempt to 
look at both historical and institutional roots of contention between small private 
entrepreneurs and the Russian state. 
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6.2. The Russian past as a factor in shaping attitudes to the state 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet regime, there has been much discussion among 
scholars about the effect that legacies of that regime will have on new political 
economies. Advocates of the path-dependency thesis have argued that preexisting 
institutional structures plays a crucial role in both institutional and organizational 
development. While formal rules can be changed (or so claimed) overnight, we cannot 
expect the same rapidity from the normative structure, from culture specific “strategies of 
action”, because they are deeply ingrained in people’s minds, into patterns of social 
behavior and relationships, they grow from cultural heritage and are supported by such 
strong sentiments as nationalism and religion. Three elements of historic legacy influence 
the relationships between Russian entrepreneurs and the state: a weak property rights 
tradition, a weak civil society tradition, and weak norms of rule-compliance.  
Hundreds of years of capitalism in the West allowed organizations to develop 
relatively efficient structures, which are based on the inviolability of private property on 
the one hand, and the balance of political power to secure protection of rights of all 
economic actors on the other. In the West, corporate and individual sovereignty was 
fought over by the state, the church and nobility, and in the process of this struggle social, 
legal and political institutions were built. Russian history is in many ways different from 
its Western neighbors. While capitalist institutions were developing in the West, Russia 
was an autarkic expansionist empire, economically based on agricultural slavery. In the 
twentieth century it became an authoritarian expansionist superpower, with a planned 
industrial economy. Never in its history were property rights strong or important. Post-
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Communist Russia inherited four centuries of a system of rule in which political authority 
presupposed substantial (often nearly complete) control not only of the nation's economy 
but of the individual property of the state's subjects as well.  
Civil society never existed in Russia in a developed form either. Virtually to the 
day of its sudden collapse, the totalitarian old regime relentlessly sought to extirpate, 
suppress, subvert, or co-opt voluntary organizations in which the habits of self-
governance, personal responsibility, and reconciliation of interests could have been 
instilled and reproduced: trade unions, community associations, clubs. Although it was 
argued that Soviet totalitarian regime had not succeed in ultimate atomization of 
individuals that would have been particularly difficult and time-consuming to overcome 
(Gibson 2001), it certainly left a tradition of poor civic engagement. 
At the moment, the level of participation in public affairs among general public is 
very low, professional associational life is only starting to appear, and strong points of 
grass-roots voluntary organization, like churches and community associations, are nearly 
absent. Endemic corruption further weakens interpersonal trust. Contrary to the optimistic 
analyses and prognoses of Westerns scholars who observed a large amount of social 
capital in Russia (Marsh 2000) and predicted quick development of democratic society on 
the foundation of extensive informal social networks that cross family and class structure 
(Gibson 2001), we instead see the reverse process in many areas of social, economic and 
political life. Civic Forum held in Moscow in November 2001 by twenty-six major 
Russian NGOs adopted a resolution that says:  
A system of so-called "managed democracy" is developing in Russia instead 
of a democratic society predicated on civil institutions. Under this system, 
citizens are gradually restricted from decision-making processes which may 
have direct impacts on their interests, and society in general is deprived of the 
227
opportunity to control governmental activities. Consequently, a situation 
emerges in which governments do not serve the public interest and are not 
controlled by the public. On the contrary, the public becomes more and more 
subordinate to the government. (Civic Forum 2001, 1) 
 
A feeling of estrangement from decision-making processes is clearly heard in the 
words of my respondents. In their own assessment, small business owners continue to be 
most excluded and victimized economic players in Russian business world, with little 
hope of gaining any real political leverage in near future.  
And finally, the centuries of absolutism first, and Soviet authoritarianism second, left 
the country with exceptionally weak normative patterns of rule-compliance. Corruption 
and blat have been features of Russian economic life for centuries, and the Soviet era was 
not an exception. Since the rigidities of the socialist command economy in Russia 
required a significant degree of rule circumvention in order to succeed, individuals 
developed a largely predatory attitude to the law: use it when it is possible and profitable, 
and forget about it at all other times. The history of lawbreaking in pre-perestroika Russia 
created a negative environment for the new generation of laws and policies, this time 
intended to facilitate free market development. Another side of this process is its self-
reinforcement: 
Evasion of rules in one area tends to induce responses in other areas. For 
example, the possibility for policemen to earn money through bribes lowers 
their official salaries. And while firms are evading their legal obligations to 
the state in tax payments, the state is evading its legal obligations to firms in 
terms of payments for goods, which in turn is partly responsible for delayed 
or nonpayment of wages and further tax evasion, and so on. (Leitzel 1998, 
125) 
Feige (1998) argues that those economies that had pre-transitional norms of 
noncompliance and distrust of the state, like Russia did, can increasingly find themselves 
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accepting a wide range of protective and predatory behaviors that impose severe 
adjustment costs on the transformation process. In Russia, a lack of strong property rights 
and civil society traditions exacerbate the predatory attitudes of both entrepreneurs and 
the state, where the state’s agents display a lack of respect for entrepreneurs’ property, 
and entrepreneurs act opportunistically toward state property, and toward fellow 
entrepreneurs.  
As illustrated in quotations from interviews with entrepreneurs in the previous part 
of this chapter, those who are determined to keep their business ‘clean’ find the costs of 
compliance with the official regulatory system in Russia extremely high. The first reason 
for this is the constantly changing legislation which causes uncertainty and frustration 
even among the best-intentioned economic actors. The state fails to fulfill its main 
function for the market: provision of an institutional system beneficial to economic 
actors, stable and fair legislation and protection against criminal elements (Murrell 2001; 
Frye and Zhuravskaya 2000; Hass 1999). The reciprocal nature of rule evasion that 
Leitzel points out in the quotation above creates a vicious circle: entrepreneurs regard the 
state’s claim to taxes as unjust because the state does not follow the rules that it laid out 
while the state cannot afford to keep all its promises because the tax revenues are 
insufficient.  
Antagonism between public servants and private entrepreneurs is profoundly 
embedded in Socialist norms and practices. Before perestroika, private entrepreneurship 
was called ‘profiteering’ and netrudovyie dohody [unearned income], and constituted a 
criminal offence. The general populace was subjected to extensive propaganda about the 
evils of individualism as a foundation of capitalism. In the accepted moral code, it was 
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wrong to care about individual success and personal enrichment. Instead, the masses were 
taught to sacrifice individualist desires for the sake of the collective good. Many Russians 
still uphold those values. 
Still, a small private sector has always existed in a shadow economy despite 
relentless persecution by police and extortion by criminal gangs. Many of those illegal 
entrepreneurs from Soviet times legalized their activity as soon as private 
entrepreneurship was permitted, with the first laws on private property at the end of the 
1980s78. It is hardly surprising, though, that the mutual distrust and animosity between 
these entrepreneurs and state officials has lingered for a long time after that. On the other 
hand, those private entrepreneurs who came from the state sector, also had little trust in 
the state. The issue of the credibility of the state’s promises has been at the center of 
managers’ grievances:  
From the beginning of the century, since the actual interpretation and 
enforcement of state law was arbitrary, the Soviet manager had become very 
suspicious of government edicts and regulation. Both the communist regime 
and the tsarist regimes would backtrack on their word, as both groups were 
concerned with their survival and considered their survival to be above the 
law. (Randall 2001, 57) 
Concerned with its own well-being, the post-Soviet Russian government has done 
little to improve its credibility with both the general public, and the business world. Just 
like the Party nomenklatura under the Soviet regime, the new capitalist elites have no 
regard for formal laws, largely because the two groups overlap enormously (McDaniel 
1996; McFaul 1997, Hedlund 2001). The change of regime brought not the rule of law, 
but the rule of the strong. The attitudes of a new class of private entrepreneurs toward the 
state reflect that. 
 
78 For an example, see Luba’s story (Appendix 2). 
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Conclusion 
There is a popular saying in Russia: the severity of Russian law is mitigated by the 
ease of its circumvention. This saying was mentioned to me by several of my 
respondents, and the others would probably agree with it, too. This folk wisdom becomes 
especially true when public servants are the chief offenders. Both the state and 
entrepreneurs display predatory behavior and a lack of regard for the law. This is an 
important distinction from the circumstances in which non-state contract enforcement 
strategies get shaped and operate in developed western economies. 
In this chapter, I showed that the contention between Russian entrepreneurs and the 
state has both contemporary reasons and historical causes that include weak property 
rights and civil society tradition, weak norms of rule-compliance, and a lack of credibility 
of the state in the eyes of entrepreneurs. 
State officials and reformers in Russia should realize that without the good will of 
the entrepreneurial class it will be much more difficult to achieve the changes that the 
Russian government is attempting. With the ultimate goal of building a system of 
smoothly functioning capitalism, the state must reach out and connect to society, 
ultimately bridging the immense gap that exists now. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Research Findings 
It has been over a decade since free market reforms and political restructuring were 
embarked upon in Russia, and a great deal has been written about the painful and uneven 
process of change. This dissertation attempted to shed light on a particular aspect of 
transition – the problem of contract enforcement, experienced by a particular group of 
actors – small entrepreneurs. The goal of the dissertation was to show what kinds of 
problems small Russian entrepreneurs experience with contracting, where these problems 
come from, and how they are solved on the ground. In doing so, I hopefully succeeded in 
demonstrating the significance that state contract enforcement institutions have for 
economic exchange.  
While it was argued by many scholars that economic actors can successfully develop 
self-governing organizations to enforce their contracts and protect their property rights 
(Ellickson 1991; Frye 2000, Macauley 1963), my research shows that non-state contract 
enforcement strategies developed by small entrepreneurs in Russia at best create as many 
problems as they solve. I argued that it is the proximity of reliable state enforcement 
institutions that makes non-state enforcement in developed western economies 
successful. What distinguishes Russian ways of contract enforcement from somewhat 
similar strategies found in other places is that they are formed in the context of failing 
state enforcement institutions, and contentious relations between private entrepreneurs 
and the state. Entrepreneurs still perceive Russian state enforcement institutions as unable 
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to guarantee impartial and reliable enforcement services to economic actors, and view the 
state and its agencies in an overwhelmingly negative light, for reasons both historical and 
contemporary.  Historically weak traditions of property rights, a weak civil society and 
weak norms of rule compliance, in conjunction with the Soviet legacy of prosecuting 
entrepreneurship negatively affect relations between entrepreneurs and the state. Today, 
according to my data, corruption on all levels of public authority and confusing and 
constantly changing legislation are seen by entrepreneurs as among the most serious 
problems they face. The contentious relations between the state and entrepreneurs impact 
strategic choices that entrepreneurs make, including the problems of dispute resolution 
and contract enforcement. The enormous gap that exists now between small businesses 
and the state is likely to result in an unfavorable business climate, as well as implicit 
grass-roots resistance to reformation.  
As my research shows, most Russian entrepreneurs rely on non-state ways of 
enforcing their agreements. These strategies are either based on a given firm’s own 
resources (financial or social), or come from various agencies that offer enforcement 
services for sale, which vary from government licensed private courts to criminals. Non-
state enforcement strategies are mostly network-based, are rooted in preexisting norms, 
practices and attitudes, and develop in response to specific kinds of state failure to 
provide contract enforcement. For example, the ineffectiveness of police agencies 
contributed to the spread of criminal involvement in business relations, as a violent 
means of redress. Corrupt and omnipotent state officials opened avenues for bringing 
state institutions onto one’s side through bribery. 
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The third major question that I asked and attempted to answer in this dissertation 
concerns the consequences that reliance on non-state enforcement strategies has for new 
Russian capitalism. The obvious virtue of non-state enforcement is that it facilitates 
transactions by giving them certain security. The major negative consequence of firm-
based strategies of contract enforcement is the considerable entrance restriction they 
present to new firms who may lack social capital to participate in the information and 
closed exchange networks, have no connections to state institutions, powerful individuals 
or criminal groups, and cannot afford to prepay for every service they need to purchase. 
Other negative consequences include the contamination of the business environment with 
criminal methods in contract enforcement and dispute resolution, and further diminishing 
the legitimacy of the state’s claims to taxation.  
The state’s legitimacy becomes a particularly important issue when we turn to the 
impact that non-state enforcement strategies have on the building of new market 
institutions. As chapter 6 showed, the everyday frustration of economic actors with the 
endemic corruption of state officials, confusing tax legislation, high levels of regulatory 
involvement, and a lack of reliable protection from state legal institutions against crime 
and fraud amass to a rejection of state authority in other areas as well, including tax 
collection and policy implementation. However, contrary to the arguments by some 
scholars who characterize changes in the Russian economy as a process of de-
formalization (Radaev 2001), I found that in fact the opposite is true – more firms now 
rely on contract enforcement and dispute resolution through formal procedures by state 
institutions than a few years ago. 
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Finally, in the attempts to answer the forth research question – why firms choose a 
particular course of action over others – I looked at two reasons that can be seen as 
complementary. The first explanation was offered on the level of the explanatory factors 
that were discussed in detail in chapter 2, and then referred to in chapters 4 and 5. These 
factors are certain attributes of firms that help us better understand firms’ needs in 
enforcement strategies on one hand, and their available resources to deal with disputes 
and contract enforcement problems on the other. Three out of five explanatory factors 
were found significant in predicting the use of non-state enforcement strategies, one of 
which is reflective of firms’ internal resources (connections to criminals), one serves as 
an indicator of a firm’s needs in enforcement (area of business) and one is described as an 
indicator of both (a firms’ size). Firms’ need in contract enforcement determines whether 
or not a firm would develop a specific strategy or strategies for dealing with contractual 
problems, while the available resources largely shape the response the firm chooses. 
The other important factor that was found to impact firms’ choices of contract 
enforcement strategies is the temporal dimension of the transaction. Out of nine described 
strategies three work by prevention, and two of them are the most commonly used 
strategies among the studied firms. The other six strategies are “coercive”, they get 
employed after the fact of a transaction and a violation of the terms of contract, and they 
mainly aim to obtain redress. The firms with most acute needs and available resources 
tend to have elaborate approaches to dealing with contract violation that combine 
preventive and coercive contract enforcement strategies. 
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Theoretical contributions of the study 
The lessons concerning the powerful structuring role of enforcement institutions 
which my dissertation draws from Russian experience have much wider implications not 
only for analysis but also for policy, and provides valuable contributions to our 
understanding of processes of post-communist transition, the role of the state in capitalist 
development, to economic sociology and organizational analysis.  
First and foremost, my research contributes to the debate on transition in a number of 
ways. While some existing research supports the claims that state enforcement 
institutions fail to guarantee enforcement of business agreements, few scholars looked at 
how small firms with no leverage adapt to this environment. My dissertation 
demonstrated that enforcement institutions have a dominant role in the development of 
organizational structure and capitalist exchange. The research evidence supports the 
claims of neostatists that in the market economy, a strong state is indispensable 
(Kochanowicz 1994), and lays emphasis on enforcement institutions and the rule of law. 
In Russia the predictability of market exchange is undermined by the state’s failure to 
provide contract enforcement – the basic prerequisite for the functioning of a modern 
economy. 
A focus on ‘small people’ gives ground for another important contribution that the 
study makes to this literature. Differently from most research on transition that 
concentrates on elites, my study shows that everyday actions of small businesspeople 
should also be treated as very significant, because they create a new environment of 
capitalistic exchange and give shape to new market institutions. 
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The study’s central argument of the powerful structuring role of enforcement 
institutions also connects this research to the body of literature on state and development. 
State is defined here in terms of authority and enforcement (Rueschemeter and Evans 
1985), and viewed as critical in economic development (Evans et al. 1985). The research 
evidence contradicts the neoliberal claim of sufficiency of self-regulating markets for 
smooth functioning of the economy in favor of the argument that the capability to provide 
independent enforcement services for business is an indispensable feature of the modern 
state, and failure to do so undermines the state’s legitimacy and creates an unfavorable 
business environment. In the dissertation I argued that contract enforcement is one of the 
fundamental services that are expected from the state, and failure to provide it contributes 
to a rejection of state authority in other areas as well, including tax collection and policy 
implementation, thus compromising the development of capitalist institutions in Russia. 
My study also contributes to network analysis. While insightful with respect to the 
significance of both inter-firm and intra-firm networks in which economic exchange is 
embedded, authors tend to omit the embeddedness of networks of economic actors in a 
larger structure. My research emphasizes the importance of embeddedness of 
entrepreneurs in the networks both outside and outside of the business community.  
The study also makes a contribution to organizational analysis. There has been little 
research done to show how new routines of organizational behavior (Hannan and 
Freeman 1977) get established in conditions of changing institutional structure. The 
evidence from this research shows how such routines emerge from survival strategies 
under a perceived failure of state enforcement institutions, and the cultural roots of these 
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strategies. Explanatory variables in this research also help reveal how sector, size and 
available resources affect choice of enforcement strategies used. 
 
Future Research 
One of the important findings that emerged from my dissertation research is the 
enormous role that social networks play in capitalistic exchange in Russia. Reliance on 
business-to-business ties as a means to reduce uncertainty is typical of the initial stage of 
market institution building (Frye 2000). But what I found different about the structure of 
networks that private firms develop in Russia is the significance of structural 
embeddedness of firms in networks outside of the business community. Touching upon 
this question only marginally and in relation to the contract enforcement problem, my 
dissertation research showed the importance of extensive outside connections for firms’ 
functioning. Firms’ mostly informal ties to criminal groups, to officials in various state 
institutions, to professional associations, to financial organizations and even political 
parties were mentioned to me by my respondents as at times crucial to a firms’ survival. 
In the future research, I will further explore this issue. Specifically, I am interested in 
investigating the role that agents outside of business community play in facilitating 
economic exchange, in the context of post-communist political economies, and 
examining how institutional uncertainty in the business environment relates to the 
significance of such networks. The character, quality and structure of these ties and the 
influence they exert over economic activity need to be studied. The first goal of such 
research would be to specify a relationship between the successful economic activity of a 
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private firm, and its embeddedness in social networks outside of the business community, 
in the context of post-communist political economies.  
Based on my PhD dissertation research, I suggest that such embeddedness must have 
a substantial positive impact on the economic activity of private firms because ties to 
outside agents give firms additional resources in addressing problems with contract 
enforcement, dispute resolution, licensing, loans and credit lines, and also may provide 
essential information regarding other economic actors. The reason why a firm’s 
embeddedness in networks outside of the business community seems to matter so much 
in new capitalist economies is that the institutions that are supposed to perform the tasks 
of facilitating economic exchange are weak, poorly defined, and perform inconsistently. 
For example, in Russia credit rating agencies are virtually non-existent (Guseva and 
Rona-Tas 2001), state contract enforcement institutions are unreliable (Frye 2001; Frye 
and Zhuravskaya 2000; Hass 1998, 1999; Rona-Tas 1998, Hendley 2001, Solomon and 
Foglesong 2000), and corruption among officials from state regulatory institutions is high 
(Levin and Satarov 2000).  
While my field research on contract enforcement provides ample evidence of firms’ 
embeddedness in social networks outside of the business community, more empirical data 
may be needed to specify the character of such network operation, its role in economic 
exchange, and the impact of institutional uncertainty on such networks’ activity. I intend 
to study a sample of private firms in Russia, with regards to their involvement in social 
networks outside of their immediate business community. 
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On a more general note, further comparative research of non-state forms of contract 
enforcement and dispute resolution as a strategic response by economic actors to various 
challenges of business environment is needed. What are general forms of non-state 
contract enforcement that can be observed across various institutional settings, and what 
accounts for their development, and degree of their influence over economic exchange? 
My work provides a partial answer to this question, but only in the context of Russian 
economy. However, without systematic comparison it is hard to make claims regarding 
specificity of institutional forms of non-state enforcement found in Russia at the present 
time. Works by scholars on non-state contract enforcement in African countries 
(Kahkonen and Meager, 1998) or in China (Xin and Pearce, 1996) demonstrate that many 
of enforcement solutions are not unique to Russia, and are found in other countries, as 
well. Further research is needed to map out the relationships between institutional 
legacies, forms of state enforcement mechanisms, and non-state enforcement solutions in 
various institutional contexts.  
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APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
Content of the questionnaire: 
1. General information about the firm/respondent 
2. Nature of contractual relations 
3. Nature of the problems with enforcement of contracts/business agreements 
4. Types of solutions to enforcement problems (strategies of enforcement) 
5. Attitude/knowledge of state enforcement institutions  
6. Attitude toward the state 
7. Relationships with other firms 
8. Personnel, investments in growth 
9. Criminal involvement 
 
IV = Independent Variable  
 
NOTE ON THE INTERVIEW PROCEDURES: The interviews started with the 
Introductory words explaining to the respondents the purposes of the research, then 
assuring them as to the complete confidentiality and anonymity of the process, and 
signing the Informed Consent form. The respondents were asked not to mention any 
names during the interviews that could lead to their identification:  
 
Introductory words:
The research you are about to participate in aims to investigate strategies of 
contract enforcement that small firms in St.Petersburg currently use. Several 
dozen firms in various fields of activity participate in this study. I PERSONALLY 
GUARANTEE FULL CONFIDENTIALITY OF OUR CONVERSATION. 
The procedures of the field research were approved by the Institutional Review 
Board of the University of Maryland, USA. With your permission, I will tape-
record our interview; it then will be transcribed and tapes will be destroyed.  
To ensure anonymity, I would like to ask you not to mention any last names, 
names of companies or any other information that can lead to the identification of 
your firm during the tape-recorded interview. 
 
I then asked respondents questions from the questionnaire, and while tape-recording their 
full answers, coded their answers in the multiple choice questionnaire. During interviews, 
I tried to encourage respondents to give comments and examples from their personal 
experience. Thus the final result of interviews was two-fold: a completed questionnaire 
on one hand, and tape-recorded comments and examples on the other. The latter 
component of the interview materials was treated as qualitative data, analyzed separately, 
and used as illustrations and explanations throughout the dissertation. 
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1. General information about the firm/respondent
1.1. What is the main business activity of a firm (IV1)   
code Sector Specify  
1 Trade  
2 Service  
3 Manufacturing  
1.2. When was the firm founded (IV2) 
code time period Specify  
1 Before 1995  
2 1995-1998  
3 1999 – 2000  
1.3. Was the firm previously part of a state enterprise?  
code 
1 Yes 
2 No  
1.4. What is the number of full time personnel employed by your firm? (IV4) 
code # of employees Specify  
1 2 – 50  
2 51-200  
1.5. Position of respondent in the firm 
code position 
1 Single owner 
2 Co-owner 
3 General manager 
4 Manager  
5 Accountant 
6 Other: specify 
1.6. Age of respondent 
age 
1.7. Sex of respondent 
code 
1 Female 
2 Male 
1.8. Education of respondent  
code Highest achieved education 
1 Graduate degree 
2 College degree 
3 Professional diploma (PTU)
4 High-school diploma 
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1.9. Have you ever held a managerial position (if yes, for how long)?  
Note: if the respondent had not worked as a manager before her/his present 
employment, then zeros in the second column. 
code Specify total  # of years  
1 Yes, before 1990  
2 Yes, after 1990  
1.10. Have you ever held a managerial position in a state enterprise? (IV3) 
code Specify total  # of years  
1 Yes  
2 No  
2. Nature of contractual relations 
2.1. With what types of firms and with how many firms do you have contractual 
relations (clients, suppliers, partners, contractors)? 
 Yes / No and the # of firms 
1 Clients  
2 Suppliers  
3 Partners  
4 Contractors  
5 Other (specify) 
2.2. With how many of them do you have long-term relationships (with whom you 
have worked a long time and continue to do so)? 
 # of firms  
1 Clients  
2 Suppliers  
3 Partners  
4 Contractors  
5 Other (specify) 
NOTE: Throughout this questionnaire, the term “contract” refers to those 
agreements between your firm and its business partners that are signed for each 
separate deal, and not for a specific time period. [To indicate here if the firm 
signs only time-based contracts.] 
 
2.3. How ‘real’ are the contracts you sign? Do they report the sums of money and 
other conditions accurately?  
code 
1 Do not indicate at all neither sums of money, nor time frame 
2 Indicate sums of money and/or time frame, but incorrectly 
3 Indicate exact sums of money and time frame with any factual changes constituting breach 
4 Other (specify) 
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2.4. How frequently do you sign a contract after the deal has already taken place, 
solely for the purposes of reporting to state officials? 
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
5 Other 
2.5. How do your business agreements with your clients and suppliers look like in 
terms of required prepayment? 
Code 
1 Always or most of the time pay in full after the deal 
2 Always or most of the time prepay 100% 
3 Always or most of the time prepay less than 50%  
4 Always or most of the time prepay more than 50% 
5 Always different, without any pattern 
6 Always cash at the time of the deal 
2.6. Does it ever happen that you delay payment? If so, how do your business 
partners react to this? How have you solved this problem (describe in detail)? 
Code (multiple selection is possible; detailed explanation of cases to be recorded) 
1 If happened to delay payment, the business partner would understand it was a necessity 
2 If happened to delay payment, personal negotiation would follow, which is a part of routine 
3 If happened to delay payment, personal negotiation would follow, often leading to spoiled relations
4 If happened to delay payment, the business partner would use his protection agency to negotiate 
5 If happened to delay payment, the business partner would appeal to police or courts 
6 If happened to delay payment, the business partner would threaten with severe prosecutorial 
actions to obtain payment 
7 If happened to delay payment, the business partner would use connections with other members of 
the trade network to exert pressure 
8 Never delayed payment because always pay in full beforehand 
9 Never delayed payment although prepay only partially or not at all 
10 Other (specify)
3. Nature of the problems with enforcement of contracts/business agreements
3.1. Have you ever experienced the problem of non-payment or other violation of 
contract (list all)? 
code 
1 Yes, non-payment 
2 Yes, delayed payment 
3 Yes, breach of terms of delivery 
4 Yes, other (specify) 
5 No 
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3.2. If not, what do you think are the reasons (given how widespread is the problem 
in Russia right now)? (detail reasoning and description of strategies employed by 
mangers to protect the firm from contract violation) 
code 
1 Always require 100% prepayment 
2 Trade only with few long-term partners 
3 Have been in business for a short time 
4 Don’t know 
5 Other 
3.3. How often do you have problems of this kind? 
3.3.1. Before the crisis of 1998? 
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
5 Firm did not yet exist  
3.3.2. After the crisis of 1998 (September 1998 – 2001)  
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
5 Firm did not yet exist  
3.3.3. Now (this year)? 
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
3.4. How often does your firm breach written and verbal business agreements 
(include delayed payment, delayed delivery, etc)? 
 
WRITTEN AGREEMENTS VERBAL AGREEMENTS 
3.4.1. Before the crisis of 1998? 
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
5 Firm did not yet exist  
3.4.2. After the crisis of 1998 
(September 1998 – 2001)  
3.4.4. Before the crisis of 1998? 
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
5 Firm did not yet exist  
3.4.5. After the crisis of 1998 
(September 1998 – 2001)  
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code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
5 Firm did not yet exist  
3.4.3. Now (this year)? 
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
5 Firm did not yet exist  
3.4.6. Now (this year)? 
code 
1 All the time or almost all the time 
2 More than 50% of all deals 
3 Less than 50% of all deals 
4 Never or almost never 
3.5. If you have to delay payment/delivery to one of two business partners, one of 
whom is ‘old’ and the other is ‘new’ (all other conditions being equal), whom do 
you think you are more likely to delay payment/delivery to? (explain why)  
code 
1 ‘Old’ one (explain why) 
2 ‘New’ one (explain why) 
4. Types of solutions to enforcement problems (strategies of enforcement)
4.1. How do you react to a problem of violation of contract/business agreements? 
(detail the story) 
4.1.1. Go to the police (outcome?) 
code 
1 Yes, resolved positively 
2 Yes, resolved negatively 
3 Yes, unresolved 
4 No  
4.1.2. Go to a protection agency (outcome?) 
code 
1 Yes, resolved positively 
2 Yes, resolved negatively 
3 Yes, unresolved 
4 No  
4.1.3. Ask friends, relatives who can help to pressure the violator (outcome?) 
[Where 1 = yes, resolved positively (for the firm); 2 = yes, but resolved 
negatively (for the firm); 3 = yes, but unresolved; 4 = no.] 
 (multiple selection is possible; explanation of cases to be recorded) Outcome 
code 1. (+)  2.(-) 3. (-) 4. (no) 
4.1.3.1 Friend, relative in state organization  (police, city administration, etc.)     
4.1.3.1 Friend, relative in a non-state organization (trade association, etc.)     
4.1.3.3 Someone who can physically threaten the violator     
4.1.3.4 Other  (specify)     
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4.1.4. Apply to the state court/private court (outcome?) 
code 
1 Yes, resolved positively 
2 Yes, resolved negatively 
3 Yes, unresolved 
4 No  
4.1.5. Hire somebody so they would resolve the dispute (a person in state 
institution; person(s) who can physically threaten the violator) (outcome?) 
[Where 1 = yes, resolved positively (for the firm); 2 = yes, but resolved 
negatively (for the firm); 3 = yes, but unresolved; 4 = no.] 
(multiple selection is possible; explanation of cases to be recorded) Outcome 
code 1. (+)  2.(-) 3. (-) 4. (no) 
4.1.5.1 Employee of a state organization (police, city administration, etc.)     
4.1.5.1 Employee of a non-state organization (trade association, etc.)     
4.1.5.3 Someone who can physically threaten the violator     
4.1.5.4 Other  (specify)     
4.1.6. Negotiated yourself (outcome?) 
code 
1 Yes, resolved positively 
2 Yes, resolved negatively 
3 Yes, unresolved 
4 No  
4.1.7. Other solutions (specify) (outcome?) 
code 
1 Yes, resolved positively 
2 Yes, resolved negatively 
3 Yes, unresolved 
4 No  
4.2. Why haven’t you used other methods of addressing the problem? 
code More then one selection is possible 
1 Lack of resources (both social and financial) 
2 Lack of experience with other methods 
3 Never tried other methods 
4 Tried different ones, and now stick to what is known to work 
5 Did not think of any other 
6 Other (specify) 
7 Don’t know 
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4.3. If you encountered the problem of contract enforcement now, how would you 
address it? (choose the most likely scenario and explain) 
code 
1 Negotiate myself 
2 Go to protection agency 
3 Go to police or appeal to court 
4 Call friends and ask to help 
5 Don’t know 
6 Such situation cannot arise because work only 
with small number of trusted firms 
7 Other (specify) 
4.4. Do you use services of a private protection agency?  
code 
1 Yes  
2 No (skip to 4.5) 
4.4.1. If yes, for how long?  
code 
1 Since the founding of the firm 
2 About half-way through  
3 Started using only just recently 
4 Don’t know 
4.4.2. How successfully?  
code 
1 Agency was useful many times, happy with collaboration 
2 Agency is useful occasionally, quite glad about collaboration 
3 Agency is not really used, collaborate ‘just in case’ 
4 Agency is not useful at all 
4.4.3. How did you start using its services?  
code 
1 Agency appeared one day and offered their services 
2 Firm found this agency by recommendation 
3 Firm knew about agency through personal ties 
4 Other (specify) 
4.5. Have you ever had to ask your private protection agency to help you with 
contract enforcement? 
code 
1 Yes, resolved positively for the firm 
2 Yes, resolved negatively for the firm 
3 Yes, unresolved 
4 No  
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4.6. Among your friends who work for, or own, small firms, does everyone use the 
services of a private protection agency? 
code 
1 Everyone or nearly everyone 
2 About half 
3 Less than a half 
4 Nobody  or almost nobody 
5 Don’t know 
4.7. Please give examples of activity of private protection agencies which you 
personally witnessed (for your firm or other firm)? 
code 
1 Help out with obtaining various licenses or permits 
2 Help out with non-payment/delivery problems 
3 Only security of the premises  
4 Other (specify) 
5 Nothing 
4.8. Have you ever been contacted by private protection agencies that work for other 
firms, regarding contract enforcement problem? 
code 
1 Yes, about payment/delivery delays 
2 Yes, other (specify) 
3 No 
4.9. Have you ever appealed to a private (treteiskii) court to address a problem of 
contract violation? If yes, please, describe the case(s) and the outcome(s) in 
detail. 
code 
1 Yes, more than once (describe each case) 
2 Yes, once (describe the case) 
3 No  
4.10. Do you know any business owner or manager of a firm who would appeal 
to a private (treteiskii) court to resolve a problem of delayed 
payment/delivery/non-payment (or other problems connected to contract 
enforcement)? 
code 
1 Yes, more than one person/case (describe each case) 
2 Yes, one person/case (describe the case) 
3 No, don’t know anybody who would use a private court 
4.11. Do you know personally anyone in 
4.11.1. Tax collection office 
code 
1 Yes, informal acquaintance/friend (indicate how you know this person) 
2 Yes, formal acquaintances (work-based relationships only) 
3 No  
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4.11.2. State inspection offices of any kind 
code 
1 Yes, informal acquaintance/friend (indicate how you know this person) 
2 Yes, formal acquaintances (work-based relationships only) 
3 No  
4.11.3. City administration 
code 
1 Yes, informal acquaintance/friend (indicate how you know this person) 
2 Yes, formal acquaintances (work-based relationships only) 
3 No  
4.11.4. Any other person in a position to help you out with business contracts? 
code 
1 Yes, informal acquaintance/friend (indicate the position of a person and how s/he can be helpful) 
2 Yes, formal acquaintances (indicate the position of a person and how s/he can be helpful) 
3 No  
4.12. Have any of these people ever attempted to help you with problems 
concerning your business? 
code 
1 Yes  (explain how) 
2 No  
4.13. If a firm with whom you have continuous business relations has a dispute 
with another firm, how soon do you think you will find out about it? 
code 
1 Very soon 
2 Quite soon 
3 May not necessarily find out at all 
4 Don’t know, hard to tell 
4.14. If you have a dispute with some firm, will you inform your other business 
partners? 
code 
1 Yes, always 
2 Yes, but only to the best business partners 
3 Maybe, depending on the circumstances 
4 No  
5. Attitude/knowledge of state enforcement institutions 
5.1. Have you ever dealt with police in St.Petersburg? 
5.1.1. For personal reasons 
code 
1 Yes 
2 No  
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5.1.2. As a representative of a business firm  
code 
1 Yes 
2 No  
5.2. What is your opinion of police forces in St.Petersburg (rate from 1 to 5, where 1 
is the lowest and 5 is the highest): 
5.2.1. Effectiveness (1 is useless, cannot implement its decision, and 5 is highly 
effective) 
 1 2 3 4 5
5.2.2. Reliability as law protectors (1 is very corrupt, and 5 is reliable protector 
of the law) 
 1 2 3 4 5
5.3. Have you ever dealt with state courts 
5.3.1. For personal reasons 
code 
1 Yes 
2 No  
5.3.2. As a representative of a business firm  
code 
1 Yes 
2 No  
5.4. (if not) Do you know what would be the procedures and fees for a court hearing 
if you had to press charges against some other firm (describe)?
code 
1 Yes (describe) 
2 No  
5.5. What is your opinion of courts in St.Petersburg? (rate from 1 to 5, where 1 
means you fully disagree with the evaluation, and 5 means you fully agree) 
 
code rating from 1 to 5 
1 Efficient   
2 Expensive  
3 Corrupt   
4 Other (specify)  
5 No opinion  
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5.6. Have you ever dealt with private courts 
5.6.1. For personal reasons 
code 
1 Yes, more than once (describe each case) 
2 Yes, once (describe the case) 
3 No  
5.6.2. As a representative of a business firm  
code 
1 Yes, more than once (describe each case) 
2 Yes, once (describe the case) 
3 No  
5.7. (if not) Do you know what would be the procedures and prices for a private court 
hearing if you had to press charges against some other firm? 
code 
1 Yes (describe) 
2 No  
5.8. What is your opinion of private courts in St.Petersburg? (rate from 1 to 5, 
where 1 means you fully disagree with the evaluation, and 5 means you fully 
agree) 
 
code rating  from 1 to 5 
1 Efficient   
2 Expensive  
3 Corrupt   
4 Other (specify)  
5 No opinion  
6. Attitudes toward the state
6.1. What do you think about the Russian state in relation to economy? (rate from 1 
to 5, where 1 means you are fully disagree with the statement, and 5 means 
you are fully agree) 
 rating from 1 to 5 
6.1.1 State attempts to create most favorable conditions for private business  
6.1.2 State takes into account only interests of big business  
6.1.3 State officials are all corrupt  
6.1.4 Government cannot implement its own decision  
6.3.5 State is too weak  
6.3.6 Other (specify)  
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6.2. What do you think about the law enforcement abilities of the Russian state 
(=effectiveness of courts, police forces, and other executive institutions 
responsible for policy implementation and law enforcement)? Rate from 1 to 5, 
where 1 is the least effective and 5 is the most effective) 
 1 2 3 4 5
6.3. What are the biggest problems for small and medium-sized business firms in 
dealing with the Russian state that you can identify (rate each from 1 to 5, where 
1 is a very serious problem and 5 is not a problem at all)?  
 rating from 1 to 5 
6.3.1 High level of taxation  
6.3.2 High level of regulation (number of necessary licenses, etc)  
6.3.3 Lack of protection from the state against unlawful actions of 
some economic actors 
 
6.3.4 Unreliable and corrupt police   
6.3.5 Inefficient and expensive courts  
6.3.6 General level of crime in the region  
6.3.7 Other (specify)  
6.4. How serious are other problems small and medium-sized businesses experience 
at the present time in Russia, in your opinion, particularly, in your sector? (rate 
each from 1 to 5, where 1 is the worst problem and 5 is not a problem at all) 
 rating from 1 to 5 
6.4.1 Lack of investment  
6.4.2 Confusing law  
6.4.3 Bureaucracy (too high level of regulations: number of necessary 
licenses, etc) 
 
6.4.8 Other (specify) 
6.5. What has changed in this regard in the past few years (after the crisis of 1998)?  
 became 
worse 
did not 
change 
became 
better 
6.5.1 Lack of investment 1 2 3 
6.5.2 Confusing law 1 2 3 
6.5.3 Bureaucracy (too high level of regulations: number of necessary 
licenses, etc) 
1 2 3
6.5.4 Lack of protection from the state against unlawful actions of some 
economic actors 
1 2 3
6.5.5 Unreliable and corrupt police  1 2 3 
6.5.6 Inefficient and expensive courts 1 2 3 
6.5.7 General level of crime in the region 1 2 3 
6.5.8 Other (specify) 1 2 3 
6.6. Morally speaking, do you think you ought to pay taxes (not in general, but 
specifically you in your business situation, right now)?  
code 
1 Yes (explain why) 
2 No (explain why) 
3 Don’t know  
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6.7. What do you think the state gives you for the taxes (multiple selection possible)?
code 
1 Infrastructure (roads, etc) 
2 Security (police, etc) 
3 Law and order (government, legislature, etc.) 
4 Welfare benefits (free education, medical care, pensions) 
5 Other (specify) 
6 Nothing really  
6.8. It has been estimated that if a small private firm in your business area pays all the 
required taxes it is hard for it to survive. Hence most firms have to misreport 
their operational and financial results. Could you approximate misreporting in 
your business area? 
6.8.1. hidden sales as a percent of actual sales 
 ____________(percent)
6.8.2. hidden salaries as a percent of actual salary  ____________(percent)
7. Relationships with other firms
7.1. What kind of relationships do you form with your business partners (clients, 
suppliers, contractors, etc)? How informal are they? 
code 
1 Mostly business-like, formal 
2 Formal with ‘new’, personal and informal with ‘old’ 
3 Mostly personal, informal  
4 Don’t know 
7.2. How much do you trust your business partners (that they would not breach a 
contract or let you down in some other way)? 
code 
1 I trust them 
2 I trust my ‘old’ partners, but not ‘new’. 
3 I don’t trust anybody 
4 Everything depends on the circumstances,  ‘trust’ is a wrong word in business 
5 Don’t know 
7.3. What is the approximate ratio of stable (continuous) clients/suppliers to 
new/revolving ones?  
code 
1 Only stable 
2 1 to 1 
3 1 to 2 
4 1 to 5 
5 1 to 10 and more 
6 Other (specify) 
254
 
7.4. Of those continuous clients/suppliers, with how many do you have informal, 
personal relationships? 
code 
1 With nearly everyone of continuous clients/suppliers 
2 With about half of them 
3 With less than a half of them 
4 With no one 
5 Hard to say 
7.5. With how many of them (continuous clients/suppliers) do you socialize on a 
regular basis (meet in informal environment, not for business purposes)?  
code 
1 With  nearly everyone of continuous clients/suppliers 
2 With about half of them 
3 With less than a half of them 
4 With no one 
5 Hard to say 
7.6. Do you think that these informal and personal relationships help you to avoid 
potential problems with breach of contract? 
code 
1 Yes, undoubtedly 
2 Maybe 
3 I don’t think there is a connection 
4 Don’t know 
7.7. Are contracts with those continuous clients/suppliers written or verbal most of 
the time?  
code 
1 Written all the time 
2 Sometimes written, sometimes verbal 
3 Verbal at all times 
4 Don’t know 
7.8. What is the approximate percentage of your total annual turnover that comes 
form trade with long-term clients/suppliers? (estimate) 
code 
1 80-100% 
2 60-80% 
3 40-60% 
4 20-40% 
5 Less than 20% 
6 Don’t know 
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7.9. Please describe what was your primary source of information about these 
continuous clients/suppliers before they became your important client/supplier? 
(list per each firm) 
code 
1 Client/supplier was a close friend/relative  
2 Client/supplier was a personal acquaintance 
3 Client/supplier was an acquaintance/partner from the previous job 
4 Client/supplier was recommended by a friend/relative 
5 Client/supplier was recommended by a business partner 
6 Other (specify) 
7 Did not have any information about this client/supplier before 
started working with them. 
7.10. Is there any difference in ways you build contractual relationships with 
continuous clients/suppliers, and firms that you do not have such ties to? 
code 
1 Yes, with continuous clients/suppliers no formal contracts are made 
2 Yes, with continuous clients/suppliers contracts are just a formality 
3 There is no difference 
4 Other (specify)
5 Don’t know 
7.11. Is it more likely that you will be more tolerant of payments/delivery delays 
from continuous clients/suppliers, than from other firms? 
Code 
1 Yes, we depend on continuous clients/suppliers so we have to be more tolerant 
2 Yes, we trust our continuous clients/suppliers and delays are not a problem 
3 No, our reaction is always the same 
4 Other (specify)
5 Don’t know 
7.12. How do you establish relationships with new firms? (Do you research a 
firm’s reputation before signing the first contract?) (more than one selection is 
possible) 
code 
1 Always attempt to obtain as much information about a firm as possible  
2 Will not trade with a firm unless it was recommended by someone I know 
3 Depends a lot on whether I like representatives of a new firm personally 
4 A firm is put on a ‘trial period’ with special conditions (100% prepayment) 
5 Other (specify) 
7.13. When you are entering into a deal with a firm, do you trust the reputation 
of a firm, or a manager with whom you sign the agreement? 
code 
1 Trust a firm 
2 Trust a person 
3 Other (specify)
256
7.14. Have you ever refused to conduct business with a firm simply on the 
grounds that you did not know anything about this firm? 
code 
1 Yes 
2 No  
3 Don’t know 
8. Personnel and investments in growth
8.1. (if the respondent is not an owner) How did you find this job?  
code 
1 By recommendation of a personal friend/relative 
2 By recommendation of an personal acquaintance 
3 By recommendation of a business acquaintance  
4 Through ad or recruiting agency 
5 Other (specify) 
8.2. Is there a high level of competition in your area of business in town? 
code 
1 Yes, very high 
2 Rather high 
3 Not very high 
4 No significant competition at all 
5 Don’t know, new in the field 
8.3. What have you done in past few years to maintain your position on the market? 
What did you invest in to ensure growth of your firm (for example, raising 
salaries for personnel, buy new computers, more advertising, etc.) 
code 
1 Investment in training personnel  
2 Investment in equipment (computers, etc) 
3 Raise salaries for key people so they would not leave 
4 Invest in improving relationships with key clients/suppliers  
5 Other (specify) 
6 Nothing 
8.4. How far ahead do you plan your firm’s activity?  
code 
1 A few months 
2 About a year 
3 Two-three years 
4 Four years or more 
5 Don’t know (don’t plan, not in a position to plan, etc.) 
8.5. What, in your view, is the ‘recipe of success’ for an owner/manger of a small 
private firm in contemporary Russia? (open question) 
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9. Criminal involvement
9.1. To the best of your knowledge, has there been any connection between the 
owner(s) of the firm and criminal business (please remember that the interview is 
anonymous and will be analyzed only in aggregate with dozens of other 
questionnaires)? (IV5) 
9.1.1. connections on the level of personal relations 
code 
1 Yes 
2 No  
3 Don’t know 
9.1.2. connection on the level of capital investments in the firm 
code 
1 Yes 
2 No  
3 Don’t know 
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APPENDIX 2: LUBA’S STORY 
 
The interview below was taken as a part of the dissertation project “The Big Issue 
of Small Businesses: Contract Enforcement in the New Russia”, on the 4th of 
August, 2002, in St.Petersburg, Russia.  The respondent – a middle aged Russian 
woman – was introduced to me by a common friend, in whose apartment the 
interview took place. The guiding questions are omitted from the text below. All 
the information concerning the respondent and her firm is retained in the text 
with the permission of the respondent. 
This story of a failed enterprise is illustrative in many respects. It shows in detail 
a variety of problems that most small Russian entrepreneurs faced during 1990s; 
many of them are still present today. It also shows in action some of the strategies 
discussed in the dissertation, in the context of their application. But the main 
reason why I selected this story is because it is a stunningly candid account of one 
woman’s journey into entrepreneurship Russian-style, with all her hopes and 
losses, and bitterness of defeat from the hands of those who were supposed to 
protect her. I present this story here in almost unabridged version. 
 
Everything started in 1985, when I was left alone with a little child, I was 28 then. I 
had no money, and it was sad: my little son asks me for an apple, and the only food I 
have at home is onions. I had to do something urgently. One day I counted all the 
remaining money, it was 60 kopeks. I took a little notebook and wrote down: “60 
kopeks”. Two months later I had 2,000 rubles. How did I make it? I started with taking 
my golden necklace to a pawnshop, and buying some fabric with the money. Before the 
baby I worked as a costume designer at a theatre, and I knew how to sew and how to 
work with fabrics.  
I have heard that winter parka jackets were fashionable, so I decided to try to sew 
them. I made up technology how to dye fabric effectively, how to sew these jackets. 
Made up a few, and gave them to ‘hawkers’ who were selling “imported” clothes on the 
main streets in St.Petersburg. But they brought them back, said they could not sell them. I 
259
cried a little, of course. I used the remaining fabrics to sew pants, with the same result. 
Cried again, no money was left. Three weeks past, and then suddenly all three “hawkers” 
came by, and all three with orders. One wanted a batch of “Italian” pants, 20 pairs. The 
other ordered 50 jackets, and the third something else, don’t remember. They said that 
what I was making was not in demand, but they knew what was, and so I started sewing 
for them to sell. I sewed all these “Italian”, “French”, “American” and other “imported” 
clothes, that was impossible to find in stores. They were selling it on the street, for a nice 
price.  
When they gave me the very first order, and very little time to complete it, I figured 
that there is no way I could sew it all by myself. So I called a few girls dressmakers, 
whom I knew from the theatre, and offered them to help me, for cash. Their salary at the 
theatre was from 80 to 100 rubles, and I was paid 30 rubles for one jacket, with costs of 
material around 5 rubles. So I could pay them really well. After we coped with the first 
order, we were in business. 
And like this I worked for two years. These guys were very careful about secrecy, 
they never met in my place. They usually left their cars couple of blocks away and 
walked to my place by backyards, so nobody would notice them. What we were doing 
was totally illegal, and everyone was afraid of getting caught by police. They supplied 
accessories (buttons, zips, labels) and I had to take care of fabrics. It was quite difficult at 
that time even to buy decent fabrics, but I found ways. I concentrated on organizing 
everything, and cutting out – designing, and arranged people at my former work place to 
dye fabrics. Girls dressmakers sewed clothes the way I told them, they worked mainly at 
their homes, and some even at their workplaces. 
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I kept writing all the financial details in my little notebook. One of my “hawkers” 
saw it once, and was terrified. “Burn it immediately”, he told me, “this is a police file you 
are writing for yourself”! He was right of course, especially because at that time our local 
police officer started stopping by regularly. “I don’t understand”, he was saying, “how 
you can live so well without working”.  
But I was working a lot, in fact. Very soon we manufactured more than my three 
guys could sell. Quality, to tell the truth, was appalling, but nobody wanted quality, just 
quantity. State stores were totally empty at that time, so people were buying anything that 
could be worn.  
In three or four months I had enough money to buy a car, and it eased the problem of 
transporting ready clothes. Police officer started to stop by more often. Once my 
girlfriend and I were cutting fabrics in my kitchen, and someone let him in. I saw the 
uniform in the corridor and froze with fright. But my friend saved the situation: she 
quickly took off her pants and started screaming “No, no, you can’t come in, we are 
trying on something”! She was a beautiful girl, so the officer’s attention was on her, and 
thankfully not on loads of fabric lying around. We quickly stuffed everything under the 
couch, and he did not suspect anything. It was close call, though. At that time it was a 
criminal offence to do what we were doing, it was called “unearned income”. Although 
how can one call it unearned?! But we could go to prison for many years, and we were 
very, very afraid, all the time.  
A day came when someone told me that now it is legal to have a private business. I 
could not believe it, of course. Then all the papers started writing about cooperatives, and 
about new law that would permit non-state forms of organization, and income. It was 
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spring of 1987. I was eager to get rid of the constant fear in which I lived for two years, 
and I was eager to work openly and honestly. So I started trying to register my own co-
operative, I wanted to open a beauty salon (first in town, in fact, they only had 
hairdressers at that time). Wherever I would go though, in all official institutions, they 
were saying “go away with this rubbish”. Because they were all party people, they did 
not believe that it was happening. Then when I demanded to be registered on the basis of 
this new law, they rejected my application because of the name, because I wanted to call 
my salon with my own last name. They said to me: “Who are you, to call an enterprise 
after yourself?” So I had to change it to something neutral.   
I still managed to register within a week since the law was adopted. My co-operative 
was among first ones in St.Petersburg. But this was just the beginning. After overcoming 
all the hurdles of registering, I had to endure many months ordeal of trying to rent a place 
for my beauty salon. Because the city was built to accommodate either big state owned 
stores, or apartments for citizens, there were very few suitable premises for small 
enterprises. These places were in the ownership of the district administration, and there 
was just one person there who could sign a contract of rent. I found a nice place that I 
liked, convinced the administrator to rent it to me, and started renovation. Hired workers, 
and we worked hard for a month. In the end of month, I come there to work one day, and 
all my locks are removed and someone else is occupying my premises! It turned out that 
the administrator changed her mind! I could not believe how it was possible, I had a 
signed contract!  
But in reality I could not do anything, no matter how much I tried. There were no 
laws yet regulating these kinds of issues, so it was useless to try to go to court. On the 
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level of local or even city administration the resistance to co-operatives was huge. It was 
only in press and international conferences that things were changing to give people more 
economic freedom, in reality it was far from truth. It was virtually impossible to work. To 
start with, it was impossible to buy renovation materials, impossible to buy legally 
anything that one may need to organize a private business. There weren’t even word 
“private” then in legislation. 
After I lost that first place, I was looking for others, but somehow I never could get 
any. The administrator in charge seemed to hate me. Eventually, she offered me a 
horrible basement, which hosted homeless and drug addicts, and was 5 foot high. How 
could I make a beauty salon in such a place? – I asked her. But she said – either this, or 
none. So I had to agree. I spent all my savings trying to make that basement acceptable. 
We had to deepen it by 4 feet, remove some walls, change position of water pipes that ran 
though it… Lots of things. I would never have enough money for that now, but 15 years 
ago construction workers used to work for a bottle of vodka. If now dollars are the 
common currency, back than it was vodka. 
The major problem turned out to be pipes of heating that were passing though whole 
basement, 2 feet above the ground. There was no official service that I could call and 
arrange them moved, so I had to hire a handyman from that building to do the job. He 
agreed to do it for 300 rubles (2 his monthly salaries), cut all the pipes away, took money 
and disappeared. The next day the central heating was supposed to come on in the whole 
district. The coincidence was that the head of the local administration lived in the same 
building with my basement. So when next day the central heating did not come on (the 
pipes were cut!), my basement became flooded with officials from all offices. Everybody 
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yelled and swore at me, and threatened me with jail, and finally some big boss tore my 
contract of rental of this basement into pieces. Well, the pipes themselves were fixed 
really quickly, officials looked to that, but what was I supposed to do without premises, 
already having invested so much in that basement? 
So I tried to get my basement back. The big official who destroyed my contract of 
rental refused point blank to see me, so I started following him everywhere, like a 
shadow. Once after a few weeks I managed to get into his office and with lots of tears 
and begging persuaded him to give me back the basement. 
The next problem after renovation was equipment – sewing machines. My idea was 
to make a beauty salon where women not simply could have their hair cut and skin taken 
care of, but also could rent a beautiful evening gown for a fancy party, because they were 
not available in stores. But again, professional sewing machines that I needed were not 
available in stores. The administrator who made me take the basement on the first place 
was probably feeling guilty, knowing about all the troubles I had with it, so she promised 
help. She sent me to sewing factory, asking local manager to help me. There I purchased 
a few sewing machines that were written off. I had to sell my car for that, I did not have 
any money left. 
But now things were going. Evening gown rental turned out to be a losing idea, so in 
the end I had a beauty salon slash night club. Apart from hair cutting and alike, I had a 
bar, a pool, a piano, and on the weekends we had club-like evenings, with fashion shows, 
beauty contests, and things like that. The place became very popular, many “rich and 
famous” were regulars. I had about 40 people personnel working for my salon. 
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From 1998 to 1994 we did not have any major problems, and business was running 
smoothly. Although there were ‘funny’ incidents, of course. Once, for example, I had tax 
inspectors visiting, without warning. They came in and the first thing they saw was 
freshly polished hard-wood floor. And one of them says loudly: “Wow, here we will be 
taking money”. I did not understand why, I knew that I paid all taxes on time, out of the 
principle, because that was the reason I was registered and official, because I wanted to 
work honestly. But these tax inspectors obviously thought differently. After long search 
they managed to find three documents on which my signature was missing, simply 
because I did not get to those papers yet. And although factually everything was in order, 
they took formal approach. I was saying – please, let me sign them now, but they in 
response confiscated all the documents, and fined me 50 thousand rubles (= 10,000 
dollars). For three missing signatures. Everybody told me that they just wanted money 
from me, but I never knew how to bribe, I am always afraid to insult a person by offering 
a bribe. So in the end I had to pay that fine, and also spend lots of time in police station, 
looking for my ceased documents. My lawyer, who is also my brother and worked for me 
from the beginning, was insisting that the fine was illegal, but I did not want to drag the 
matter to court. 
In 1994 a new problem arose: gangsters. In the beginning of 1990s different gangs 
were fighting for areas of control in St.Petersburg, and they extorted money from 
enterprises on “their territories”. In the beginning they mainly paid attention to highly 
profitable types of business: casinos, night clubs, trade (especially alcohol, tobacco). 
Service sector was first of all underdeveloped, and second, never as profitable. But by 
1994 new gangs from out of town started crawling in, and increased competition forced 
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gangs to look for revenue in new sources. One day the gangsters that controlled the 
“territory” where my salon was located, suddenly discovered that not only I don’t pay 
them for some reason, but that I don’t really have a “roof”.  
It turned out that since my salon had such prominent clientele, they assumed that I 
had some serious protection. When they found out that I did not, they were furious. They 
came and said: “How dare you not to have any protection?” “Protection” services were of 
course their way of extortion. I answered to them that I did not need any protection, 
because nobody ever attacked me. So they quickly organized an attack on the premises, 
and then came by again and said “You see, you need protection”. Finally I agreed to pay 
to them for their “protection”. 
So if at first gangsters simply wanted money on the regular basis, a few months later 
they started wanting more, they demanded ownership. But it was already different gang. 
My “protectors” were from some association of former soldiers who fought in 
Afghanistan, and these new were from Kazan. The latter looked at my business, figured 
how profitable it really was, and approached me with threats, demanding to give in my 
business. They offered me to be the executive manager on a nice salary, and give my 
ownership to them. Of course, I refused. Then they started to rob my salon. They would 
come in the afternoon, with guns, say “everyone on the floor” to personnel and clients, 
and take away everything that they could. What they could not take, like build-in walls 
mirrors, they would break. When I called my “protection agency” and they arrived, new 
gangsters offered my “protectors” a share in the profit from robbery, and they agreed! 
The boss of my “protectors” later was running for a deputy in a city hall.  
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Gangster came and robbed the place couple more times. Twice they attacked me – 
once I got a concoction, and once a bad knife wound. Many times I looking for protection 
from police, but in the police station I was told that “bandits” and “businessmen” start 
with the same letter “b”, so I should figure out how to solve my problems myself. All 
these times when my salon was robbed, or I was in a hospital after an attack, they refused 
to start a criminal investigation. 
The gangsters, they did not understand that the business requires a lot of work to be 
profitable. Looking at the surface, they thought that everything is happening by itself, and 
ultimately my role was just to collect money. They found out that I had a teenage son and 
two baby girls, and said to me directly: “You have small children, so take care of them, 
and we will take care of your business”. When I refused again, they said that they will do 
whatever it takes to make me surrender. I immediately put my kids on the plane to 
Siberia, to my mother, and myself decided to fight to the end. By then I already had a 
habit of carrying two dictaphones with me at all times, one in the bag, and one on me. 
Occasionally they searched me and took them away, but some records I managed to save. 
For example, I still have a recording of that conversation between my “protectors” and 
Kazan gangsters, where the former agree to share profits from my business, and to 
“eliminate” me. When I went to the police with this recording, I again was told that it was 
my problem and they did not want to get involved. 
This fight with gangsters lasted two years, when by robbing my business and 
attacking me they hoped to scare me into giving up. But I did not. Finally, they simply 
bankrupted me. For that they changed tactics. One day I received a order from the court 
to come to a hearing, where I am accused in not paying a certain firm a large sum of 
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money. At first I could not understand what was going on, I never heard of that firm. 
Having come to the court, I found familiar faces of those who had been after me for two 
years. I knew that I did not sign any of those contracts that these boys claimed I did, but 
after looking at the papers I realized that they were signed by one of six of my managers. 
So finally gangsters found a way to get to me. But I told to the judge that according to 
law, that manager did not have any right to sign financial documents, and plus he did not 
even work for me anymore for quite some time. Despite my objections, these fake 
contracts were taken as a proof that my firm owed money to their firm. Arguments of my 
lawyer were ignored, and when we attempted to submit documents that would prove that 
the contracts were fake, judge refused to consider them. The judge openly told me that if 
I had problems with gangsters it was my own fault that I did not sort it out with them, like 
others do. I simply could not believe this all was happening. 
In one of my numerous conversations with gangsters they said to me that I cannot 
win my fight with them, because they “have it fixed” everywhere, including court. Now I 
remembered that, and it became clear that the judge was bribed. Through some of my 
friends I even knew how much this judge takes for the verdict: $100. So little money, and 
I probably should have offered more to him, but I still believed then that I could win 
simply because I was right, and because I had all the documents to prove it, I only had to 
make them look at them. So I lost that case, but I appealed.  
Meanwhile, since I refused to pay that large sum of money that gangsters wanted 
from me, the court ordered confiscation of all the assets of the firm. By law, if I paid the 
money, I would forfeit my right for an appeal. Theoretically, my property should have 
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been stored in the court’s custody for the duration of the appeal, but instead I saw that my 
opponents got it right away. 
A few years passed since that first hearing, but the case is still lasting. I am actually 
suing them now, but it is dragging very slowly. It’s been about 20 meetings of the court 
on this matter, and something always prevents the judge from reaching the decision. 
Often some witnesses won’t come, or something else will make the judge to put off the 
hearing. I wouldn’t be surprised if these guys paid to this judge, too.  
My basement is now empty, plundered, only rats running around. For that I blame 
not only those gangsters, but mostly actually the Committee of Management of State 
Property (KUGI in Russian abbreviation). When the major troubles hit me in 1996 with 
gangsters, I had to close the salon after all the property was ceased. Clearly, I was short 
of money. By law, if the major renovation has been done in rented premises, the estimate 
of the costs of the renovation can be used toward the rent payment. I made a beautiful 
place out of tiny dirty basement, but KUGI refused to prolong the rent contract anyway. I 
had to stop working because of it. I am suing them now, too, because it was illegal. They 
are generally crooks over there. I remember how I once came there to prolong my 
contract of rent, it was just when my problems with gangsters started. The head of KUGI 
was Gref at that time, who is a minister in the Russian government now, famous person. I 
remember I came to his office, brought all the necessary papers, I thought it was just a 
formality really. And suddenly he tells me with a nasty smile: “This will cost you 10,000 
dollars, for charity. Otherwise I already have an offer with 50,000 dollars, from such-and-
such”, - and he names those gangsters who were trying to take my business away from 
me. I was so angry at this blackmail, but I paid anyway, although my lawyer advised me 
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against it, and I could not really afford it. I learned later that by such means KUGI was 
raising money for renovation of the Philharmonic Hall.  
Now of course I could organize a new enterprise. Everybody thinks that things are 
better now, with both street gangsters and state gangsters, but I don’t believe it. I am 
afraid that I will work hard, and everything will be taken from me once again. Of course, 
I have to do something to support myself and my kids, but now I prefer to work like in 
old days – just with my sewing machine. Of course, I have too much energy and 
knowledge for such work, I did manage a successful enterprise for 10 years, and it is hard 
for me to simply follow somebody’s orders. But I know that one thing that did not change 
in the past ten years is that it is still impossible to work honestly, without hiding anything. 
Taxes are still huge, laws are written in such a way that always leaves inspecting officials 
an opportunity to find a violation and fine you unless you bribe them, and I don’t want to 
bribe anyone. I worked honestly for so many years, I paid all taxes, and what have I got 
from the state in response? Neither police, nor courts helped me against criminals, and I 
lost everything. And what is even worse, is that they destroyed me with the help of the 
state, of the state institutions and state officials. So the main lesson that I learned from my 
ordeal is that the state protects not honest people who work really hard, but criminals.  
And so I am back “underground”, like I was in the middle of 1980s. Although I 
know I could organize a successful business and give jobs to many people. But then I 
would be out in the open again, a prey to all those vultures. In the “underground”, I make 
little money, of course, but at least I do not have fear that any day I can have visitors 
from tax office, from fire department, from sanitary control, from local gang, and that all 
270
of them will be looking for a pretext to make me pay them. I don’t want to work for these 
parasites anymore. 
I think that my story is very typical for small firms that went bankrupt. Extortion by 
gangsters, coupled with extortion by state officials and venality of courts forced all 
honest people out of business, in my opinion. I consider myself lucky, because my kids 
are alive and well, and I got off without long lasting injuries. I lost money, of course. I 
estimate that I lost about quarter of a million dollars that I lost to gang robberies, to 
confiscation, to KUGI that never paid me for renovating their property, to courts for their 
bribed decision, all the money that I made in ten years of hard work. I do have two law 
suits pending, one against those gangsters, and one against KUGI. If I win them, or at 
least one of them, and the court will manage to ensure that the other party pays me what 
they owe, then I will be a rich woman. But I don’t believe in it, although I do keep 
fighting. And I don’t believe in doing business here anymore either. I am happy now 
because I am free, and the only thing that I want for myself now is to get married and to 
simply be a woman. 
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APPENDIX 3: Explanation of the coding technique 
 
In the data collection and analysis for this dissertation research I used multiple case 
study methodology developed by Charles Ragin (1994, 2000). I compiled a data set of 
forty-five cases and applied some of the techniques of multiple case studies in the 
analysis of the cases. One of Ragin’s techniques that I used was his idea of partial set 
membership: instead of having a case fully ‘in’ or fully ‘out’ of the dataset on some 
attribute, a case can be assigned a partial membership, depending on the degree of its 
participation. In Ragin’s view, this feature helps better capture the complexity of the real 
world because it helps avoid the homogenizing bipolarity and instead invites a range of 
in-between possibilities into the analysis. I apply this technique to the analysis of the 
frequencies of use of contract enforcement strategies by the studied firms. It allows me to 
follow the trends in the use of strategies, to distinguish between strategies that used to be 
popular in the past and those that are currently in common use, and also to estimate the 
intensity of their use.  
Four categories of usage of each strategy were identified for each of forty-five 
studied firms:  
“0” – strategy has never been used; 
“1” – strategy has been used once or several times in the past but unlikely to be 
used it again; 
“2” – strategy is currently used to some extent, when necessary or possible; 
“3” – strategy is currently used as a main strategy. 
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Category “0” was the easiest to determine with regard to all strategies but one: 
Information and closed exchange networks, the coding for which will be discussed in 
detail below. A question or a set of questions were asked during the interviews that were 
designed to obtain information about past use of each contract enforcement strategy. For 
example, question 4.1 asked “How do you react to the problem of a violation of 
contract/business agreements?”, and a following subset of questions specified possible 
actions of a firm, like contacting protection agency or suing. An unambiguous answer 
was quite easy to obtain regarding some strategies, like for example the usage state 
courts.  
Category “1” combined the information about a firm’s past use of a strategy with the 
information about a firm’s likely response in a case of a contract violation: question 4.3 
“If you encountered the problem of contract enforcement now, how would you address 
it? Please choose the most likely scenario(s)”. If a respondent said that his/her firm had 
used, for example, its protection agency in the past, but it is not intending to use it again 
in the future (for any reason: bad experience in the past, changed relationships with the 
protection agency, does not have contacts with agency any more at all, etc), then the 
strategy “Protection agencies” is coded as “1” for this firm.  
Categories “2” and “3” were the most difficult to assign. They both refer to those 
cases where a firm’s representative maintained that the strategy was being currently used, 
but the distinction between these two categories is supposed to capture the difference in 
the intensity of usage. This difference is however not identical for “preventive” and 
“coercive” strategies. As discussed in chapter 5, three out of nine strategies are 
“preventive” (Information and closed exchange networks, Professional associations and 
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Financial tools), and the remaining six are “coercive” and work by seeking redress after 
the fact of a transaction and violation. Consequently, the nature of the strategies’ usage 
also differs along these axes. Preventive strategies get employed routinely, on an 
everyday basis, while coercive strategies only get used at times of violations.  
To determine whether a coercive strategy is used occasionally (code “2”) or 
routinely (code “3”), I primarily relied on the qualitative data from the interviews: the 
examples given by participants and the language that they used. If a respondent used an 
assertive language in talking about solutions that his/her firm had to address contract 
violations (question 4.3), gave recent examples and consistently referred to the same 
strategy (strategies) as dominant in their firm’s dealing with contract violations, then this 
strategy was coded as “3”. If however the respondent seemed much less certain about the 
course of action of his/her firm in a case of violation, used indecisive and uncertain 
language, did not have recent examples and/or specifically mentioned that a coercive 
strategy could only be used under extraordinary circumstances, then I coded such strategy 
for such firm as “2”.  
To differentiate the usage of preventive strategies between categories “2” and “3” I 
looked at how each strategy was being used. For example, in evaluating the Financial 
tools strategy I looked if all firm’s transactions with clients required 100% prepayment 
and thus no room for a violation was left (question 2.5[2]; 3.2[1]; 7.12[4]), then the 
strategy was coded as “3” for this firm. If however the amount of prepayment was 
negotiable, could range between 0 and 100% with an average of 30% to 50% and thus 
definitely leaving the room for a violation, and was supplemented by other strategies, 
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then I coded such case as “2” for the use of Information and closed exchange networks as 
a contract enforcement strategy by this firm.  
A similar rationale was employed for assessing the intensity of using Information 
and closed exchange networks. If a firm’s representative said that the firm would only 
trade with a few long-term business partners (questions 2.1; 2.2; 7.3; 7.8), would refuse 
to trade with someone new (questions 7.12[2]; 7.14), and said that the firm does not have 
or expect to have any problems with contract enforcement because they only work with a 
small number of trusted firms (question 3.2[2]; 4.3[6]) then this strategy was coded as 
“3” for this firm. However, if a firm was willing to trade with new partners (questions 
2.1; 2.2; 7.3; 7.8; 7.14), but used its information networks to obtain information about 
new clients/suppliers (question 7.12[1]), had quite a high proportion of old business 
partners and expressed trust in old partners (question 7.2), then this strategy’s use was 
coded as “2”.  
Out of all strategies, the usage of the Information and closed exchange networks was 
the hardest to code. Assigning codes to other strategies required little degree of subjective 
judgment, since it was possible to pose direct questions to respondents about specific 
strategies on the one hand, and determine standards for the coding on the other hand. For 
example, regarding coercive strategies it is all about facts: a firm either used protection 
firms for contract enforcement, or not; either sued another firm for non-payment, or not. 
With the usage of networks the story is much less clear-cut. Respondents may not 
necessarily recognize that they use networks as a safeguard strategy to protect themselves 
against potential losses due to non-payment or other contract violations. It is also harder 
to pinpoint the change in the usage of this enforcement strategy. Thus, to determine how 
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frequently participants of my study relied on the network strategy I asked a number of 
questions throughout the interviews. Apart from a few direct questions regarding the use 
of networks, a wide range of other questions were asked that were meant to indirectly 
indicate reliance on networks for contract enforcement. For example, question 3.5 asked 
whether long-term or new business partners are given priority in a tight financial situation 
(which happens often to nearly all firms); question 4.13 asked about the speed and 
reliability of the dissemination of information about contract breaches. Finally, section 7 
of the questionnaire is fully devoted to relationships between firms and asks questions 
about the level of trust that exists between respondents and their business partners and 
clients, level of formality in communication, and sources of information about business 
partners. The inference about the degree of usage of networks as a contract enforcement 
strategy was made on the basis of all of these questions (2.1; 2.2; 3.2; 3.5; 4.13; 4.14; 7.1 
– 7.14).  
In making a decision about assigning a category of usage for each of eight 
strategies79 (one strategy – Private arbitration courts – had no instances), at times it was a 
judgment call, when all available information did not present a clear-cut solution. I 
believe that the advantage of being able to assess changes in the use of strategies over 
time and intensity of their use is important and justifies bringing in the analysis a certain 
degree of subjectivity that unavoidably accompanied such coding procedures. 
 
79 The full list of codes that denote the use of contract enforcement strategies by all studied firms is found 
in Table 5.5.1 in chapter 5.  
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